The MacArthur Maze Fire and Roadway Collapse: A “Worst Case Scenario” for Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation?

Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Harold Adkins ◽  
Judith Cuta ◽  
Nicholas Klymyshyn ◽  
...  

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred near Oakland, California, at the interchange known as the “MacArthur Maze.” The accident involved a double tanker truck of gasoline overturning and bursting into flames. The subsequent fire reduced the strength of the supporting steel structure of an overhead interstate roadway causing the collapse of portions of that overpass onto the lower roadway in less than 20 minutes. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has analyzed what might have happened had a spent nuclear fuel transportation package been involved in this accident, to determine if there are any potential regulatory implications of this accident to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper provides a summary of this effort, presents preliminary results and conclusions, and discusses future work related to the NRC’s analysis of the consequences of this type of severe accident.

Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton

In 2007, two severe transportation accidents occurred in the state of California. The first occurred in Oakland on a section of Interstate 880 known as the “MacArthur Maze” and involved a tractor trailer carrying gasoline which impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire caused the collapse of a portion of the Interstate 580 overpass onto the remains of the tractor trailer in less than 20 minutes, due to a reduction of strength in the structural steel exposed to the fire. The second incident was a chain-reaction accident involving over thirty tractor trailers in the Interstate 5 “Newhall Pass” truck bypass tunnel in Santa Clarita. This accident also involved an intense fire, fueled mostly by produce and other food commodities, that damaged the concrete walls of the tunnel and required the tunnel to be closed for repairs. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is in the process of studying both of these accidents to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper will summarize work recently completed on these severe transportation accidents by the NRC.


Author(s):  
Todd S. Mintz ◽  
George Adams ◽  
Marius Necsoiu ◽  
James Mancillas ◽  
Chris Bajwa ◽  
...  

As the regulatory authority for transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires that SNF transportation packages be designed to endure a fully engulfing fire with an average temperature of 800 °C (1,475 °F) for 30 minutes, as prescribed in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71. The work described in this paper was performed to support NRC in determining the types of accident parameters that could produce a severe fire with the potential to fully engulf a SNF transportation package. This paper describes the process that was used to characterize the important features of rail accidents that would potentially lead to a spent nuclear fuel transport package being involved in a severe fire. Historical rail accidents involving hazardous material and long duration fires in the United States have been analyzed using data from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). Parameters that were evaluated from this data include, but were not limited to, class of track where the accident occurred, class of hazardous material that was being transported, and number of railcars involved in the fire. The data analysis revealed that in the past 34 years of rail transport, roughly 1,800 accidents have led to the release of hazardous materials resulting in a frequency of roughly 1 accident per 10 million freight train miles. In the last 12 years, there have only been 20 accidents involving multiple car hazardous material releases that led to a fire. This results in an accident rate of 0.003 accidents per million freight train miles that involved multiple car releases and a fire. In all the accidents analyzed, only one involved a railcar carrying Class 7 (i.e., radioactive) hazardous material (HAZMAT).


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an analysis of historical rail accidents (from 1975 to 2005) involving hazardous materials and long duration fires in the United States. The analysis was initiated to determine what types of accidents had occurred and what impact those types of accidents could have on the rail transport of spent nuclear fuel. The NRC found that almost 21 billion miles of freight rail shipments over a 30 year period had resulted in a small number of accidents involving the release of hazardous materials, eight of which involved long duration fires. All eight of the accidents analyzed resulted in fires that were less severe than the “fully engulfing fire” described as a hypothetical accident condition in the NRC regulations for radioactive material transport found in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Section 73. None of the eight accidents involved a release of radioactive material. This paper describes the eight accidents in detail and examines the potential effects on spent nuclear fuel transportation packages exposed to the fires that resulted from these accidents.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Darrell S. Dunn ◽  
Robert E. Shewmaker

In 2007, two severe transportation accidents, involving primarily long-haul tractor trailers, occurred in the State of California. In the first, which occurred in Oakland in the “MacArthur Maze” section of Interstate 580, a tractor trailer carrying gasoline impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire, which burned for over 2 hours, led to the collapse of the overpass onto the remains of the tractor trailer, due to the loss of strength in the steel exposed to the fire. The second incident was a chain-reaction accident involving several tractor trailers in the I-5 “Newhall Pass” truck bypass tunnel in Santa Clarita. This accident also involved an intense fire that damaged the tunnel and required the closing of the tunnel for repairs to the concrete walls. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is studying both these accidents to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of radioactive materials and spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper will provide a summary of that effort.


Author(s):  
Nicholas A. Klymyshyn ◽  
Harold E. Adkins ◽  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Jason M. Piotter

The evaluation of spent nuclear fuel storage casks and transportation packages under impact loading is an important safety topic that is reviewed as part of cask and package certification by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Explicit dynamic finite element models of full systems are increasingly common in industry for determining structural integrity during hypothetical drop accidents. Full cask and package model results are also used as the loading basis for single fuel pin impact models, which evaluate the response of fuel cladding under drop conditions. In this paper, a simplified package system is evaluated to illustrate several important structural dynamic phenomena, including the effect of gaps between components, the difference in local response at various points on a package during impact, and the effect of modeling various simplified representations of the basket and fuel assemblies. This paper focuses on the package impact analysis, and how loading conditions for a subsequent fuel assembly or fuel cladding analysis can be extracted.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 section 73(c)(4), (10 CFR 71.73(c)(4)) requires that transportation packages used to ship radioactive material must be designed to resist an engulfing fire of a 30 minute duration and prevent release of radioactive material to the environment. In July, 2001, a derailed train carrying hazardous materials caught fire in a railroad tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland, and burned for several days. Although the occurrence of a fire of such duration during the shipment of spent nuclear fuel is unlikely, questions were raised about the performance of spent nuclear fuel casks under conditions similar to those experienced in the Baltimore tunnel fire incident. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission evaluates the performance of spent fuel transportation casks under accident conditions. The National Transportation Safety Board is responsible for investigating railroad accidents and identifying the probable cause(s) and offers recommendations for safety improvements. They are currently investigating the Baltimore tunnel fire accident. This paper assesses the performance of a spent fuel transportation cask with a welded canister under severe fire conditions. The paper describes the analytic model used for the assessment and presents a discussion of the preliminary results.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has completed a study of historical rail accidents (from 1975 to 2005) involving hazardous materials and long duration fires in the United States. The study was initiated to determine what types of accidents had actually occurred, and what type of impact those types of accidents could have on the rail transport of spent nuclear fuel. The NRC found that almost 21 billion miles of rail shipments has yielded only a small number of accidents involving hazardous materials, eight of which involved both hazardous materials and long duration fires. The NRC reviewed these eight accidents in detail to determine what types of effects these accidents might have on a spent fuel cask, should one have been involved. The staff determined that the fires witnessed in the accidents studied would not have provided a fully engulfing fire environment as described by the hypothetical accident condition fire in NRC regulations for radioactive material transport found in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Section 73. This paper will detail the NRC study of these accidents and conclusions regarding effects on transportation casks exposed to the fires that resulted from these accidents.


2002 ◽  
Vol 757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Kiess ◽  
Stephen H. Hanauer

ABSTRACTThe Yucca Mountain site was designated in July 2002 as the United States' location for a geological repository for spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes. This site designation was a watershed event in the history of the project, enabling the U.S. Department of Energy to seek a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to construct and operate a geologic repository. Summarized below are the history and technical basis for this site designation and some key anticipated future events. Many of the significant events to date have been framed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (and Amendments) and the requirements of the regulatory standard.


2012 ◽  
Vol 135 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas A. Klymyshyn ◽  
Harold E. Adkins ◽  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Jason M. Piotter

The evaluation of spent nuclear fuel storage casks and transportation packages under impact loading is an important part of cask and package certification by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Finite element models are increasingly used for evaluating cask and package structural integrity during hypothetical drop accidents. Full cask and package model results are also used as the loading basis for single fuel pin impact models, which evaluate the response of fuel cladding under drop conditions. In this paper, a simplified package system is evaluated to illustrate the difference between local and bulk impact responses, the effect of simplified basket and fuel assembly representations, and the effect of gaps between components. This paper focuses on the package impact analysis and how loading conditions for a subsequent fuel assembly or fuel cladding analysis can be extracted. The results of this study suggest that detailed package system models are needed to determine cladding deceleration load histories.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua M Milnes ◽  
Elizabeth H Beers

Abstract Trissolcus japonicus (Ashmead), an Asian parasitoid of Halyomorpha halys (Stål) (Hemiptera: Pentatomidae), was first detected in North America in 2014. Although testing in quarantine facilities as a candidate for classical biological control is ongoing, adventive populations have appeared in multiple sites in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Extensive laboratory testing of T. japonicus against other North American pentatomids and H. halys has revealed a higher rate of parasitism of H. halys, but not complete host specificity. However, laboratory tests are necessarily artificial, in which many host finding and acceptance cues may be circumvented. We offered sentinel egg masses of three native pentatomid (Hemiptera: Pentatomidae) pest species (Chinavia hilaris (Say), Euschistus conspersus Uhler, and Chlorochroa ligata (Say)) in a field paired-host assay in an area with a well-established adventive population of T. japonicus near Vancouver, WA. Overall, 67% of the H. halys egg masses were parasitized by T. japonicus during the 2-yr study. Despite the ‘worst case’ scenario for a field test (close proximity of the paired egg masses), the rate of parasitism (% eggs producing adult wasps) on all three native species was significantly less (0.4–8%) than that on H. halys eggs (77%). The levels of successful parasitism of T. japonicus of the three species are C. hilaris > E. conspersus > C. ligata. The potential impact of T. japonicus on these pentatomids is probably minimal.


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