Children’s Group Biases In Third-Party Punishment Are Guided By Norms-Focused Behaviors

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Luz Gonzalez-Gadea ◽  
Antonella Dominguez ◽  
Agustin Petroni
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Trajectories ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Controlled Processes ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Shed Light

Children tend to punish norm transgressions, even when they are mere external observers—a phenomenon known as third-party punishment. This behavior is influenced by group biases, as children unevenly punish in-group and out-group members.Two opposing hypotheses have been proposed to explain group biases during third-party punishment: the Norms-Focused Hypothesis predicts that individuals punish more harshly selfishness by in-group than by out-group members; contrarily, the Mere Preferences Hypothesis predicts that people are more lenient to selfishness by in-group than by out-group members. Here, we tested these hypotheses in children between six and 11 years of age (N=124) and explored the mechanisms underlying group biases during the development of third-party punishment. Our results supported the Norms-Focused Hypothesis: children preferentially punished unfair sharing from in-group members evidencing in-group policing bias, and they were also more willing to punish selfishness directed at in-group members than out-group members, showing in-group favoritism bias. We observed different developmental trajectories and mechanisms associated with these biases: while in-group policing remained stable over childhood as automatic as well as more effortful and controlled processes, in-group favoritism increases with age and was manifested only in the context of more controlled processes. These results shed light on the mechanisms underlying the development of third-party decisions and could be used to plan strategies and interventions to manipulate group biases in children.

Intergroup Bias Influences Third-Party Punishment and Compensation: In-group Relationships Attenuate Altruistic Punishment

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (8) ◽  
pp. 1397-1408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingjie Liu ◽  
Xiaohua Bian ◽  
Yu Hu ◽  
Ya-Ting Chen ◽  
Xuzhou Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Intergroup Bias ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Intergroup Relationships ◽  
Trait Empathy ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Group Relationships ◽  
Shed Light

Intergroup relationships can impact on a third party's willingness to punish a violator, but few researchers have explored how intergroup relationships affect third-party compensation tendencies. We recruited 163 participants to observe a dictator game, and then choose either to punish the dictator or compensate the recipient, each of whom could be from the participant's in-group or out-group. Third parties often chose not to punish in-group dictators and to compensate both in-group victims and out-group victims. When out-group members transgressed against the in-group, participants punished these out-group members just as often as they compensated the in-group recipients, although they punished out-group dictators more harshly than others overall. However, when both proposer and recipient came from the out-group, participants often did not intervene. We also found that third-party punishment and compensation were related to individual differences in participants' trait empathy and Machiavellianism. Our findings shed light on the modulating effect of intergroup relationships on third-party altruistic decisions.

Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moeed Yusuf
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
The Third ◽  
China And India ◽  
International Setting ◽  
Multiple Audiences ◽  
Crisis Behavior ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Shed Light

This book is the first to theorize third party mediation in crises between regional nuclear powers. Its relevance flows from two of the most significant international developments since the end of the Cold War: the emergence of regional nuclear rivalries; and the shift from the Cold War’s bipolar context to today’s unipolar international setting. Moving away from the traditional bilateral deterrence models, the book conceptualizes crisis behavior as “brokered bargaining”: a three-way bargaining framework where the regional rivals and the ‘third party’ seek to influence each other to behave in line with their crisis objectives and in so doing, affect each other’s crisis behavior. The book tests brokered bargaining theory by examining U.S.-led crisis management in South Asia, analyzing three major crises between India and Pakistan: the Kargil conflict, 1999; the 2001-02 nuclear standoff; and the Mumbai crisis, 2008. The case studies find strong evidence of behavior predicted by the brokered bargaining framework. They also shed light on several risks of misperceptions and inadvertence due to the challenges inherent in signaling to multiple audiences simultaneously. Traditional explanations rooted in bilateral deterrence models do not account for these, leaving a void with serious practical consequences, which the introduction of brokered bargaining seeks to fill. The book’s findings also offer lessons for crises on the Korean peninsula, between China and India, and between potential nuclear rivals in the Middle East.

Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

scholarly journals The Greek vs. the Cypriot guaranteed minimum income schemes: an exploratory comparative analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Varvara Lalioti ◽  
Christos Koutsampelas
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Research ◽  
Developmental Trajectories ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Superior Performance ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Minimum Income ◽  
Welfare Systems ◽  
Key Variables ◽  
Guaranteed Minimum Income ◽  
Shed Light

Abstract This exploratory paper utilises a comparative research approach to shed light upon the developmental trajectories of the Greek and Cypriot guaranteed minimum income (GMI) schemes. Our analysis indicates that, despite similarities (e.g. in the emergence of the two schemes, as part of the extensive reforms imposed during the financial crisis on the Greek and Cypriot welfare systems), there are also significant differences. These mainly relate to implementation and, ultimately, the “success” of the two schemes in attaining their declared goals. Moreover, we argue that the developmental paths followed by the Greek and Cypriot GMI schemes should be interpreted in the light of key variables (“functionalist,” “political” and “institutional”), often used to explain the establishment and further evolution of such schemes. Within this context, the relatively “superior” performance of the Cypriot GMI, compared with the Greek scheme, is largely attributed to factors such as government effectiveness and political stability.

scholarly journals A Small Price to Pay: National Narcissism Predicts Readiness to Sacrifice In-group Members to Defend the In-group’s Image

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bjarki Gronfeldt ◽  
Aleksandra Cichocka ◽  
Aleksandra Cislak ◽  
Anni Sternisko ◽  
Irem
Keyword(s):  
Medical Equipment ◽  
Well Being ◽  
National Image ◽  
National Group ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

Collective narcissism is a belief in in-group’s greatness that is not appreciated by others. In three studies, conducted in the context of COVID-19, we found that collective narcissism measured with respect to the national group was related to support of policies that protect the national image at the expense of in-group members’ health. In Study 1, British national narcissism was related to opposing cooperation with the EU on medical equipment. In Study 2, American national narcissism predicted opposition to COVID-19 testing in order to downplay the number of cases. In Study 3, American national narcissism was related to support for releasing an untested COVID-19 vaccine, in order to beat other countries to the punch. These relationships were mediated by concern about the country’s reputation. Our studies shed light on collective narcissism as a group-based ego-enhancement strategy in which a strong image of the group is prioritised over its members’ well-being.

Ribotyping and a Study of Transmission of Staphylococcus aureus Collected from Food Preparation Facilities

2004 ◽  
Vol 67 (6) ◽  
pp. 1116-1122 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHIRU KISHIMOTO ◽  
YUICHI HIOKI ◽  
TETSUYA OKANO ◽  
HIROTAKA KONUMA ◽  
KAZUHIRO TAKAMIZAWA ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Staphylococcus Aureus ◽  
Food Poisoning ◽  
Study Participant ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Food Preparation ◽  
Preparation Process ◽  
Cross Contamination ◽  
Food Items ◽  
Cooking Equipment ◽  
Shed Light

Food poisoning from Staphylococcus aureus is sometimes caused by improper handling of food items in food preparation facilities. Prevention of contamination by employees is particularly important in facilities where a significant amount of food preparation is performed by hand. Some experiments have been performed to describe bacterial cross-contamination in the food preparation process, but there have been few studies of cross-contamination in actual food preparation facilities. Aiming to shed light on the transmission of S. aureus in food preparation facilities, this study collected samples of 66 strains of this bacterium from the fingers of food preparation staff, foodstuffs, prepared foods, cooking utensils, and cooking equipment and typed them with the ribotyping method. S. aureus from the same ribogroup was detected on the hands of a study participant, a faucet, knife, frying pan, and a salad, indicating that bacteria found on the hands of the study participant was transmitted to cooking utensils and prepared foods. Transmission (from a faucet to a frying pan handle) of bacteria by another person, a third party, was also detected.

Revenge, Gossip, and Restorative Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen
Keyword(s):  
Restorative Justice ◽  
Control Function ◽  
Behavioral Control ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Reputational Concerns

Besides formal third-party punishment, punishment can take alternative forms such as revenge, gossip, and restorative justice. This chapter examines these alternative punishment forms in light of the idea that punishment is a basic moral instinct. Revenge means that the victim (or people close to the victim) directly punishes the perpetrator. Revenge has a behavioral-control function similar to third-party punishment’s, but it is less successful due to a lack of legitimacy and proportionality. Gossip enables group members to harm an offender’s reputation. These reputational concerns stimulate cooperation, even among the most powerful members of the group, if group members are likely to gossip. Finally, although restorative justice (e.g., healing an injustice through victim–offender mediation) is frequently portrayed as alternative to punishment, it actually works best if it contains punishment. Restorative justice is mostly an improved procedure to implement punishment, increasing fairness and hence cooperation.

scholarly journals Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 706-727
Author(s):  
Frank M Häge ◽  
Nils Ringe
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Competing Demands ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Selection Of

Shadow rapporteurs play an important role in developing the European Parliament’s collective policy positions and in defending them in inter-institutional negotiations. This study sheds light on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of shadow rapporteur selection. Qualitative insights from practitioner interviews and a quantitative analysis of shadow rapporteur data from the 7th European Parliament (2009–2014) indicate that the appointment process is primarily one of bottom-up self-selection by group members based on their policy interests. The party group leadership, in the form of group coordinators, plays an important coordinating role when there is competition for a shadow rapporteurship. However, the role of group coordinators is more akin to a third-party arbiter of competing demands than a mechanism of top-down control by the leadership, as suggested by principal-agent theory.

Design and Coding of some Secret Sharing Schemes

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anindya Kumar Biswas ◽  
Mou Dasgupta
Keyword(s):  
Secret Sharing ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Secret Sharing Schemes ◽  
Sensitive Information ◽  
Simple Method ◽  
Cheating Detection ◽  
Secret Keys ◽  
Key Exchange Protocols ◽  
Group Members

The study, coding and experimental results of secret sharing schemes (SSS) along with a proposed method are presented in this book. It is very important and essential in any security application, because none of the security techniques can be developed without pre-negotiation of security keys or values. For instance, different key exchange protocols are used in IPSec/SSL for pre-establishment of secret keys. Also, for symmetric encryption, which is much faster than public-key encryption, a mutually known pre-secret value is used for encryption and decryption of sensitive information to be exchanged between entities. In 1979, a perfect 𝑡/𝑛 threshold SSS was introduced by Shamir, where 1 < 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛 and any group with 𝑡more participants can reconstruct the secret selected by a trusted third party (TTP) known as Dealer 𝐷 , however, any group with less than 𝑡 participants cannot get the secret. This scheme is perfectly secure; however, it has a flaw as one or at most 𝑡 − 1 dishonest participants can exchange with their fake shares (instead of their own genuine shares as received from 𝐷 secretly), with other group members and obtain the correct secret only for themselves. It was first noticed and shown by Tompa in 1998 and proposed a simple method for reducing the cheating probability. In his method, a prime parameter 𝑝 ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {(𝑠−1)(𝑡−1)/ɛ + 𝑡, 𝑛} is taken such that if cheating is occurred, then the secret reconstructed would be out of the secret set 𝑠 = {0, 1, 2, … , 𝑠 − 1} considered. Here ɛ > 0 is a very small number. In this thrilling work, we develop algorithms and coding in Python for Shamir’s SSS, Tompa’s cheating and Harn-Lin’s SSS for detection of cheating. Some experimental results for each of them are also presented for better understanding of Shamir’s method and cheating prevention. We also present an improvement over the method proposed by Harn-Lin in areas of cheating detection.

scholarly journals The sensitivity of third party punishment to the framing effect and its brain mechanism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiamiao Yang ◽  
Jie Liu ◽  
Ruolei Gu ◽  
Kexin Deng ◽  
Xiaoxuan Huang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Effect Size ◽  
Framing Effect ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Physical Pain ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Shed Light

AbstractPeople as third-party observers, without direct self-interest, may punish norm violators to maintain social norms. However, third-party judgment and the follow-up punishment might be susceptible to the way we frame (i.e., verbally describe) a norm violation. We conducted a behavioral and a neuroimaging experiment to investigate the above phenomenon, which we call “third-party framing effect.” In these experiments, participants observed an anonymous player A decided whether to retain her/his economic benefit while exposing player B to a risk of physical pain (described as “harming others” in one condition and “not helping others” in the other condition), then they had a chance to punish player A at their own cost. Participants were more willing to execute third-party punishment under the harm frame compared to the help frame, manifesting as a framing effect. Self-reported moral outrage toward player A mediated the relationship between empathy toward player B and the framing effect size. Correspondingly, the insula (possibly related to empathy) and cerebellum (possibly related to anger) were activated more strongly under the harm frame than the help frame. Functional connectivity between these regions showed strongest weight when predicting the framing effect size. These findings shed light on the psychological and neural mechanisms of the third-party framing effect.Graphic abstract

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