Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Ronald Reagan Administration in the United States

Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (11 (109)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
German Gigolaev

The USA, as well as the USSR, initiated the convocation of the III UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973—1982). However, after the Ronald Reagan administration came to the White House, American diplomacy significantly changed its policy toward the Conference, which eventually resulted in US refusal to support the draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was worked out during the Conference. This behavior was in line with policy course of the Reagan administration — more aggressive than that of their predecessors. The article considers the American policy regarding Law of the Sea negotiations in the first months of Reagan's presidency, during the Tenth Session of the III UNCLOS.

1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 808-816 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Watters

The Convention on the Law of the Sea, the culminating document of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, received favorable votes from 130 States in April 1982. The United States voted against approval. Articles 149 and 303, which address archaeological and historical objects found in various ocean zones, are compromise measures with ambiguous texts that are subject to interpretation. Archaeologists generally, not simply underwater archaeologists, should be concerned with these provisions because they could set an unfortunate precedent for future international negotiations involving cultural resources, and because they may apply to inundated prehistoric sites as well as to shipwrecks.


Author(s):  
Alfred W. McCoy

The current war on drugs being waged by the United States and United Nations rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the global nar­cotics traffic. In 1998, for example, the White House issued a National Drug Con­trol Strategy, proclaiming a 10-year program “to reduce illegal drug use and avail­ability 50 percent by the year 2007,” thereby achieving “the lowest recorded drug-use rate in American history.” To this end, the U.S. program plans to reduce foreign drug cultivation, shipments from source countries like Colombia, and smuggling in key transit zones. Although this strategy promises a balanced attack on both supply and demand, its ultimate success hinges upon the complete eradi­cation of the international supply of illicit drugs. “Eliminating the cultivation of il­licit coca and opium,” the document says in a revealing passage, “is the best ap­proach to combating cocaine and heroin availability in the U.S.” (U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy 1998: 1, 23, 28). Similarly, in 1997 the new head of the United Nations Drug Control Program, Dr. Pino Arlacchi, announced a 10-year program to eradicate all illicit opium and coca cultivation, starting in Afghanistan. Three years later, in the United Nation’s World Drug Report 2000, he defended prohibition’s feasibility by citing China as a case where “comprehensive narcotics control strategies . . . succeeded in eradicat­ing opium between 1949 and 1954”— ignoring the communist coercion that al­lowed such success. Arlacchi also called for an “end to the psychology of despair” that questions drug prohibition, and insisted that this policy can indeed produce “the eradication of coca and opium poppy production.” Turning the page, however, the reader will find a chart showing a sharp rise in world opium production from 500 tons in 1981 to 6,000 tons in 2000— a juxtaposition that seems to challenge Ar-lacchi’s faith in prohibition (Bonner 1997; Wren 1998a, 1998b; United Nations 2000d, 1–2, 24). Examined closely, the United States and United Nations are pur­suing a drug control strategy whose success requires not just the reduction but also the total eradication of illicit narcotics cultivation from the face of the globe. Like the White House, the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) re­mains deeply, almost theologically committed to the untested proposition that the prohibition of cultivation is an effective response to the problem of illicit drugs.


1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-178 ◽  
Author(s):  

In 1982 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted a treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, that succeeded in resolving the most fundamental questions of the law of the sea in accordance with three basic principles: 1.The rules of the law of the sea must fairly balance the respective interests of all states, notably the competing coastal and maritime interests, in a manner that is generally acceptable.2.Multilateral negotiations on the basis of consensus replace unilateral claims of right as the principal means for determining that balance.3.Compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms should be adopted to interpret, apply, and enforce the balance.


1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke T. Lee

The decision of the United States and 22 other countries not to sign the Law of the Sea Convention in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982, raises the important question of the legal effects of the. Convention upon nonsignatories (hereinafter referred to as “third states”). Will the latter be entitled to claim and enjoy treaty provisions beneficial to them, such as those pertaining to military or commercial navigation through international straits, including submerged passage and overflight rights, or will these rights be considered as contractual in nature, exercisable only by states parties? Clearly, the question is of critical importance to the regime of the law of the sea. Since there has been to date no systematic legal analysis of this important question in debates surrounding the Law of the Sea Convention, this essentially legal question has been consigned to general policy pronouncements.


Grotiana ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Logue

AbstractOn April 30, 1982, the Eleventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) endorsed the final version of the Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea by a vote of 130 to 4, with 17 abstentions.1 The Session met at UN Headquarters in New York from March 8 to April 30.2


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