Scan-Based Side-Channel Attack on the Camellia Block Cipher Using Scan Signatures

Author(s):  
Huiqian JIANG ◽  
Mika FUJISHIRO ◽  
Hirokazu KODERA ◽  
Masao YANAGISAWA ◽  
Nozomu TOGAWA
2012 ◽  
Vol 546-547 ◽  
pp. 1489-1494
Author(s):  
Yi Kun Hu ◽  
Zun Yang Qin

Among the block cipher algorithms, AES or DES is an excellent and preferred choice for most block cipher applications. But AES and DES are not very suitable for hardware implementation because of the high cost that they require large areas of routing and the processing efficiency is low, relatively. So lightweight cipher algorithms come into beings, among which PRESENT is very competitive. Along with the structure of a message authentication algorithm ALRED, a new family of Tunable Lightweight MAC based on PRESENT is proposed, that is TuLP. However, PRESENT is not able to resist side channel attack, so is TuLP, of course. For the above reason, in this paper, we provide an improvement of PRESENT by inserting random dummy cycles as well as shuffling to strengthen the security of PRESENT against side channel attacks. We will implement PRESENT and TuLP in Verilog and do simulation on Xilinx ISim platform. At last, we would like to provide the power analyzing of Xilinx XPower.


Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 1438
Author(s):  
Krithika Dhananjay ◽  
Emre Salman

SIMON is a block cipher developed to provide flexible security options for lightweight hardware applications such as the Internet-of-things (IoT). Safeguarding such resource-constrained hardware from side-channel attacks poses a significant challenge. Adiabatic circuit operation has recently received attention for such applications due to ultra-low power consumption. In this work, a charge-based methodology is developed to mount a correlation power analysis (CPA) based side-channel attack to an adiabatic SIMON core. The charge-based method significantly reduces the attack complexity by reducing the required number of power samples by two orders of magnitude. The CPA results demonstrate that the required measurements-to-disclosure (MTD) to retrieve the secret key of an adiabatic SIMON core is 4× higher compared to a conventional static CMOS based implementation. The effect of increase in the target signal load capacitance on the MTD is also investigated. It is observed that the MTD can be reduced by half if the load driven by the target signal is increased by 2× for an adiabatic SIMON, and by 5× for a static CMOS based SIMON. This sensitivity to target signal capacitance of the adiabatic SIMON can pose a serious concern by facilitating a more efficient CPA attack.


2012 ◽  
Vol 132 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-12
Author(s):  
Yu-ichi Hayashi ◽  
Naofumi Homma ◽  
Takaaki Mizuki ◽  
Takafumi Aoki ◽  
Hideaki Sone

Author(s):  
Daisuke FUJIMOTO ◽  
Toshihiro KATASHITA ◽  
Akihiko SASAKI ◽  
Yohei HORI ◽  
Akashi SATOH ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Hiroaki MIZUNO ◽  
Keisuke IWAI ◽  
Hidema TANAKA ◽  
Takakazu KUROKAWA

IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 22480-22492
Author(s):  
Yoo-Seung Won ◽  
Dong-Guk Han ◽  
Dirmanto Jap ◽  
Shivam Bhasin ◽  
Jong-Yeon Park

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
Somdip Dey ◽  
Amit Kumar Singh ◽  
Klaus McDonald-Maier

Side-channel attacks remain a challenge to information flow control and security in mobile edge devices till this date. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing cores are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In this paper, we study how computer vision-based convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could be used to exploit temperature (thermal) side-channel attack on different Linux governors in mobile edge device utilizing multi-processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). We also designed a power- and memory-efficient CNN model that is capable of performing thermal side-channel attack on the MPSoC and can be used by industry practitioners and academics as a benchmark to design methodologies to secure against such an attack in MPSoC.


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