Training in the Application of the ASME Code to Transportation Packaging of Radioactive Materials

Author(s):  
V. N. Shah ◽  
B. Shelton ◽  
R. Fabian ◽  
S. W. Tam ◽  
Y. Y. Liu ◽  
...  

The Department of Energy has established guidelines for the qualifications and training of technical experts preparing and reviewing the safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) and transportation of radioactive materials. One of the qualifications is a working knowledge of, and familiarity with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, referred to hereafter as the ASME Code. DOE is sponsoring a course on the application of the ASME Code to the transportation packaging of radioactive materials. The course addresses both ASME design requirements and the safety requirements in the federal regulations. The main objective of this paper is to describe the salient features of the course, with the focus on the application of Section III, Divisions 1 and 3, and Section VIII of the ASME Code to the design and construction of the containment vessel and other packaging components used for transportation (and storage) of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The training course includes the ASME Code-related topics that are needed to satisfy all Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation Part 71 (10 CFR 71). Specifically, the topics include requirements for materials, design, fabrication, examination, testing, and quality assurance for containment vessels, bolted closures, components to maintain subcriticality, and other packaging components. The design addresses thermal and pressure loading, fatigue, nonductile fracture and buckling of these components during both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions described in 10 CFR 71. Various examples are drawn from the review of certificate applications for Type B and fissile material transportation packagings.

Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Darrell S. Dunn

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred in Oakland, California in what is commonly known as the “MacArthur Maze” section of Interstate 580 (I-580). The accident involved a tractor trailer carrying gasoline that impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire burned for over 2 hours and led to the collapse of the overpass due to the loss of strength in the structural steel that supported the overpass. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) studied this accident to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel. This paper will discuss the details of the NRC’s MacArthur Maze fire investigation.


2002 ◽  
Vol 757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Kiess ◽  
Stephen H. Hanauer

ABSTRACTThe Yucca Mountain site was designated in July 2002 as the United States' location for a geological repository for spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes. This site designation was a watershed event in the history of the project, enabling the U.S. Department of Energy to seek a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to construct and operate a geologic repository. Summarized below are the history and technical basis for this site designation and some key anticipated future events. Many of the significant events to date have been framed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (and Amendments) and the requirements of the regulatory standard.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Paul T. Mann

The Department of Energy (DOE) has been shipping university reactor fuels and other fissile materials in the 110-gallon Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M container for over 20 years. The DOT 6M container has been the workhorse for many DOE programs. However, packages designed and used according to the Specification 6M (U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, 49 CFR 178.354; 2003) do not conform to the latest package safety requirements in 10 CFR 71, especially performance under hypothetical accident conditions. For that reason, the 6M specification containers are being terminated by the DOT. Packages designed to the 6M specification will no longer be allowed for in-commerce shipments after October 1, 2008. To meet on-going transportation needs, DOE evaluated several different concepts for replacing the 110-gallon 6M. After this evaluation, DOE selected the Y-12 National Security Complex for the project. The new Y-12 container, designated the ES-4100 shipping container, will have a capacity of four times the current 6M and will be certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The ES-4100 project began in September 2006 and prototypes of the new container are now being fabricated. Details on the design features and the upcoming regulatory testing of this new container are discussed in this paper.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Kenneth E. Sanders

The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M containers had been the workhorse bulk Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) shipping containers for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) and many other shippers for over 20 years. This DOT specification container was terminated for shipment of radioactive material on September 30, 2008. The anticipation of this action prompted DOE to develop and implement the ES-3100 shipping container as a replacement for the 6M. The ES-3100 was first licensed in April 2006. Since then, the license has been revised nine times. The ES-3100 was operationally ready for use at several sites by September 2007, and is now in being used on a regular basis for materials that had been shipped in the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 has also been certified for air transport, in support of foreign research reactor fuel supply and international nonproliferation efforts. This container has a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and a Competent Authority Certificate from the DOT. The utility of the ES-3100 continues to grow. The ES-3100 CoC allows many forms of fissile material to be shipped, and continues to be amended to authorize additional contents for a variety of shippers. This paper will identify the currently certified contents for the ES-3100 and the planned certificate amendments to expand the content basis, as well as the approach to add new contents to the CoC. The path to becoming a user of the ES-3100 will be outlined. Operational requirements for this container, handling tools and non-standard operating tools needed for the use of this container will be covered. Readiness requirements, maintenance issues, training, and lessons learned will also be discussed. This paper will provide the information necessary for organizations to obtain ES-3100 containers, the special tools, adequate training, and any other information that would be helpful for a site to be able to use this fissile, radioactive material shipping container system.


1984 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Steindler ◽  
W. B. Seefeldt

Some nuclear waste is destined for disposal in deep geological formations. The disposal system for wastes from commercial nuclear activities, and perhaps also for high-level wastes from defense-related activities, is to be designed and operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) and licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Nuclear Waste Policy Act [1] outlines some of the procedures and schedules that are to be followed by DOE in carrying out its assignment in the disposal of high-level nuclear waste (HLW). The regulations of the NRC that deal with HLW [2] are only partly in place, and amendments (e.g., related to the unsaturated zone) are yet to be approved and issued. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has issued only draft versions of the regulations pertaining to HLW disposal [3], but key features of these drafts are at present in adequate agreement with NRC documents. On the basis of the trends that have become evident in the last few years, the DOE will be required to substantiate performance predictions for all pertinent aspects of a repository, especially the performance of the engineered waste package. The basis for demonstrating that the waste package performance in the repository will be in concert with the requirements is data on the waste package materials. These key materials data must clearly be highly reliable, and DOE will be required to assure this reliability. This paper addresses the organization and functions that have been assembled to aid in establishing the quality of materials data that are important in the licensing of a waste repository.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 section 73(c)(4), (10 CFR 71.73(c)(4)) requires that transportation packages used to ship radioactive material must be designed to resist an engulfing fire of a 30 minute duration and prevent release of radioactive material to the environment. In July, 2001, a derailed train carrying hazardous materials caught fire in a railroad tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland, and burned for several days. Although the occurrence of a fire of such duration during the shipment of spent nuclear fuel is unlikely, questions were raised about the performance of spent nuclear fuel casks under conditions similar to those experienced in the Baltimore tunnel fire incident. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission evaluates the performance of spent fuel transportation casks under accident conditions. The National Transportation Safety Board is responsible for investigating railroad accidents and identifying the probable cause(s) and offers recommendations for safety improvements. They are currently investigating the Baltimore tunnel fire accident. This paper assesses the performance of a spent fuel transportation cask with a welded canister under severe fire conditions. The paper describes the analytic model used for the assessment and presents a discussion of the preliminary results.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Harold Adkins ◽  
Judith Cuta ◽  
Nicholas Klymyshyn ◽  
...  

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred near Oakland, California, at the interchange known as the “MacArthur Maze.” The accident involved a double tanker truck of gasoline overturning and bursting into flames. The subsequent fire reduced the strength of the supporting steel structure of an overhead interstate roadway causing the collapse of portions of that overpass onto the lower roadway in less than 20 minutes. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has analyzed what might have happened had a spent nuclear fuel transportation package been involved in this accident, to determine if there are any potential regulatory implications of this accident to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper provides a summary of this effort, presents preliminary results and conclusions, and discusses future work related to the NRC’s analysis of the consequences of this type of severe accident.


Author(s):  
Amir Ali ◽  
Edward D. Blandford

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated a generic safety issue (GSI-191) assessing debris accumulation and resultant chemical effects on pressurized water reactor (PWR) sump performance. GSI-191 has been investigated using reduced-scale separate-effects testing and integral-effects testing facilities. These experiments focused on developing a procedure to generate prototypical debris beds that provide stable and reproducible conventional head loss (CHL). These beds also have the ability to filter out chemical precipitates resulting in chemical head loss. The newly developed procedure presented in this paper is used to generate debris beds with different particulate to fiber ratios (η). Results from this experimental investigation show that the prepared beds can provide reproducible CHL for different η in a single and multivertical loops facility within ±7% under the same flow conditions. The measured CHL values are consistent with the predicted values using the NUREG-6224 correlation. Also, the results showed that the prepared debris beds following the proposed procedure are capable of detecting standard aluminum and calcium precipitates, and the head loss increase (chemical head loss) was measured and reported in this paper.


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