The Role of the Actinides in a Performance Assessment of a Nuclear Waste Repository. SKB's Supporting Actinide Research

2010 ◽  
Vol 1265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Werme ◽  
Sergei Butorin ◽  
Peter M Oppeneer

AbstractAfter a few hundred years, the actinides will dominate the radiotoxicity of spent nuclear fuel. This does not necessarily mean that the actinides will dominate the dose to organisms at the surface above a geologic repository. Quite the contrary, in most performance assessments this dose is dominated by long-lived fission products, activation products and, in the very long perspective, actinide daughters.This makes the far-field migration properties of the actinides less interesting for further research. There are, however, other aspects of the presence of actinides in spent nuclear fuel and some of these and SKB's research in these fields is presented and discussed here.

2003 ◽  
Vol 807 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Wikberg ◽  
Kaj Ahlbom ◽  
Olle Olsson

ABSTRACTThe Swedish nuclear waste management programme has entered the site investigation phase. Early 2002 SKB received permission from the municipalities of Östhammar and Oskarshamn to perform site investigations for a potential deep geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel. The goal of the site investigation phase is to obtain a permit to build the deep repository for spent nuclear fuel. In parallel with the investigations, consultations will be held with county administrative boards, regulatory authorities and municipalities, as well as with members of the public.


Author(s):  
Ed Rodwell ◽  
Albert Machiels

There has been a resurgence of interest in the possibility of processing the US spent nuclear fuel, instead of burying it in a geologic repository. Accordingly, key topical findings from three relevant EPRI evaluations made in the 1990–1995 timeframe are recapped and updated to accommodate a few developments over the subsequent ten years. Views recently expressed by other US entities are discussed. Processing aspects thereby addressed include effects on waste disposal and on geologic repository capacity, impacts on the economics of the nuclear fuel cycle and of the overall nuclear power scenario, alternative dispositions of the plutonium separated by the processing, impacts on the structure of the perceived weapons proliferation risk, and challenges for the immediate future and for the current half-century. Currently, there is a statutory limit of 70,000 metric tons on the amount of nuclear waste materials that can be accepted at Yucca Mountain. The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the project analyzed emplacement of up to 120,000 metric tons of nuclear waste products in the repository. Additional scientific analyses suggest significantly higher capacity could be achieved with changes in the repository configuration that use only geology that has already been characterized and do not deviate from existing design parameters. Conservatively assuming the repository capacity postulated in the EIS, the need date for a second repository is essentially deferrable until that determined by a potential new nuclear plant deployment program. A further increase in technical capacity of the first repository (and further and extensive delay to the need date for a second repository) is potentially achievable by processing the spent fuel to remove the plutonium (and at least the americium too), provided the plutonium and the americium are then comprehensively burnt. The burning of some of the isotopes involved would need fast reactors (discounting for now a small possibility that one of several recently postulated alternatives will prove superior overall). However, adoption of processing would carry a substantial cost burden and reliability of the few demonstration fast reactors built to-date has been poor. Trends and developments could remove these obstacles to the processing scenario, possibly before major decisions on a second repository become necessary, which need not be until mid-century at the earliest. Pending the outcomes of these long-term trends and developments, economics and reliability encourage us to stay with non-processing for the near term at least. Besides completing the Yucca Mountain program, the two biggest and inter-related fuel-cycle needs today are for a nationwide consensus on which processing technology offers the optimum mix of economic competitiveness and proliferation resistance and for a sustained effort to negotiate greater international cooperation and safeguards. Equally likely to control the readiness schedule is development/demonstration of an acceptable, reliable and affordable fast reactor.


Author(s):  
Joosep Pata ◽  
Alan H. Tkaczyk

It is necessary to consider the complexities of both natural and engineered components of a nuclear waste repository since fission products and minor actinides remain harmful to the environment for tens of thousands of years. In safety and performance assessments often used in decision-making about repository designs, the effect of uncertain initial guesses on the models’ output must be understood. As the necessary safe times and hence the simulated times are often in the order of magnitude of hundreds of thousands of years, uncertain initial values become increasingly important. To minimize the danger from high-level radioactive waste and to make informed decisions over designs, sensitivity analysis of the models used should be performed. The Simplified Total System Performance Assessment (STSPA) model developed by Golder Associates Inc., Booz-Allen Hamilton, Stone and Webster and the University of Nevada Reno and used in the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository performance assessment is analyzed for sensitivity by varying the activities of technetium-99 and iodine-129 by several orders of magnitude. The resultant dose to a maximally-exposed individual over time periods of 100,000 and 1,000,000 years is compared to the relevant regulatory limits. Incorrect estimates can be seen to have large effects on the behavior of the model while the method used allows conclusions to be drawn about the robustness of the model.


2021 ◽  
Vol 286 ◽  
pp. 106087
Author(s):  
María Victoria Villar ◽  
Beatriz Carbonell ◽  
Pedro Luis Martín ◽  
Carlos Gutiérrez-Álvarez

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-42
Author(s):  
Md Akhlak Bin Aziz ◽  
Afrin Ahsan ◽  
Md Monsurul Islam Khan ◽  
Zahid Hasan Mahmood

Separation of heat generating, high level fission product caesium and strontium from spent nuclear fuel boosts the capacity of waste repositories by as much as fifty times. For efficient use of already scarce repositories, separation of such fission products is mandatory. Separations of caesium and strontium using Chlorinated Cobalt Dicarbollide (CCD), PEG (Polyethylene Glycol), UNEX process and by Calixarenes or Fission Product Extraction Process (FPEX) were discussed. The UNEX method was then proposed as the most feasible method option. Following separation, nuclear waste immobilization techniques for such high-level fission product were discussed. The techniques included usage of concrete, glass and synthetic rock. Among them synthetic rock was identified as the most suitable one for immobilization of high-level nuclear waste. Finally, a safe disposal system with necessary required geology was shown for safe disposal of the waste.Journal of Chemical Engineering, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2017: 37-42


MRS Bulletin ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 24-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.H. Johnson ◽  
L.O. Werme

The geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel is currently under consideration in many countries. Most of this fuel is in the form of assemblies of zirconium-alloy-clad rods containing enriched (1–4% 235U) or natural (0.71% 235U) uranium oxide pellets. Approximately 135,000 Mg are presently in temporary storage facilities throughout the world in nations with commercial nuclear power stations.Safe geologic disposal of nuclear waste could be achieved using a combination of a natural barrier (the host rock of the repository) and engineered barriers, which would include a low-solubility waste form, long-lived containers, and clay- and cement-based barriers surrounding the waste containers and sealing the excavations.A requirement in evaluating the safety of disposal of nuclear waste is a knowledge of the kinetics and mechanism of dissolution of the waste form in groundwater and the solubility of the waste form constituents. In the case of spent nuclear fuel, this means developing an understanding of fuel microstructure, its impact on release of contained fission products, and the dissolution behavior of spent fuel and of UO2, the principal constituent of the fuel.


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