scholarly journals Religious Offence and Human Rights: The Implications of Defamations of Religions

Author(s):  
Gabru Naeema

This contribution is a review of a book on actions which may offend religious feelings even if it was not the intention of the offender to do so. This book illustrates how, drawings (amongst others) on the face of it, may be construed to be a mere exercise of the right to freedom of expression or free speech in a democratic society. This is regardless of the content of the drawing which, to other societies, may constitute an offence.  

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Sakr

AbstractThere is more to the denial of freedom of expression than outright censorship. The right to freedom of expression is interdependent with, and indivisible from, other rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To discuss freedom of expression narrowly as if it were self-contained, and to conceal the issues, processes, and conflicts implicit in its achievement, can be seen as a hegemonic strategy that serves relations of domination. Three sets of public exchanges analyzed here, conducted on and about Arab television against a background of growing international intolerance for free speech, arguably contributed to a narrow, reified understanding of freedom of expression. The first centered on a television drama serial, the second on cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, and the third on the ambitions of a privately owned television station in Egypt. Since freedom of expression was repeatedly referred to in all three cases, it might be said that Arab television increased awareness on this topic. Evidence shows, however, that instead of illuminating ways in which the rights and duties inherent in freedom of expression could benefit the viewing public, each set of exchanges helped to sustain power relations by obscuring them.


Author(s):  
Natalya OPOLSKA

The article examines the main criteria for the legitimacy of restriction the right to freedom of creation in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular, legitimacy (legality) – the restriction of the right to freedom of creation should be provided for by international and national legislation, the purpose of which is to restrict the right to freedom of creation to be justified, coherent purpose, consistent with the principle proportionality and not to go beyond the bounds of necessity; content – restrictions on the freedom of creation can not be interpreted expanded, correspond to the basic content of freedom of creation and its social purpose. It has been determined that in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights there are various legal positions regarding the restriction of the right to freedom of creation. In order to streamline the practice of applying the Convention, since compliance with the precedent not only meets the requirements of the independence and impartiality of the Court, but also reflects the very essence of judicial policy, consider the most typical decisions of the ECtHR in complaints about limiting the right to freedom of creation. It is concluded that in each case dealt with by the ECtHR, there are grounds for making a decision both in favor of the complainants and in support of governments for limiting the freedom of creativity. The importance of the above mentioned restrictions on the right to freedom of creativity in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is that: - first, they relate to pressing issues concerning the restriction of freedom of creation, as the competence of the right to freedom of expression, which is enshrined in Art. 10 of the Convention; - second, in the cases cited above, the ECtHR ruled that convictions were not in these cases in violation of Article 10 of the Convention and supported the position of national courts in interfering with freedom of expression of the arts; - Thirdly, the decision of the ECHR points to the absence of a single international concept of "public morality", from which it can be concluded that it is expedient to determine the general tendencies in the development of modern morals of mankind; - fourthly, the decision of the ECtHR in complaints concerning the restriction of the right to freedom of creativity, which infringes religious feelings of the population, norms of social ethics and morals, provided that the state intervention was carried out with a high degree of conviction in its expediency, the court turns to the side national courts. Relevant restrictions on the freedom of creativity are considered legitimate if they are aimed at preventing neglect of the feelings of national minorities or believers in protecting the most vulnerable categories of the audience (children) if there is a danger that they may have access to this information. However, we are talking about well-considered decisions, since under the same slogans censorship and other undemocratic institutions can be introduced, and here the important point of the ECHR as a guarantor of the Convention is considered. It is determined that in the European legal tradition, the freedom of creativity is closely connected with the restrictions, the need for which must be proved with a high degree of their legitimacy (legality), proportionality and expediency (purpose). The analysis of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the violation of Article 10 of the Convention made it possible to summarize the case law of the ECHR in the area of restricting the right to freedom of creation and to divide it into three groups, depending on the grounds for interference of the states in the freedom of creativity: Restriction of the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect health; Restrictions on the right to freedom of creativity that are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public security, in order to prevent riots or crimes; Restriction of the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect the reputation or rights of others. When restricting the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect the health or morals of others, the case law of the ECtHR recognizes a broad discretion by the states. In resolving the question of the limits of state intervention in order to protect public morality, the Court proceeds from the absence of a single coherent international concept of "public morality". The limits of freedom of creativity are set by the states in accordance with the norms of social ethics and morals. Relevant restrictions on the freedom of creativity are considered legitimate if they are aimed at preventing neglect of the feelings of national minorities or believers, to protect the most vulnerable categories of the audience (children), etc. (“Müller and Others v. Switzerland”, "Handyside v. Great Britain", "Otto Preminger v. Austria"). The restrictions on creativity in the practice of the ECHR in cases involving encroachments on the democratic foundations of society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public security, in order to prevent riots or crimes are relatively narrower. The precedent of such decisions in assessing the validity of government actions, their determinants of urgent social need, proportionality and compliance with the legitimate aim. When interfering with the right to freedom of creativity, an analysis of the balance between the restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society and the right to freedom of expression are considered. Summing up the practice of the ECHR concerning restrictions on the freedom of creativity that are necessary in a democratic society.


Author(s):  
Andrew Clapham

‘Balancing rights—free speech and privacy’ considers the human rights that have built-in limitations. The thrust of international human rights law for these rights is that limitations to rights must be justified by reference to pre-existing accessible laws that allow for proportionate action necessary to achieve a legitimate aim such as national security, public order, or the rights of others. Human rights simultaneously claim to protect freedom of expression and the right to privacy, but how do you balance these rights and put them into practice? It all depends on the context and proportionality.


Author(s):  
Leto Cariolou

This chapter analyses key features of the purported conflict between the right to free speech and the right to reputation in the context of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The chapter addresses two questions. How can it be that the right to free speech and the right to reputation co-exist as equal, when they can require directly opposite results or protective measures? Second, how can the seemingly inescapable conflict between them be principally reconciled without leading to inconsistent outcomes, depending on how the claims on which they are grounded are framed and adjudicated? The chapter argues that, in adjudicating defamation cases, the ECtHR employs in principle substantive reasoning aimed at delineating or defining the content of both rights, which effectively circumnavigates the conflict between them. Thus the limits of freedom of expression are set where protection of the right to reputation begins; and vice versa.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-83
Author(s):  
José Poças Rascão

The article addresses human rights, in particular freedom of expression and the right to privacy, including on the internet, proposing to emphasize the issue of their dialectics in the context of contemporary digital society that, in the face of the digitization of modern life, faces many challenges. It becomes necessary in this way to understand, through a theoretical review, the history of fundamental human rights, a psychosocial analysis of the concepts of freedom and privacy, the normative framework in which they fall, the internet as a platform for exercising rights and freedoms, the problems associated with it, digital data and people's movements, citizen surveillance, social engineering of power, online social networks and e-commerce, and spaces of trust and conflict.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Ashley Floyd Kuntz

Abstract Student protests have developed on campuses throughout the country in response to controversial speakers. Overwhelmingly, these protests have been framed as conflicts over the right to free speech and the importance of free inquiry on college campuses. This essay reframes conflicts like these as moral disagreements over the role of individuals and institutions in producing and disseminating knowledge that supports or undermines justice within a pluralistic, democratic society. Using the specific case of Charles Murray’s visit to Middlebury College in spring 2017 and drawing insight from social moral epistemology, the essay aims to clarify the moral concerns at stake in clashes over controversial speakers and to identify possibilities to advance the moral aims of institutions of higher education in response to such events.


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


Author(s):  
Allan Hepburn

In the 1940s and 1950s, Britain was relatively uniform in terms of race and religion. The majority of Britons adhered to the Church of England, although Anglo-Catholic leanings—the last gasp of the Oxford Movement—prompted some people to convert to Roman Catholicism. Although the secularization thesis has had a tenacious grip on twentieth-century literary studies, it does not account for the flare-up of interest in religion in mid-century Britain. The ecumenical movement, which began in the 1930s in Europe, went into suspension during the war, and returned with vigour after 1945, advocated international collaboration among Christian denominations and consequently overlapped with the promotion of human rights, especially the defence of freedom of worship, the right to privacy, freedom of conscience, and freedom of expression.


2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Gerstenberg

In this paper I want to address, against the background of the ECtHR’s recent attempt to resolve the clash between property rights and the right to freedom of expression in its decision in Appleby v. UK, two questions, both of which I take to be related to the overarching theme of “social democracy”. First, there is the problem of the influence of “higher law”-of human rights norms and constitutional norms-on private law norms; second, the question of the role of adjudication in “constitutionalizing” private law, in other words, the question of the “judicial cognizability” of constitutional norms within private law.


Author(s):  
Sophy Baird

Children are afforded a number of protections when they encounter the criminal justice system. The need for special protection stems from the vulnerable position children occupy in society. When children form part of the criminal justice system, either by being an offender, victim, or witness, they may be subjected to harm. To mitigate against the potential harm that may be caused, our law provides that criminal proceedings involving children should not be open to the public, subject to the discretion of the court. This protection naturally seems at odds with the principle of open justice. However, the courts have reconciled the limitation with the legal purpose it serves. For all the protection and the lengths that the law goes to protect the identity of children in this regard, it appears there is an unofficial timer dictating when this protection should end. The media have been at the forefront of this conundrum to the extent that they believe that once a child (offender, victim, or witness) turns 18 years old, they are free to reveal the child's identity. This belief, grounded in the right to freedom of expression and the principle of open justice, is at odds with the principle of child's best interests, right to dignity and the right to privacy. It also stares incredulously in the face of the aims of the Child Justice Act and the principles of restorative justice. Measured against the detrimental psychological effects experienced by child victims, witnesses, and offenders, this article aims to critically analyse the legal and practical implications of revealing the identity of child victims, witnesses, and offenders after they turn 18 years old.


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