Technical Stability Conditions for Controlled Processes with Lumped Parameters

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-116
Author(s):  
Konstantin S. Matviychuk
1972 ◽  
Vol 27 (02) ◽  
pp. 361-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter H. Seegers ◽  
Lowell E. McCoy
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Luz Gonzalez-Gadea ◽  
Antonella Dominguez ◽  
Agustin Petroni

Children tend to punish norm transgressions, even when they are mere external observers—a phenomenon known as third-party punishment. This behavior is influenced by group biases, as children unevenly punish in-group and out-group members.Two opposing hypotheses have been proposed to explain group biases during third-party punishment: the Norms-Focused Hypothesis predicts that individuals punish more harshly selfishness by in-group than by out-group members; contrarily, the Mere Preferences Hypothesis predicts that people are more lenient to selfishness by in-group than by out-group members. Here, we tested these hypotheses in children between six and 11 years of age (N=124) and explored the mechanisms underlying group biases during the development of third-party punishment. Our results supported the Norms-Focused Hypothesis: children preferentially punished unfair sharing from in-group members evidencing in-group policing bias, and they were also more willing to punish selfishness directed at in-group members than out-group members, showing in-group favoritism bias. We observed different developmental trajectories and mechanisms associated with these biases: while in-group policing remained stable over childhood as automatic as well as more effortful and controlled processes, in-group favoritism increases with age and was manifested only in the context of more controlled processes. These results shed light on the mechanisms underlying the development of third-party decisions and could be used to plan strategies and interventions to manipulate group biases in children.


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