scholarly journals Tortious Civil Liability in Environmental Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-34
Author(s):  
Gabriela Nemțoi ◽  
Ciprian Gabriel Ungureanu
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Environmental Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Tort Liability ◽  
Legislative Framework ◽  
The Common ◽  
Injured Party ◽  
The One ◽  
Balance Rehabilitation

Tort liability consists in the obligation of the one who has committed an injury to indemnify the injured party. Tort liability is a legal operation which, according to the Civil Code, when an unlawful act causing damage is committed, the reverse means compensating the injured party. In the case of the environment, the one who harms is not always sanctioned, so in the case of this issue the legislator has developed a rather broad legislative framework. The common law has become applicable in the field of the environment based on the provisions of art. 135 para. (2) lit. e) of the Constitution, which stipulates that , which stipulates that , which stipulates that, the environment is an area that must have a legal protection so that the state maintains a permanent ecological balance. Rehabilitation of the environment is done by applying sanctions to those concerned. So the institution of tort liability is an instrument in the gear of environmental protection.

scholarly journals Conceptualising A Role for The Common Law in Environmental Protection in Singapore

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Kenny Chng
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Environmental Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Common

Abstract In Singapore, the key institutions driving environmental protection are the legislature and the executive. The judiciary's role in environmental protection has thus far been relatively minor. By drawing upon environmental law theory and comparative analysis of other common law jurisdictions, this article explores avenues through which the common law can be engaged more meaningfully to further environmental protection in Singapore. A conceptualisation of environmental law as directed at furthering the rule of law by promoting carefully-considered and participatory environmental governance will be suggested as a fruitful way forward for thinking about the role of the common law in environmental protection. Drawing upon this theory, as well as the experience of other common law jurisdictions, the article proposes a set of concrete steps by which greater common law engagement with environmental protection in Singapore can be achieved.

Surrender to the inevitable?

1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Louise Tee
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
Trust Mechanism ◽  
Land Registration ◽  
Land Transfer ◽  
Adverse Possession ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Times ◽  
The One ◽  
Substantive Law

ADVERSE possession and registered land are unlikely bedfellows–the one originating in the common law idea that a freehold estate results from possession and the other premised upon registration validating title. Indeed, when registration of title was introduced into England and Wales in the nineteenth century, acquisition of title to registered land by adverse possession was prohibited–see section 21 of the Land Transfer Act 1875. However, a more pragmatic approach then ensued, and the Land Registration Act 1925, s. 75, expansively provided that the Limitation Acts should apply to registered land in the same manner and to the same extent as those Acts applied to unregistered land. But technically, of course, this was impossible, and the section detailed a special trust mechanism for registered land alone. Section 75 thus clearly illustrates the inherent difficulties in trying to retain the substantive law of unregistered land within a registered context. Tensions are inevitable, because of the very different conceptual bases of the two systems. In Central London Commercial Estates Ltd. v. Kato Kagaku Ltd., The Times, 27 July 1998, Sedley J. was directly faced with such tension, as he strove to determine the effect of section 75.

Is the Prisoner's Character Indivisible?

1953 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. N. Gooderson
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sexual Morality ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
A Charge

“There is no such thing known to our procedure as putting half a prisoner's character in issue and leaving out the other half.” This observation fell from Humphreys J. in delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Winfield (1939). The purpose of this article is to suggest that at common law this statement is not borne out by principle or by authority. The effect on the common law where the prisoner elects to go into the witness-box in exercise of the statutory opportunity created by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, will also be considered. The type of situation that arises is illustrated by Winfield's Case, where the facts, in brief, were that on a charge of indecent assault, W. put in issue his good character for sexual morality, and the prosecution in cross-examination proved his previous convictions for offences involving dishonesty. The court held that such cross-examination was proper. The question is whether the evidence of the good or bad character of the prisoner must be confined to the trait or traits relevant to the type of crime charged. It will be submitted that the evidence must be so confined. On an indictment for murder, evidence of the good or bad character of the prisoner for honesty will be inadmissible. Not only the crime charged but also the circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed must be considered. If the murder is committed with a hammer, character for peace and quiet on the one hand and for violence on the other will be admissible, but not if it is a case of slow poisoning.

The Legal Protection of Believers and Beliefs in the United Kingdom

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier García Oliva
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Legal Mechanism ◽  
Degree Of Overlap

The enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is the most recent legal mechanism developed to protect believers, beliefs and religious feelings in the United Kingdom. Despite the recognition of a certain degree of overlap between the different categories, this article proposes a broad distinction between legal devices which protect believers and those which safeguard beliefs and religious feelings. The common law offence of blasphemy is analysed, taking into consideration the response of both the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights. The endorsement of the English law of blasphemy by Strasbourg is particularly relevant. Furthermore, this paper focuses on different instruments that, throughout the last few decades, have been articulated to protect the faithful, such as the crimes of religiously aggravated offences and the offence of incitement to religious hatred.

scholarly journals THE DEVELOPMENT OF A “RESCUE CULTURE”. INSOLVENCY GLOBALIZATION

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Ionel DIDEA ◽  
Diana Maria ILIE
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
The Self ◽  
General Will ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Global Context ◽  
Structural Coherence ◽  
Self Adaptation ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One

We are heading towards a phenomenon of internationalization and globalization of the substantiation of law, due to the fact that Romania is, inevitably, part of the process of integration and reflection of its own identity in a European and global context. Ultimately, law derives from observing the society and analysing its needs, passing through the filter of equity the final legal form in order to ensure the completeness of law, and also the structural coherence of society. Although the continental European legal culture is attached to the “general will”, globalization managed to erase many of the symbolical boundaries between the legal culture promoted by the Common-law, the one promoted by our system deeply markedby the Romano-Germanic System, and also the legal system outlined by American Realist trends, thus allowing the law to become the result of the self-adaptation of the society, not just the creation of the State.

scholarly journals Creating a Servitude to solve an Encroachment Dispute: A Solution or creating another Problem?

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 454
Author(s):  
Zsa-Zsa Temmers Boggenpoel
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Court Order ◽  
General Application ◽  
African Context ◽  
Personal Level ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

The main focus of this note is the case of Roseveare v Katmer, Katmer v Roseveare 2013 ZAGPJHC 18, which provides an interesting (though possibly constitutionally problematic) perspective to the encroachment problem. The decision in this case has opened the door for courts to create servitudes in instances where encroachments are left intact based on policy reasons. Concerning these policy reasons, the note investigates the reasonableness standard as it was applied in the case. It is argued that it is important to differentiate between the applications of reasonableness in encroachment cases and alleged nuisance disputes. The decision in this case creates the impression that courts may now order that a servitude be registered in favour of the encroacher against the affected landowner’s property. It seems as though the court had in mind the creation of a praedial servitude to justify the continued existence of the encroachment. The servitude is created by court order against the will of the affected landowner. At common law, the creation of a servitude in this respect does not exist, and the authority from which the power derives to make an order like this is not entirely clear. The court also does not provide any authority for the creation of the servitude in favour of the encroacher. Consequently, it is argued that this may have serious constitutional implications. For one, lack of authority for the deprivation that results may be unconstitutional because there is no law of general application that authorises the deprivation in terms of section 25(1). The creation of a servitude to explain the continued existence of the encroachment is not automatically included in the general discretion to replace removal with compensation. It is contended that an order that forces the affected landowner to register a servitude in favour of the encroacher to preserve the existing encroachment situation will be in conflict with section 25(1) as far as the common law does not authorise such an order. Furthermore, an order creating a servitude against the affected landowner’s will need to be separately justified in terms of the non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1). In this respect, the order will be unjustified and therefore arbitrary on both a general and personal level. Although this decision eliminates the enduring problem in encroachment law concerning the rights of the respective parties to the affected land where encroachments are not removed, it is reasoned in this note that the solving of this problem may have created another one. The decision is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, in so far as the court has attempted to provide clarity in terms of the rights to the encroached-upon land. However, the absence of authority either in terms of the common law or legislation to create a servitude in this context, indicates that courts should avoid orders of this nature because of their implications. If legislation is enacted to regulate building encroachments, it may be useful to explain what happens when the encroachment is not removed and it may also provide the required law of general application to prevent constitutional infringement. The legislation should specify the nature of the right acquired by the encroacher, which in the South African context should probably be a servitude created against the affected landowner’s property. This may ensure that the required authority exists for the creation of the servitude and would also provide the necessary justification to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of property. It is accordingly submitted that the unnecessary confusion that results from the inability to explain the outcome (or provide sufficient reason) on the one hand, and the possible constitutional infringement due to the lack of authority on the other, may therefore be cleared up by the suggested legislation.

scholarly journals PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE IN SOUTH AFRICA: PROHIBITION OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lizelle Ramaccio Calvino
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Physical Punishment ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Private Sphere ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Legislative Framework ◽  
The Common

On 18 September 2019, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the common-law defence of “reasonable and moderate chastisement” is unconstitutional as it unjustifiably violates sections 10 and 12(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. As a result, parents are no longer permitted to punish their child at home by way of inflicting physical punishment behind a facade of discipline. Despite the aforesaid, it should be noted that corporal punishment in the private sphere is not explicitly prohibited by South African legislation. In addition, South Africa’s legislative system lacks an appropriate regulatory framework to administer the anticipated proliferation of assault cases against parents. It is against this backdrop that this article first analyses the current legislative framework regulating the protection of children from physical punishment, and then follows with a succinct overview of the Constitutional Court ruling. The article assesses whether the mere repeal of the common-law defence of “reasonable and moderate” chastisement will be sufficient to eradicate corporal punishment in the private sphere, and if not, whether legislative prohibition and/or other interceding strategies will be required to give effect to the objective of the Constitutional Court ruling. In this regard, by way of comparative research, the legislative framework adopted by Sweden, being the first country in the world to prohibit all forms of corporate punishment of children is evaluated. Lastly, recommendations are made for the incorporation of practical steps, including possible legislative measures, to establish a regulatory framework from a children’s rights perspective to prohibit corporal punishment in the private sphere. Accordingly, for purposes of analysis and consideration, a qualitative approach is applied for purposes of the research. Primary sources such as the Constitution, case law, legislation, governmental documents, statistical data and research reports are consulted in conjunction with journal articles and textbooks.

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