scholarly journals Constitutional Mimicry and Common Law Reform in a Rights-Based Post-Colonial Setting: The Case of South Africa and Malawi

2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-170
Author(s):  
Sibo Banda

AbstractCompetent courts in Malawi must, as courts have done in South Africa, undertake a radical path in order to enhance the common law position of distinct categories of persons. This article discusses judicial appreciation of the common law-changing function of a bill of rights and its associated values, and judicial understanding as to when such a function may be brought into play. The article examines approaches taken by courts in South Africa in determining the circumstances in which the South African Bill of Rights applies to private relationships, when private parties owe each other duties arising out of the Bill of Rights and the scope of a court's authority to amend the common law in that regard. The article projects the debate, analysis and critique of these approaches onto the Malawian legal landscape through a discussion of the tenant worker contracted on the Malawi private estate.

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Matsemela

Freedom of testation is considered to be one of the founding principles of the South African law of testate succession. Testators are given freedom to direct how their estate should devolve and free rein to dispose of their assets as they deem fit. As a result, effect must be given to the expressed wishes of the testator. Prior to 1994, such freedom could be limited only by common law or statutory law; more recently, such freedom has been tested against the Constitution of South Africa. This means that a provision in a will cannot be enforced by the courts if it is contra bonos mores, impossible or too vague, in conflict with the law, or is deemed to be unconstitutional.Having regard to the unfair discrimination provisions of section 9(3) of the Final Constitution, can a court enforce a will or a trust deed which discriminates against potential beneficiaries on account of their race, gender, religion or disability? Will such clause pass the test of constitutionality, be justified or considered to achieve a legitimate objective? Can potential beneficiaries or anyone who has locus standi challenge the freedom of testation by relying on the freedoms and rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights? It is against this background that the paper attempts to answer these questions and explore the extent to which the Constitution has an impact on freedom of testation. The central thesis of the article is to determine whether clauses in wills or trust instruments which differentiate between different classes of beneficiary can be deemed to be valid. This is done by looking at several more recent cases that have appeared before our courts.


Author(s):  
Fatima Osman

In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law through statute carries the risks associated with codification; namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional values have imported significant portions of the common law to regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of customary law in legislation and the successful implementation thereof.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marita Carnelley ◽  
Juanita Easthorpe

There are various models for determining and allocating child support obligations post-divorce and many different principles upon which such a policy can be based. In most legal systems the parents retain the duty to support their needy children after divorce as it is primarily their obligation to ensure the adequate financial welfare of their children. This principle is applicable in both the South African and Canadian legal systems. In South Africa, in terms of both the common law and legislation, both parents must maintain their children “according to their respective means”. The awarding of a specific amount of maintenance is, however, a complex process calculated by the courts on a case-by-case basis mainly by considering two issues: the needs of the children and the parents’ ability to maintain their children within the circumstances and means of each of the parents. Although both aspects are important in a maintenance enquiry, the focus of this note is on the interpretation of the calculation of the contribution of each of the parents, especially the non-custodial parent. The interpretation of the concept “means” obviously has important consequences for the parties: the broader the interpretation of the “means” of a parent, the higher the proportion of the contribution of that parent would be towards the support of the children. This is especially important in South Africa where a substantial proportion of those who are obligated to pay maintenance is impecunious. The Canadian law rested on similar principles until 1997 when the federal government promulgated the Federal Child Support Guidelines as an amendment to the Divorce Act. The impact of these Guidelines on the calculation of the parental share of post-divorce child support has been far-reaching. The aim of this note is firstly to examine the meaning of the term “means” within the South African legal system as set out in the common law, the various statutes and as these have been interpreted by the majority of courts over the past century. The second aim is to give a brief overview of the Canadian Guidelines and to compare their current system with the South African scenario. The rationale for choosing this jurisdiction is (i) the fact that in both jurisdictions the courts have the ultimate say over the amount of support paid; and (ii) as the Canadian position before their 1997 amendments was similar to the current South Africa system, it was envisaged that by exploring their reasons for change and evaluating their current system, some useful insights might be gained in solving some problems experienced in the South African maintenance system. The note will conclude with some suggestions for reform in South Africa in light of the Canadian experience. 


Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

The Muslim population of South Africa follows a practice which may be referred to asMuslim personal law. Although section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 recognises religious freedom and makes provision for the future recognition of other personal law systems, Muslim personal law is, at this stage, not formally recognised in terms of South African law. Since Muslim personal law receives no constitutional recognition the question may be asked whether the 1996 Constitution, and in particular the Bill of Rights as contained in chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution, is applicable to "non-recognised" Muslim personal law. The answer to this question depends to a large extent on the meaning of "law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution.When the viewpoint of academic writers and the courts are evaluated it seems as if the meaning of law in South Africa is restricted to the common law, customary law and legislation. If such a viewpoint is to be followed, Muslim personal law is excluded from the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. It is, however, inconceivable that there might be certain areas of "law" that are not subject to the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. In this note it will be argued that Muslim personal law should be regarded as law in terms of the 1996 Constitution, or in the alternative, that Muslim personal law (or at least Muslim marriages) should be recognised in terms of section 15 of the 1996 Constitution.Due to the historical resemblance between South Africa and India the meaning of"law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution will be compared with the meaning of "law" as contained in the Constitution of India. Although the Constitution of India indirectly gives recognition to various personal laws in India, these personal laws are not subject to the provisions of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it would be argued that one should approach the Constitution of India with caution when its provisions are compared to those of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa.


Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

The state law of South Africa consists of the common law and the customary law. However, in reality there exist various cultural and religious communities who lead their private lives outside of state law. For example, the Muslim community in South Africa is a close-knit community which lives according to their own customs and usages. Muslims are subject to informal religious tribunals whose decisions and orders are neither recognised nor reviewable by the South African courts.The non-recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law causes unnecessary hardships, especially for women. A Muslim woman is often in a "catch two" situation. For example, on the one hand her attempts to divorce her husband in terms of Muslim law may be foiled by the relevant religious tribunal and, on the other hand, the South African courts may not provide the necessary relief, because they might not recognise the validity of her Muslim marriage. Increasingly, South African courts are faced with complex issues regarding the Muslim community. The last few years there has been a definite change in the courts' attitude with regard to the recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law. Contrary to pre1994 court cases, the recent court cases attempt to develop the common law to give recognition to certain aspects of Muslim personal law. This article attempts to give an overview of the recent case law that dealt with issues regarding the recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law. Another issue, which eventuates from the current situation, is whether the South African legal order should continue to have a dualistic legal order or whether we should opt for a unified legal order or even a pluralistic legal order. In order to address this issue, some comments on the current status of Muslim personal law will be made and, finally, in order to contribute to the debate regarding the recognition of Muslim personal law, optional models for the recognition of Muslim personal law will briefly be evaluated.


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oyebanke Yebisi ◽  
Victoria Balogun

Marital rape is a form of sexual violence, which is often downplayed due to the common law position that a man cannot rape his wife. While certain jurisdictions have enacted laws criminalising it, other jurisdictions have yet to criminalise it. This paper focuses on the criminal aspects of marital rape and examines the laws regarding marital rape in South Africa and the general rape provisions in Nigeria. While marital rape is punishable under South African criminal law, it is not in Nigeria. In this paper, the provisions of the South African Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Other Related Matters) Act of 2007, the Criminal Code Act, and the Penal Code Act – Nigeria in relation to rape and marital rape – are analysed. This paper also discusses the South African Sexual Offences Court, sentencing for rape in the selected countries, and relevant case law. It concludes that South Africa (SA) has a generally good framework with respect to rape and marital rape, but the country should work more on the strict application of the laws in place. It also suggests that Nigeria should establish a sexual offences court using the South African model and should amend the Criminal Law to expressly criminalise marital rape.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Mangu

After several decades of apartheid rule, which denied human rights to the majority of the population on the ground of race and came to be regarded as a crime against humanity, South Africa adopted its first democratic Constitution in the early 1990s. The 1996 Constitution, which succeeded the 1993 interim Constitution, is considered one of the most progressive in the world. In its founding provisions, it states that South Africa is a democratic state founded on human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms. The Constitution enshrines fundamental human rights in a justiciable Bill of Rights as a cornerstone of democracy. Unfortunately, in the eyes of a number of politicians, officials and lay-persons, the rights in the Bill of Rights accrue to South African citizens only. Xenophobia, which has been rampant since the end of apartheid, seems to support the idea that foreigners should not enjoy these rights. Foreign nationals have often been accused of posing a threat to South African citizens with regard to employment opportunities. In light of the South African legislation and jurisprudence, this article affirms the position of the South African labour law that foreign nationals are indeed protected by the Constitution and entitled to rights in the Bill of Rights, including the rights to work and fair labour practices.


2012 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-306
Author(s):  
Ntombizozuko Dyani

AbstractCohabitation is left largely unregulated in South Africa, which means that many cohabitants are left destitute or financially worse off when their cohabiting partners die. The Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, in particular section 37C, is one of the few pieces of legislation that afford legal protection to cohabitants who are left financially worse off due to the death of their partners. However, three previous pension funds adjudicators gave different views as to how to interpret this provision. This note seeks to compare three decisions by three different adjudicators and concludes that the latest decision in Hlathi is the most preferred, because it interprets section 37C progressively, taking into account the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-20
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor

The quest to maximize profits by corporate administrators usually leaves behind an unhealthy environment. This trend impacts negatively on long term interests of the company and retards societal sustainable development. While there are in South Africa pieces of legislation which are geared at protecting the environment, the Companies Act which is the principal legislation that regulates the operations of the company is silent on this matter. The paper argues that the common law responsibility of the directors to protect the interests of the company as presently codified by the Companies Act should be developed by the courts in South Africa, in the exercise of their powers under the Constitution, to include the interests of the environment. This would guarantee the enforcement of the environmental interests within the confines of the Companies Act as an issue of corporate governance.


Author(s):  
N Gabru

Human life, as with all animal and plant life on the planet, is dependant upon fresh water. Water is not only needed to grow food, generate power and run industries, but it is also needed as a basic part of human life. Human dependency upon water is evident through history, which illustrates that human settlements have been closely linked to the availability and supply of fresh water. Access to the limited water resources in South Africa has been historically dominated by those with access to land and economic power, as a result of which the majority of South Africans have struggled to secure the right to water. Apartheid era legislation governing water did not discriminate directly on the grounds of race, but the racial imbalance in ownership of land resulted in the disproportionate denial to black people of the right to water. Beyond racial categorisations, the rural and poor urban populations were traditionally especially vulnerable in terms of the access to the right.  The enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, brought the South African legal system into a new era, by including a bill of fundamental human rights (Bill of Rights). The Bill of Rights makes provision for limited socio-economic rights. Besides making provision for these human rights, the Constitution also makes provision for the establishment of state institutions supporting constitutional democracy.  The Constitution has been in operation since May 1996. At this stage, it is important to take stock and measure the success of the implementation of these socio-economic rights. This assessment is important in more ways than one, especially in the light of the fact that many lawyers argued strongly against 1/2the inclusion of the second and third generation of human rights in a Bill of Rights. The argument was that these rights are not enforceable in a court of law and that they would create unnecessary expectations of food, shelter, health, water and the like; and that a clear distinction should be made between first generation and other rights, as well as the relationship of these rights to one another. It should be noted that there are many lawyers and non-lawyers who maintained that in order to confront poverty, brought about by the legacy of apartheid, the socio-economic rights should be included in a Bill of Rights. The inclusion of section 27 of the 1996 Constitution has granted each South African the right to have access to sufficient food and water and has resulted in the rare opportunity for South Africa to reform its water laws completely. It has resulted in the enactment of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 and the National Water Act 36 of 1998.In this paper the difference between first and second generation rights will be discussed. The justiciability of socio-economic rights also warrants an explanation before the constitutional implications related to water are briefly examined. Then the right to water in international and comparative law will be discussed, followed by a consideration of the South African approach to water and finally, a few concluding remarks will be made.


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