Stephen Neale. Facing Facts. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 254 + xi pp.

SATS ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Keyword(s):  
Stephen Neale

Review: Genre by Stephen Neale; Hollywood Genres by Thomas Schatz

1981 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 38-38
Author(s):  
Ernest Callenbach
Keyword(s):  
Stephen Neale

Convenções na direção de arte cinematográfica: um olhar sobre a ficção científica

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felipe Muanis ◽  
Mariana Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Science Fiction ◽  
Feature Film ◽  
Blade Runner ◽  
The Future ◽  
Science Fiction Films ◽  
Spike Jonze ◽  
Stephen Neale

The elements of cinematographic language can be used in many ways to portray a story. It appears that, over the years, many conventions have been established in different areas of cinematographic making. In this article, we aim to highlight the conventions of the science fiction genre, with a focus on the art direction of movies that portray the future. For this, films such as Ex_Machina (Alex Garland, 2014), Equals (Drake Doremus, 2015) and Blade Runner 2049 (Denis Villeneuve, 2017) are analyzed. Also noteworthy, is the feature film Her (Spike Jonze, 2013) as a work that goes against the others, which presents an approach to the future that stands out among so many other movies with scenarios and costumes similar to each other. As a basis for the research, the study of conventions by sociologist Howard Becker is used, in addition to the work by theorists David Bordwell, Rick Altman, Stephen Neale, Marcel Martin, Vincent Lobrutto, among others. Directors and their artistic departments use colors, shapes, materials, textures, and elements that have become conventions in science fiction films and few are those who dare to produce something aesthetically different.

scholarly journals Semantic Ambiguity Explained in the Framework of Cognitive Economy

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-93
Author(s):  
Lixing Mida Chu
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Data ◽  
Semantic Ambiguity ◽  
Cognitive Economy ◽  
Occam’S Razor ◽  
Referential Use ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Stephen Neale ◽  
Occam's Razor

In “Context and Communication” Stephen Neale argues that the referential use of descriptions differs from the attributive use only in the pragmatics, making referential descriptions applicable to Russellian analysis. Marga Reimer disagrees with Neale’s view and argues that the difference is in the semantics, making referential descriptions semantically ambiguous. In this paper, I argue that Neale’s Modified Occam’s Razor overlooks the behavioral data of how we actually use language. I attempt to accommodate the strength of both Neale’s and Reimer’s explanations, putting them in a framework governed by the principle of cognitive economy

The Logical Form of Descriptions

Dialogue ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 677-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Linsky
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Systematic Theory ◽  
Referential Use ◽  
Central Interest ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions ◽  
The One ◽  
Stephen Neale

Stephen Neale defends Russell's famous theory of definite descriptions against more than 40 years' worth of criticisms beginning long before Strawson's “On Referring.” Ever since Strawson's parting shot in that paper (“… ordinary language has no exact logic”), the theory of descriptions has been a battleground for the larger issue of whether a systematic theory of the semantics of natural language is really possible. Neale provides us with a sketch of part of that project as it currently stands. All of the complexities and irregularities of the use of definite descriptions in natural language can be combined, after all, in a single theory based on an “exact logic.” Neale argues that one can give a Russellian account of “incomplete descriptions” (as in ‘The table is covered with books’), generic uses of ‘the’ (‘The whale is a mammal’), plural descriptions (‘The men carried the piano’) and, of central interest, the purportedly referential uses identified by Donnellan (as in ‘The murderer of Smith is insane’ when it is Jones the accused we have in mind). Neale follows familiar answers to these objections; incorporate demonstratives into the account (to get ‘The table over there …’), distinguish the proposition expressed from the one meant (the “referential” use is what was meant not said), and point out that the problem is not unique to definite descriptions and so cannot be a fault of any particular theory of them (many expressions have generic, plural and “referential” uses).

scholarly journals Collapsing Arguments for Facts and Propositions

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Howard Sobel
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
Stephen Neale

Kurt Gödel argues in “Russell’s Mathematical Logic” that on the assumption that, contrary to Russell, definite descriptions are terms, it follows given only several “apparently obvious axioms” that “all true sentences have the same signification (as well as all false ones).” Stephen Neale has written that this argument, and others by Church, Davidson, and Quine to similar conclusions, are of considerable philosophical interest. Graham Oppy, responding to this opinion, says they are of minimal interest. Falling between these is my opinion that implications of these arguments for propositions and facts are of moderate philosophical interest, and that these arguments provide occasions for reflection of possible interest on fine lines of several theories of definite descriptions and class–abstractions.

Definite descriptions, A reader, edited by Gary Ostertag, Bradford books, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1998, xii + 411 pp. - Gary Ostertag, Introduction, Pp. 1–34. - Bertrand Russell, On denoting, A reprint of 1119. Pp. 35–49. - A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, From Principia mathematica, A reprint of pp. 30–32, 66–71, 173–175 of 1941. Pp. 51–65. - Bertrand Russell, Descriptions, A reprint of pp. 167–180 of 11126. Pp. 67–77. - Stephen Neale, Grammatical form, logical form, and incomplete symbols. A reprint of LXI 1391. Pp. 79–121. - Rudolf Carnap, From Meaning and necessity, A reprint of pp. 32–42 of XIV 237. Pp. 123–133. - P. F. Strawson, On referring, A reprint of XVIII 87, Pp. 135–160. - Karel Lambert, A theory of definite descriptions, A revised reprint of XXXII 252(1, 3) with altered title, Pp. 161–171. (Reprinted from Philosophical applications of free logic, edited by Karel Lambert, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 1991, pp. 17–27). - Keith Donnellan, Reference and definite descriptions, A reprint of XL 276(12), Pp. 173–193. - H. P. Grice, From “Vacuous names,” A reprint of pp. 138–144 of XL 479(7), Pp. 195–200. - Christopher Peacocke, Proper names, reference, and rigid designation, Pp. 201–224. (Reprinted from Meaning, reference and necessity, New studies in semantics, edited by Simon Blackburn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge etc. 1975, pp. 109–132.) - Saul Kripke, Speaker's reference and semantic reference, Pp. 225–256. (Reprinted from Contemporary perspectives in the philosophy of language, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1979, pp. 6–27; also in Studies in the philosophy of language, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 2, The University of Minnesota, Morris 1977, pp. 255–276.) - Howard Wettstein, Demonstrative reference and definite descriptions, Pp. 257–273. (Reprinted from Philosophical studies, vol. 40 (1981), pp. 241–257.) - Scott Soames, Incomplete definite descriptions, Pp. 275–308. (Reprinted from Notre Dame journal of formal logic, vol. 27 (1986), pp. 349–375.) - Stephen Neale, Context and communication, Pp. 309–368. (Reprinted from Stephen Neale, Descriptions, Bradford books, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1990, pp. 62–117.) - Stephen Schiffer, Descriptions, indexicals, and belief reports: some dilemmas (but not the ones you expect). Pp. 369–395. (Reprinted from Mind, n.s. vol. 104 (1995), pp. 107–131.)

1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 1371-1374
Author(s):  
Delia Graff
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
University Of Minnesota ◽  
Simon Blackburn ◽  
Christopher Peacocke ◽  
The University ◽  
Stephen Neale
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