scholarly journals Kant and the Forms of Realism (Translated by M. Evstigneev)

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Dietmar Heidemann
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Metaphysical Realism ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Questions

Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of Pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.

scholarly journals Kant and the forms of realism

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar Heidemann
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Metaphysical Realism ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Questions

AbstractRealism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.

scholarly journals Some Remarks in Defense of Immanuel Kant's Theory of Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Balanovskiy Valentin
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Experiential Knowledge ◽  
Central Position ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Reliable Knowledge ◽  
Conceptual Nature

The author attempts to answer a question of whether the fact that Immanuel Kant’s theory of experience most likely has a conceptual nature decreases an importance of Kant’s ideas for contemporary philosophy, because if experience is conceptual by nature, then certain problems with the search for means to verify experiential knowledge arise. In particular, two approaches are proposed. According to the first approach, the exceptional conceptuality of Kant’s theory of experience may be a consequence of absence of some important chains in arguments contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, which could clarify a question of how the conceptual apparatus of the subject corresponds to the reality. The author puts a hypothesis that the missing chains are not a mistake, but Kant’s deliberate silence caused by the lack of accurate scientific information that could not have been available to humankind in Enlightenment epoch. According to the second approach even if Kant’s theory of experience is exclusively conceptual by nature, this cannot automatically lead to a conclusion that it is unsuitable for obtaining reliable knowledge about reality, since transcendental idealism has powerful internal tools for verifying data in the process of cognition. The central position among them is occupied by transcendental reflection.

Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Gravitational Force ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Semantic Interpretation ◽  
Cognitive Semantics ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Newtonian Mechanics ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
History Of

AbstractKant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science (and which is entirely independent of Transcendental Idealism). Here I argue that Kant’s cognitive semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§ 1). I then briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§ 2), and show that it is embedded in, and strongly supports, Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (per Harper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§ 3). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s main argument for his anti-realist Constructive Empiricism, and in many common objections to realism (§ 4). These problems reveal yet a further important regard in which Constructive Empiricism is not (so to speak) ‘empirically’ adequate, not even to Classical Newtonian Mechanics (§ 5). This inadequacy of Constructive Empiricism highlights a chronic empiricist misunderstanding of Newton’s mechanics (§ 6). Finally, Kant’s cognitive semantics improves upon the semantic interpretation of scientific theories, and rectifies the presumption that laws of physics literally ‘lie’ (§ 7). Thus Kant and Newton still have invaluable lessons for contemporary philosophy and history of science (§ 8).

Rethinking Kant—Again

Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-514
Author(s):  
Manfred Kuehn
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Richard Rorty ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason

This is a highly interesting book, and one that is, in its own way, most important. The Structure of Experience is well written and effectively argued. It shows Gordon Nagel to be a rigorous and independent thinker who is as well acquainted with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as he is with modern analytic philosophy. Because he has been successful in avoiding “to presuppose a background in Kant studies”, the book can indeed “be read by anyone interested in perception, cognition, or the philosophy of mind” (vii). In fact, it is to be recommended as an introduction to recent epistemology as well as to Kant. And this is perhaps as it should be, as the study of Kant has deeply influenced the broader developments of contemporary philosophy. P. F. Strawson, Jonathan Bennett, Richard Rorty, and Barry Stroud, to name only a few of the best-known figures, all developed their own views in conscious dependence upon and/or opposition to Kant. Since Nagel is firmly rooted in this tradition, his book may be taken as a contribution to both the study of Kant and the discussion of contemporary philosophieal issues.

scholarly journals Kantian Transcendentalism in Contemporary Philosophical Discussions. Report of the “Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy-3” International Workshop

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
A. A. Shiyan ◽  
N. F., Derzhavina ◽  
S. L. Katrechko
Keyword(s):  
International Workshop ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Problem Area ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
State University ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Russian State ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Relationship

The review presents the International Workshop “Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy-3: Nature (Specificities) of Transcendental Philosophy” held in Moscow on 19-22 April, 2018. The workshop was co-sponsored by the State Academic University for the Humanities, the Russian State University for the Humanities and the Foundation for the Humanities. The review examines the main topics of the workshop, summarises the main presentations and explicates the problem area of modern interpretations of Kant and the development of transcendentalism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The presentations, questions and discussions centred around the main problems of transcendentalism: the differences between the phenomenon and the thing in itself, between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, the relationship between realist and constructivist aspects of Kantian transcendentalism, the transformation of Kantian transcendental philosophy in Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology and more.

Kants kritische Psychologie als Aufklärung

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-273
Author(s):  
Hyeongjoo Kim ◽  
Carina Pape
Keyword(s):  
Important Change ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Complete Rejection ◽  
Age Of Enlightenment

In his famous essay from 1784, Kant denied that we "live in an enlightened age"; yet he claimed that we "live in an age of enlightenment". If we should answer the question if we live in an enlightened age now, we could basically give the same answer. The enlightenment as an ongoing process can be found throughout Kant's whole work. This article focuses on how the concept of enlightenment can be applied to the Kantian psychology, which marks an important change of theory of the soul within modern western metaphysics. Kant's idea of enlightenment and 'critique' will be illustrated with reference to the "Paralogisms" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally, an analysis of some passages of the "Paralogisms" shall demonstrate that Kant's critique of the previous metaphysical doctrine of the human soul should not be understood as a complete rejection of this doctrine; rather, Kant's critique of what is called rational psychology should be understood as a critical transformation.

Kant’s Material Condition of Real Possibility

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
Rational Theology ◽  
Material Condition

In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the key to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects.

Epilogue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction

This brief chapter summarizes central findings regarding the role of parenthetical sentences in practical discourse. But it also provides historical context. It suggests that a precursor of parentheticalism may be found in Kant, especially in Kant’s views about the “I think,” especially as they are expressed in the B-Version of the “Transcendental Deduction” and the B-Version of the chapter on Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason.

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