scholarly journals Top Management Team Internationalization and Firm-level Internationalization: The Moderating Effects of Home-region Institutional Diversity and Firm Global Focus

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niccolò Pisani ◽  
Alan Muller ◽  
Paula Bogăţan
2015 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Abernathy ◽  
Thomas R. Kubick ◽  
Adi Masli

ABSTRACT Prior research provides evidence that individual executives have a significant effect on firm-level tax policy. Further research has shown that having a corporate general counsel (GC) in a firm's top management team (top five highest-paid executives) significantly affects a firm's accounting and disclosure practices. In this paper, we examine the role of the GC in corporate tax policy. Specifically, we use the ascension of the corporate GC to top management as the identifying event in which the role and influence of the corporate GC becomes more salient. We find strong evidence that GC ascension to top management is associated with an increase in tax aggressiveness, as evidenced by greater book-tax differences and a higher likelihood of engaging in tax shelter activities. Data Availability: Data are obtained from public sources identified in the paper.


1970 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-114
Author(s):  
Matthew Gilley ◽  
Bruce Walters ◽  
Bradley Olson

We investigate the influence of top management team (TMT) risk takingpropensities on firm performance. Diverging from previous work on the risktaking-performance relationship, we rely on perceptual (rather than archival)measures of risk taking. In addition to financial performance, we examineother performance outcomes of risk taking, such as innovativeness andstakeholder satisfaction. Contrary to the findings of Bromiley (1991J andBowman (1980), we find that risk taking has a strong positive influence onfirm performance. In addition, the risk taking-performance relationship ismoderated by the dynamism of the firm's industry. More specifically, we findthat the benefits of TMT risk taking are reduced in more dynamic environments.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Wang ◽  
Chia-Jung Lee ◽  
Shu-Chien Hsu ◽  
Jieh-Haur Chen

PurposeCorporate illegal activities may result in fatal injuries and economic losses and have been widely reported in the construction industry. This study is to investigate the relationship between top management team (TMT) compensation and corporate illegal activities with the moderating effects of aspiration–performance discrepancies.Design/methodology/approachUsing a multi-year sample of Chinese construction firms from 2011 to 2017, this paper employed a hierarchical logit regression model with fixed effects.FindingsThis study indicates that TMT compensation is positively related to the likelihood of corporate illegal activities. It also finds performance higher than aspirations would lower the probability of illegal activities while performance lower than aspirations also decreases the occurrence of illegal behaviors. Finally, the positive relationship between TMT compensation and illegal activities is strengthened by aspiration–performance discrepancies.Practical implicationsIt recommended the design of executive compensation may need to be reconsidered. Next, companies need to carefully monitor top management team, especially when performance is lower than the desired level. Finally, debt-to-equity ratio deserves more attention for Chinese construction firms in suppressing illegal activities.Originality/valueGiven the mixed effects of TMT compensation, this study confirms its positive impact on corporate illegal behaviors. Consistent with the behavioral theory of the firm, it unveils the direct and moderating effects of aspiration-performance discrepancies. The findings are beneficial for evaluating firms' performance and considering the prevention of corporate fraudulent activities.


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