Peer Disagreement and the Independence Principle

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (11:2) ◽  
pp. 507-520
Author(s):  
Faik Kurtulmuş
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Independence Principle

Religious Disagreement, Religious Experience, and the Evil God Hypothesis

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Religious Believer ◽  
Religious Experiences ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Religious Disagreement

Conciliationism is the view that says when an agent who believes P becomes aware of an epistemic peer who believes not-P, that she encounters a (partial) defeater for her belief that P. Strong versions of conciliationism pose a sceptical threat to many, if not most, religious beliefs since religion is rife with peer disagreement. Elsewhere (Removed) I argue that one way for a religious believer to avoid sceptical challenges posed by strong conciliationism is by appealing to the evidential import of religious experience. Not only can religious experience be used to establish a relevant evidential asymmetry between disagreeing parties, but reliable reports of such experiences also start to put pressure on the religious sceptic to conciliate toward her religious opponent. Recently, however, Asha Lancaster-Thomas poses a highly innovative challenge to the evidential import of religious experience. Namely, she argues that an evil God is just as likely to explain negative religious experiences as a good God is able to explain positive religious experiences. In light of this, religious believers need to explain why a good God exists instead of an evil God. I respond to Lancaster-Thomas by suggesting that, at least within the context of religious experience, (i) that the evil God hypothesis is only a challenge to certain versions of theism; and (ii) that the existence of an evil God and good God are compossible.

scholarly journals The Problem of Unwelcome Epistemic Company

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Joshua Blanchard
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Normative Status

Abstract Many of us are unmoved when it is objected that some morally or intellectually suspect source agrees with our belief. While we may tend to find this kind of guilt by epistemic association unproblematic, I argue that this tendency is a mistake. We sometimes face what I call the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. This is the problem of encountering agreement about the content of your belief from a source whose faults give you reason to worry about the belief's truth, normative status, etiology, or implications. On the basis of an array of cases, I elaborate four distinct kinds of problems that unwelcome epistemic company poses. Two of these are distinctly epistemic, and two are moral. I canvass possible responses, ranging from stubbornness to an epistemic prudishness that avoids unwelcome company at all costs. Finally, I offer preliminary lessons of the problem and distinguish it from the problem of peer disagreement.

Experimental Investigation of Vortex-Induced Vibrations on Yawed and Inclined Flexible Cylinders

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Vieira ◽  
Guilherme R. Franzini ◽  
Fredi Cenci ◽  
Andre Fujarra
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Flexible Structures ◽  
Resonance Region ◽  
Offshore Structures ◽  
Natural Mode ◽  
Flexible Cylinder ◽  
Decomposition Scheme ◽  
Independence Principle ◽  
Modal Amplitude ◽  
Time Histories

Abstract An experimental setup was built to investigate the Vortex-Induced Vibration (VIV) phenomenon on yawed and inclined flexible cylinders, in which five yaw angles θ = 0°, 10°, 20°, 30° and 45° and five azimuth angles ß = 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, and 180° were combined. The experiments were carried out in a towing tank facility at Reynolds numbers from 1800 to 18000, comprising vibrations up to the eighth natural mode. Time histories of displacements were recorded using a submerged optical system that tracks 17 reflective targets. A modal decomposition scheme based on Galerkin's method was applied, aiming multimodal behavior investigations. Such an approach allowed the analysis of the modal amplitude throughout time, revealing interesting results for such a class of VIV tests. The flexible cylinder total response is generally a combination of two or more modes. Only for azimuths 0°, 90°, and 180°, a unimodal response was observed for the two first lock-in regimes. The frequency response showed that, when the response was multimodal, non-dominant modes can follow the vibration frequency of the dominant one. Assuming a priori the Independence Principle (IP) valid to define the reduced velocities (Vr), it was observed that the resonance region was restricted to 3 <= Vr <= 8 for the tested cases, indicating that the IP can be at least partially applied for flexible structures. As the literature scarcely explores the simultaneous yawed and inclined configurations, the present work may contribute to further code validation and improvements regarding the design of slender offshore structures.

Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Andree Weber
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Imprecise Probabilities ◽  
Peer Disagreement

Abstract The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities.

A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement

Inquiry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (8) ◽  
pp. 795-811
Author(s):  
Ruth Weintraub
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement

Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement

Synthese ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 191 (11) ◽  
pp. 2383-2401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Cevolani
Keyword(s):  
Truth Approximation ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Belief Merging

scholarly journals The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Face ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep disagreement occurs when there is a disagreement between fundamental frameworks. According to Robert J. Fogelin disagreements between fundamental frameworks are not susceptible to rational resolution. Instead of evaluating this claim I argue that deep disagreements can lead to epistemic benefits, at least when inquiry is in view. Whether rational resolution is possible in cases of deep disagreements, their existence turns out to be epistemically beneficial. I conclude by examining whether this line of argument can be taken beyond research-related contexts.Dans la littérature sur l'épistémologie du désaccord, un argument sous-développé pour une approche non conciliatoire se fonde sur l'idée qu'il y a des bénéfices épistémiques à tirer du désaccord. De tels bénéfices sont impossibles à obtenir si un agent se concilie face au désaccord avec ses pairs, du moins dans les contextes liés à la recherche. Dans la théorie de l'argumentation, un désaccord profond se produit lorsqu'il y a un désaccord entre des propositions cadres. Je soutiens que des désaccords profonds peuvent mener à des avantages épistémiques, du moins dans le contexte de la recherche. Que la résolution rationnelle soit ou non possible en cas de désaccord profond, leur existence s'avère être bénéfique sur le plan épistémologique.

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