scholarly journals The Case of Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Louis Karel Fick: A First Step towards developing a Doctrine on the Status of International Judgments within the Domestic Legal Order

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 565
Author(s):  
Erika De Wet
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
International Law ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Common ◽  
Foreign Judgment ◽  
Domestic Law

The Fick case which was decided by the Constitutional Court on 27 June 2013 was the first time since its inception that the Constitutional Court was confronted with the status of a binding international decision within the domestic legal order. It concerned a binding decision by the (now suspended) Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal against Zimbabwe, which was also enforceable in South Africa. A key issue before the Court was whether or not the South African statutory rules of civil procedure for the enforcement of foreign judgments also covered judgments of international courts and tribunals (as anticipated by Article 32(1) of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal). As none of the relevant statutory legislation was applicable in this instance, the common law remained the only possible avenue through which the SADC Tribunal’s decision could be enforced in South Africa. At the time of the decision, the common law on the enforcement of civil judgments had developed only to a point where it provided for the execution of judgments made by domestic courts of a foreign state (ie decisions of other national courts). The Court was therefore confronted with whether or not an international decision in the form of a cost order of the SADC Tribunal amounted to a “foreign judgment” as recognized by the South African common law. The Court answered this question in the affirmative by relying on those clauses in the Constitution that committed South Africa to the rule of law, as well as its obligations under international law, and to an international-law friendly interpretation of domestic law. Although the decision is to be welcomed and applied the law correctly to the facts of the case, it does raise the issue of the wisdom of equating international judgments with foreign judgments on a more general scale. This relates to the fact that it is generally accepted in most jurisdictions that the recognition and enforcement of a “foreign judgment” can be denied where it would result in a violation of domestic public policy. The public policy exception does not, however, fit well in a regime based on public international law, which does not permit States to use their domestic law as an excuse for not implementing their international obligations.

scholarly journals PRESENCE AS A BASIS FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT SOUNDING IN MONEY: THE “REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION” TEST CONSIDERED

Obiter ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
GMN Xaba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Recognition And Enforcement ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
The Common ◽  
Foreign Judgment ◽  
Academic Debate

A somewhat contested basis of international competence in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa is mere presence. Over the years, an academic debate has raged in South Africa over mere presence as a basis of jurisdiction for the enforcement of foreign judgments sounding in money. A recent decision by the Constitutional Court makes the topic worth revisiting.Practical circumstances, social and political considerations as well as natural justice inevitably call for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. As Forsyth aptly puts it “[a] plaintiff may sue in one country and hear with pleasure judgment given in his favour, then discover, to his dismay, that the defendant, with his assets, has absconded to another country”. In such a situation, the judgment has become brutum fulmen in the court which pronounced it and the plaintiff is placed in a grossly prejudicial position. However, because of widely accepted values and principles, legal systems of the world recognize and appreciate that a judgment rendered by the courts of one country may be enforced elsewhere, provided certain conditions are satisfied.Under South African common law one of the conditions for the enforcement of foreign judgments is that the court which pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. (In Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1033 (W) 1037B the court stated that the mere fact that the foreign court may have had jurisdiction under its own laws, is not conclusive. Instead, the question of jurisdiction has to be determined in the light of the principles of our law on the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Other requirements for recognition and enforcement are that (i) the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in its effect and not have become superannuated; (ii) the recognition and enforcement of the judgment by South African courts should not be contrary to public policy; (iii) the foreign judgment should not have been obtained by fraudulent means; (iv) the judgment must not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue law of the foreign state; and (v) the enforcement of the foreign judgment must not be precluded by the provisions of the Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978, as amended. See Jones v Krok 1995 (1) SA 667 (AD) 685B−D.) This note is concerned only with the requirement that the foreign court that pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. The other four requirements are outside the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. It appears that the requirement that the foreign court must have had jurisdiction is a tenet central to the common law world. This requirement is a concept sui generis which is not affected by the internal jurisdiction rules of the foreign court, nor by the internal jurisdiction rules of the South African courts. Under South African common law there are, at least, two grounds which have been established with absolute clarity, that clothe a foreign court with international competence.

scholarly journals Oral Law in Litigation in South Africa: An Evidential Nightmare?

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Court System ◽  
The Status ◽  
Customary Laws ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Law Of Evidence

In the past, customary law has been applied rather haphazardly in the courts. Its inherent adaptive flexibility and indeterminate nature created confusion in a court system ill-equipped to deal with litigation dealing with customary law issues. Understandably, customary law was treated in the same way as a common-law custom, which also originates in a community's acceptance of certain standards of behaviour. This meant that anyone averring a rule of customary law had to prove it, except where the rule was contained in a statute or precedent. The courts were not keen to engage in law-making and where the ascertainment of customary law proved to be difficult, they would merely apply the common law. In 1998, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which allows the judiciary to take judicial notice of readily accessible customary law, made fundamental changes to this situation. The Act is still in operation, although it must now be interpreted in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). No direction on how this must be done can be found in the wording of the constitutional provisions dealing with the customary law. Besides instructing the courts to apply customary law when "applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law", the Constitution is silent on the way forward. Given the fact that most of the judiciary does not have any knowledge of the content of living customary law and the fact that there are fundamental differences between the evidentiary rules applied in the common and customary laws of South Africa, a few problems are bound to surface when litigating issues involving the customary law. They include: the status of customary law in the South African legal system; the applicability of customary law; and especially the determination of living customary law. The aim of this analysis is to determine if the existing evidentiary rules are appropriate to deal with these challenges in litigating matters involving customary law in the ordinary courts.

scholarly journals Some comments on the current (and future) status of Muslim personal law in South Africa

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
State Law ◽  
Muslim Community ◽  
The South ◽  
The Common ◽  
Personal Law

The state law of South Africa consists of the common law and the customary law. However, in reality there exist various cultural and religious communities who lead their private lives outside of state law. For example, the Muslim community in South Africa is a close-knit community which lives according to their own customs and usages. Muslims are subject to informal religious tribunals whose decisions and orders are neither recognised nor reviewable by the South African courts.The non-recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law causes unnecessary hardships, especially for women. A Muslim woman is often in a "catch two" situation. For example, on the one hand her attempts to divorce her husband in terms of Muslim law may be foiled by the relevant religious tribunal and, on the other hand, the South African courts may not provide the necessary relief, because they might not recognise the validity of her Muslim marriage. Increasingly, South African courts are faced with complex issues regarding the Muslim community. The last few years there has been a definite change in the courts' attitude with regard to the recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law. Contrary to pre1994 court cases, the recent court cases attempt to develop the common law to give recognition to certain aspects of Muslim personal law. This article attempts to give an overview of the recent case law that dealt with issues regarding the recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law. Another issue, which eventuates from the current situation, is whether the South African legal order should continue to have a dualistic legal order or whether we should opt for a unified legal order or even a pluralistic legal order. In order to address this issue, some comments on the current status of Muslim personal law will be made and, finally, in order to contribute to the debate regarding the recognition of Muslim personal law, optional models for the recognition of Muslim personal law will briefly be evaluated.

scholarly journals IS THERE STILL DEFAMATION BASED ON ADULTERY UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW? A CRITICAL REVIEW J v J (4918 2012) [2016] ZAKZDHC 33 (unreported)

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C Buthelezi
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Personality Rights ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Made In

On 22 July 2016, the Durban High Court ruled (per Masipa J) that there is no longer an action for defamation founded on the publication of allegations of adultery against another person. The court solely based its finding on the earlier judgment of the Constitutional Court (CC) in DE v RH (2015 (5) SA 83 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1003 (CC), hereinafter “DE”). Earlier, in June 2015, in the DE judgment, the CC had unanimously struck down delictual action for contumelia and loss of consortium damages founded on adultery. In annulling this action, the CC held that the common-law action for contumelia and loss of consortium was no longer viable and that it was incompatible with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Still, a question that was never considered by the courts prior the judgment of J is whether the DE judgment has automatically abolished other delictual actions aimed at protecting personality rights, specifically an action for defamation, and in general, actions for invasion of privacy and impairment of dignity, all founded on allegations of adultery. In this judgment, the court held that in view of the decision of DE, “public opinion no longer considers adultery as tabooed... a statement to the effect that a person committed adultery can no longer convey a meaning with the propensity to define a person …”. Nevertheless, when the opportunity to definitively answer this question ultimately presented itself, albeit in relation to defamation of character (or the protection of reputation), the court in J failed to satisfactorily address this vital question. As it will be demonstrated in this contribution, the judgment of Masipa J in the J judgment does not appear to be legally sound. Primarily, no authority, other than the CC judgment of DE, is used to support the judgment of J. As a result, the judgment has not even succeeded in dealing with the question of defamation, let alone other actions (namely, privacy and dignity) – all founded on adultery. Instead, the judgment creates confusion whether the judgment of DE extends to an action for defamation, and possibly to privacy and dignity. The objective of this note is to provide a critical analysis of the high court judgment in J. The critique is undertaken in light of the reasoning in DE and other like judgments. It begins by setting out the background to the ruling of the high court, followed by a commentary on the judgment. The commentary is undertaken in the form of a comparative analysis between the approaches adopted by the court in DE and in J, highlighting the striking differences in approaches by the two courts, when they develop the common-law. In addition, the critique of the high court judgment is made in light of the interests that the judgment of DE sought to protect when it abolished an action in adultery, and those that were at issue in the judgment of J. Thereafter, a conclusion is provided. The stance that the note adopts is that the CC in DE did not repeal defamation action founded on allegations of adultery; and that even if such action were to be annulled privacy and dignity ought to remain, as of necessity.

scholarly journals The protection of environmental interests through corporate governance: A South African company law perspective

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-20
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Company Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
Corporate Administrators ◽  
Environmental Interests

The quest to maximize profits by corporate administrators usually leaves behind an unhealthy environment. This trend impacts negatively on long term interests of the company and retards societal sustainable development. While there are in South Africa pieces of legislation which are geared at protecting the environment, the Companies Act which is the principal legislation that regulates the operations of the company is silent on this matter. The paper argues that the common law responsibility of the directors to protect the interests of the company as presently codified by the Companies Act should be developed by the courts in South Africa, in the exercise of their powers under the Constitution, to include the interests of the environment. This would guarantee the enforcement of the environmental interests within the confines of the Companies Act as an issue of corporate governance.

scholarly journals Roles of the Courts in New Zealand in Giving Effect to International Human Rights - with Some History

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J Keith
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Effect ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right ◽  
Domestic Law

The Right Honourable Sir Kenneth Keith was the fourth speaker at the NZ Institute of International Affairs Seminar. In this article he describes and reflects upon the role of courts and judges in relation to the advancement of human rights, an issue covered in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses international lawmakers attempting to protect individual groups of people from 1648 to 1948, including religious minorities and foreign traders, slaves, aboriginal natives, victims of armed conflict, and workers. The second part discusses how from 1945 to 1948, there was a shift in international law to universal protection. The author notes that while treaties are not part of domestic law, they may have a constitutional role, be relevant in determining the common law, give content to the words of a statute, help interpret legislation which is in line with a treaty, help interpret legislation which is designed to give general effect to a treaty (but which is silent on the particular matter), and help interpret and affect the operation of legislation to which the international text has no apparent direct relation. 

scholarly journals Consent, custom and international law in South Africa: What Australian lawmakers could learn

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 197-202
Author(s):  
Stephen Young
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
International Law ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mineral Resources ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Customary Laws ◽  
Traditional Communities

This article summarises a recent South African case, Baleni v Minister of Mineral Resources. It also analyses the Court’s reasoning to explore how a non-Australian common law state protects a traditional community’s customary laws and practices through legislation, a Constitutional Bill of Rights, and international law. Although a South African case, Baleni demonstrates how similar common law countries have adopted distinct approaches to protecting and treating traditional communities, from which Australian lawmakers could learn.

scholarly journals Constitutional Mimicry and Common Law Reform in a Rights-Based Post-Colonial Setting: The Case of South Africa and Malawi

2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-170
Author(s):  
Sibo Banda
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The South ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
The Common

AbstractCompetent courts in Malawi must, as courts have done in South Africa, undertake a radical path in order to enhance the common law position of distinct categories of persons. This article discusses judicial appreciation of the common law-changing function of a bill of rights and its associated values, and judicial understanding as to when such a function may be brought into play. The article examines approaches taken by courts in South Africa in determining the circumstances in which the South African Bill of Rights applies to private relationships, when private parties owe each other duties arising out of the Bill of Rights and the scope of a court's authority to amend the common law in that regard. The article projects the debate, analysis and critique of these approaches onto the Malawian legal landscape through a discussion of the tenant worker contracted on the Malawi private estate.

An Opportunity Missed for Male Rape Survivors in South Africa: Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Another

2008 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 284-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ntombizozuko Dyani
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Vulnerable Group ◽  
Rape Survivors ◽  
Form Part ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Anal Penetration

AbstractThe Constitutional Court of South Africa recently handed down a judgment on the extension of the common law definition of rape to include anal penetration of women, but not of men. The court argued that women form part of the most vulnerable group in society. This article analyses the court's judgment and argues that the court should have included anal penetration of men in the light of South African lower courts' decisions, international law and the fact that there is currently a law before parliament which pertains to the anal penetration of men. The article also argues that the court should have taken into consideration that this case involved a child, who is also from the most vulnerable group in society.

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