Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Gravitational Force ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Semantic Interpretation ◽  
Cognitive Semantics ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Newtonian Mechanics ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
History Of

AbstractKant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science (and which is entirely independent of Transcendental Idealism). Here I argue that Kant’s cognitive semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§ 1). I then briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§ 2), and show that it is embedded in, and strongly supports, Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (per Harper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§ 3). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s main argument for his anti-realist Constructive Empiricism, and in many common objections to realism (§ 4). These problems reveal yet a further important regard in which Constructive Empiricism is not (so to speak) ‘empirically’ adequate, not even to Classical Newtonian Mechanics (§ 5). This inadequacy of Constructive Empiricism highlights a chronic empiricist misunderstanding of Newton’s mechanics (§ 6). Finally, Kant’s cognitive semantics improves upon the semantic interpretation of scientific theories, and rectifies the presumption that laws of physics literally ‘lie’ (§ 7). Thus Kant and Newton still have invaluable lessons for contemporary philosophy and history of science (§ 8).

Kant's Cognitive Semantics, Newton's Rule Four of Philosophy and Scientific Realism

2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Gravitational Force ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Original Version ◽  
Cognitive Semantics ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason

Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasoncontains an original and powerful semantics of singular cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science. Here I argue that Kant's semantics directly and strongly supports Newton's Rule 4 of (natural) Philosophy in ways which support Newton's realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton's Rule 4 of Philosophy and its role in Newton's justification of realism about gravitational force (§II). Next I briefly summarize Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference (§III). I then show that the key point of Kant's cognitive semantics is embedded in and strongly supports Newton's Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (perHarper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§IV). Finally, I argue that Kant's semantics reveals a key defect in the original version of Bas van Fraassen's anti-realist ‘Constructive Empiricism’, and in many common objections to realism (§V). Fortunately, Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference stands independently of his Transcendental Idealism; nothing I argue in this paper depends at all upon that doctrine.In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. (Newton 1999: 796)

scholarly journals Kant and the forms of realism

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar Heidemann
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Metaphysical Realism ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Questions

AbstractRealism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.

scholarly journals KRITIK IMMANUEL KANT TERHADAP FAHAM RASIONALISME DAN EMPIRISME

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (02) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jauhan Budiwan
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Profound Impact ◽  
Philosophical Movement ◽  
Philosophical Background ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind

Immanuel Kant is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him. This portion will focus on his metaphysics and epistemology in one of his most important works. The Critique of Pure Reason, A large part of Kant’s work addresses the question “What can we know?” The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the -natural, empirical world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind's access to the empirical realm of space and time. In order to understand Kant's position, we must understand the philosophical background that he was reacting to. First, 1 will present a brief overview of his predecessor's positions with a brief statement of Kant's objections, then I will return to a more detailed exposition of Kant's arguments. There are two major historical movements in the early modem period of philosophy that had a significant impact on Kant; Empiricism and Rationalism,

scholarly journals Epistemologia Kanta jako rozwiązanie sporu empiryzmu z racjonalizmem

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Michał Wendland
Keyword(s):  
Turning Point ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
German Philosophy ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Pure Intuition ◽  
History Of ◽  
Main Ideas

The article concerns some of the most important elements of I. Kant’s epistemology and its connections with earlier epistemological ideas, namely rationalism and empiricism. The history of dispute between rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz) and empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) is hereby shortly presented while Kant’s own philosophical achievements are suggested to be both alternative and synthesis of these. The main core of this paper is summary of basis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; some most important categories are described: apriorism, synthetic and analytical judgements, knowledge a priori and a posteriori, main ideas of transcendental esthetics (two forms of pure intuition: time and space), main ideas of transcendental logic (forms of judgement and twelve categories). Also the meaning of Kant’s „copernican revolution” is presented as a turning point for classical German philosophy as well as for whole modern epistemology.

scholarly journals Some Remarks in Defense of Immanuel Kant's Theory of Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Balanovskiy Valentin
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Experiential Knowledge ◽  
Central Position ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Reliable Knowledge ◽  
Conceptual Nature

The author attempts to answer a question of whether the fact that Immanuel Kant’s theory of experience most likely has a conceptual nature decreases an importance of Kant’s ideas for contemporary philosophy, because if experience is conceptual by nature, then certain problems with the search for means to verify experiential knowledge arise. In particular, two approaches are proposed. According to the first approach, the exceptional conceptuality of Kant’s theory of experience may be a consequence of absence of some important chains in arguments contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, which could clarify a question of how the conceptual apparatus of the subject corresponds to the reality. The author puts a hypothesis that the missing chains are not a mistake, but Kant’s deliberate silence caused by the lack of accurate scientific information that could not have been available to humankind in Enlightenment epoch. According to the second approach even if Kant’s theory of experience is exclusively conceptual by nature, this cannot automatically lead to a conclusion that it is unsuitable for obtaining reliable knowledge about reality, since transcendental idealism has powerful internal tools for verifying data in the process of cognition. The central position among them is occupied by transcendental reflection.

Rethinking Kant—Again

Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-514
Author(s):  
Manfred Kuehn
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Richard Rorty ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason

This is a highly interesting book, and one that is, in its own way, most important. The Structure of Experience is well written and effectively argued. It shows Gordon Nagel to be a rigorous and independent thinker who is as well acquainted with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as he is with modern analytic philosophy. Because he has been successful in avoiding “to presuppose a background in Kant studies”, the book can indeed “be read by anyone interested in perception, cognition, or the philosophy of mind” (vii). In fact, it is to be recommended as an introduction to recent epistemology as well as to Kant. And this is perhaps as it should be, as the study of Kant has deeply influenced the broader developments of contemporary philosophy. P. F. Strawson, Jonathan Bennett, Richard Rorty, and Barry Stroud, to name only a few of the best-known figures, all developed their own views in conscious dependence upon and/or opposition to Kant. Since Nagel is firmly rooted in this tradition, his book may be taken as a contribution to both the study of Kant and the discussion of contemporary philosophieal issues.

scholarly journals Kant's wager. Kant's strong belief in extra-terrestrial life, the history of this question and its challenge for theology today

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Losch
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Strong Belief ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Terrestrial Life ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

AbstractKant was not the first in whom the ‘starry heavens’ above us inspired awe and wonder. For Kant, who was firmly convinced of the existence of inhabitants of other worlds, these heavens were inhabited. He is certain that ‘If it were possible to settle by any sort of experience whether there are inhabitants of at least some of the planets that we see, I might well bet everything that I have on it. Hence I say that it is not merely an opinion but a strong belief (on the correctness of which I would wager many advantages in life) that there are also inhabitants of other worlds.’ In this statement by Kant in no less a work than the Critique of Pure Reason one can, on the one hand, recognize a reflection of Kant's earlier convictions and expositions, on the other hand, the context of the citation and the contemporary background are, of course, relevant. Following the example of Kant, this paper investigates the meaning of such reflections about inhabitants of alien worlds, which due to advances in planetary astronomy are today again on the agenda. Consideration of this subject also represents a challenge for theology.

scholarly journals Commemorative and Anniversary Philosophical Medals as a Visual Aid and Philosophical Source

2021 ◽  
Vol V (2) ◽  
pp. 143-190
Author(s):  
Alexey Kruglov
Keyword(s):  
18Th Century ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
German Enlightenment ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Late 18Th Century ◽  
Visual Aid ◽  
History Of ◽  
Sixtieth Anniversary ◽  
Philosophical Doctrine

The paper demonstrates the significance of commemorative and anniversary philosophical medals that are seen as a special visual aid for problematic issues in the history of philosophy specification. The author puts forward the thesis that such medals can clarify the perception of philosophical doctrine and the context of philosophical doctrine consideration at a particular time. So, they greatly assist as an additional historical and philosophical source, but they can hardly be helpful with the interpretation of either various aspects of a philosophical doctrine or a particular statement of a particular philosopher. The rationale for the thesis presents the analysis of four philosophical medals: the medal commemorating the foundation of the alethophile society (1740), A. Abramsonʼs medal in honor of I. Kantʼs sixtieth anniversary (1784), A. Abramsonʼs medal for the death of I. Kant (1804), A.L. Heldʼs medals in honor of the sixtieth anniversary of G.W.F. Hegel (1830). If the first three medals contribute to a better understanding of the philosophical traits of the German Enlightenment, the reasons for appealing to Horace's words “sapere aude”, Kant's peculiarity as an Enlightenmentist, philosophical meaning of the Kantian Copernican Revolution and the transformation of the perception of the “Critique of Pure Reason” in the late 18th century, expectations regarding the fourth medal has proved misplaced. It cannot clarify the Hegelian phrase about reason as a rose on the cross of modernity and reconciliation with reality. In addition, in the course of clarifying the meaning of the four aforementioned medals, the author also turns to the commemorative medal of Chr. Wolff by J. Dassier (c. 1733), the medal for the return of Chr. Wolff to Halle by J.Chr. Koch (1740) and the medal for Kantʼs death by F.W. Loos (1804).

scholarly journals Kant and the Forms of Realism (Translated by M. Evstigneev)

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Dietmar Heidemann
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Metaphysical Realism ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Questions

Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of Pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.

scholarly journals Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this?

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Jan Noras
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Philosophical Concept ◽  
History Of ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to introduce this term in the classification of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriateness of building the model of “Kantianism - Neo-Kantianism - Neo-Neo-Kantianism - Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's “Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early (classical) and late (“correct”). Neo-Kantianism shows the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or Hans-Michael Baumgartner.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document