scholarly journals Financial Stability Governance and Central Bank Communications

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1328) ◽  
pp. 1-57
Author(s):  
Juan M. Londono ◽  
◽  
Stijn Claessens ◽  
Ricardo Correa ◽  
◽  
...  

We investigate how central banks' governance frameworks influence their financial stability communication strategies and assess the effectiveness of these strategies in preventing a worsening of financial cycle conditions. We develop a simple conceptual framework of how central banks communicate about financial stability and how communication shapes the evolution of the financial cycle. We apply our framework using data on the governance characteristics of 24 central banks and the sentiment conveyed in their financial stability reports. We find robust evidence that communications by central banks participating in interagency financial stability committees more effectively mitigate a deterioration in financial conditions and advert a potential financial crisis. After observing a deterioration in conditions, such central banks also transmit a calmer message, suggesting that the ability to use policy tools other than communications strengthens incentives not to just "cry wolf".

Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

Words are critical in how the public perceives the work of central banks and the quality of monetary policy. Press releases that accompany policy rate decisions and, where available, the minutes of central bank committee meetings, are focal points for the media in public discussions about the conduct of monetary policy. Using data from five countries, this chapter examines whether the language used by central banks has changed since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began. Briefly, the findings show that concerns about financial stability peaked just as the global financial crisis reached its zenith. However, concerns over uncertainty about the current and anticipated state of the economy have also risen over time. More generally, central bank speak became more aggressive throughout the crisis years. More conventional expressions about the current stance of monetary policy took a back seat to other concerns in central bank policy statements and minutes.


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

Words are critical in how the public perceives the work of central banks and the quality of monetary policy. Press releases that accompany policy rate decisions and, where available, the minutes of central bank committee meetings, are focal points for the media in public discussions about the conduct of monetary policy. Using data from five countries, this chapter examines whether the language used by central banks has changed since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began. Briefly, the findings show that concerns about financial stability peaked just as the global financial crisis reached its zenith. However, concerns over uncertainty about the current and anticipated state of the economy have also risen over time. More generally, central bank speak became more aggressive throughout the crisis years. More conventional expressions about the current stance of monetary policy took a back seat to other concerns in central bank policy statements and minutes.


Author(s):  
Zehra Vildan Serin ◽  
Erişah Arıcan ◽  
Başak Tanınmış Yücememiş

After the global financial crisis, central banks have changed attitudes towards gold and have unconventional policy measures, in addition to conventional interest rate cuts. With these measures central banks aimed to support financial stability, and to reduce to potential adverse effects from international capital flows. From the perspective of investors and central banks gold positions and gold reserves are still significant and debatable issues. The purpose of this study is to investigate the composition of central bank reserves the period of 2008 and 2018. In this paper, generally we compared gold reserve holdings of major central banks with Turkey. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) has increased gold reserves especially since 2002. With implementing effective policies, CBRT has increased gold holdings in international reserves. CBRT is one of the countries with the highest share of gold reserves in the world.


Author(s):  
Zekayi Kaya ◽  
Erkan Tokucu

During the historical process, application of the monetary policies and the roles of the central banks have changed within the framework of the developments in the world economy, problems encountered and the economic policies as a solution to these problems. The financial crises after 1990 and the recent financial crisis as the biggest experienced one after 1930s, caused an increase in the importance of the task of providing financial stability besides price stability and in this context in the function of “lender of last resort” of the central bank. The crisis required using new policy instruments in addition to interest rate instrument which was not sufficient enough in providing financial stability and the roles of the central banks in providing financial stability changed. In this study, applications of monetary policies and the changing role of the central banks will be examined. Within this framework, traditional and non-traditional instruments will be explained and the problems that can be confronted by a central bank when providing price stability besides financial stability will be remarked.


Author(s):  
Michael W. Taylor ◽  
Douglas W. Arner ◽  
Evan C. Gibson

The traditional central bank consensus is designed around two mandates: monetary and financial stability. Following the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, central banks’ policy objective became biased toward maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation or monetary stability. This was based on the presumption that a stable price level would achieve both monetary and financial system stability. The deemphasis on financial stability remained until the global financial crisis, when the prevailing consensus was exposed for being thoroughly inadequate. A new consensus has emerged that broadens central banks’ financial stability mandate to include macroprudential supervision. This chapter analyzes the new central bank consensus, how this has resulted in institutional redesign, and the effectiveness of discharging postcrisis financial and monetary stability mandates.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-142
Author(s):  
Haidar Hamza Judy ◽  
Noufel Smaili .

Since the recent Global Financial Crisis, Central Banks Have extensive Powers and Objectives include both Monetary Sability and Financial Stability. Which required new arrangements for the Governance of Central Banks and the design of a new Institutional Framework to restrict the use of power by focusing on Independence, Accountability and Transparency. Perception of individuals to risks resulting from shifts in Monetary Policy because of the change in the multiple goals weakens the degree of the effectiveness and acceptance. As the Central Bank is responsible for Monetary Policy management, identify orientations, objectives and choose the appropriate means, it works to ensure the effectiveness of Monetary Policy, and for that warrant provided on the Independence, Accountability, and Respect for the Principles of Transparency, So the application of Banking Governance..


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. p23
Author(s):  
Gongpil Choi

The post-global financial crisis highlighted the importance of engaging in collateralized securities financing to meet the ever-increasing market needs for liquidity and risk management. Given the heavy reliance on volatile Eurodollar system and the fragmented governance and limited cross-border usability of the collateral among ASEAN+3 countries, it is important to relax prevailing constraints on collateral and mobilize cross-border transactions. To address the imperatives for securing collateral-based cross-border financial markets in the region, Asia needs the initiatives of central banks to develop a regional collateral framework for better financial plumbing. By collaborating on common grounds for cross-border collateral utilization, some of the prevailing constraints on collateral use can be relaxed. The inclusive collateral framework that incorporates CBCA (Central Bank Collateral Arrangement) would provide strong initial market support for the ABMI, thus help achieve sustainable financial stability.


Author(s):  
Forrest Capie

Central banks date from the late nineteenth century but the great majority from the twentieth century. They are institutions whose principal purpose is to provide stable monetary and financial conditions, though their functions have varied over time. Claims made for the banks’ powers have often been greater than was merited. This chapter sets out how central banks’ responsibilities arose and how they have been fulfilled. It gives particular attention to something that was almost lost sight of in recent years that of their traditional responsibility for financial stability. Other aspects of central banking are then discussed: the role they might have in supervision/regulation; central bank co-operation has played; and the meaning and desirability of central bank independence.


Author(s):  
Viktor Koziuk

This study argues that post-crisis discussions on central bank independence are less about a choice of a level of independence but more about a relation between the independence and the central bank mandate in financial stability. An offered hypothesis states that an increasing role of financial factors in the macroeconomic policy agenda has led to emerging of two approaches to the central bank independence. Within the orthodox approach, responsibility for the financial stability is a challenge to the accepted model: one mandate – one goal – one instrument. Interference into the financial cycle impairs transparency and distorts responsibility, while deflation bias risks get in conflict with price stability principles, adherence to which is exactly what central banks are granted independence for. In terms of the heterodox approach, a wider responsibility of central banks for financial stability requires more independence to protect the legitimacy of interference into the financial cycle and implementation of a more prudent regulatory regime. Orthodox view is contradictory in its nature, while the vulnerability of the second approach lies in quality of institutional environment. Price stability mandate is argued to remain the first priority, while the financial stability issues should be institutionalized in a clearer way to secure independence.


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