Research on the External Governance Effects of Short Selling Mechanism on Technological Innovation and Enterprise Performance

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Wenzhen Mai

<p>The effect of short selling mechanism is remained to be discussed as the conjecture regulators regard it as the cause of stock crash, while numerous previous studies have shown the external corporate governance effect of short selling which could supervise and monitor the behaviors of managements by reducing information asymmetries and agency costs. By reviewing the precious researches on the short selling, the findings of this study are that besides short selling could improve the informativeness of stock pricing, it also acts as external corporate governor and innovation motivator to develop the overall value and innovation performance of firms. </p>

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 236
Author(s):  
Wenzhen Mai ◽  
Nik Intan Norhan Binti Abdul Hamid

This study demonstrates an investigation of the external corporate governance effect of short selling mechanisms on firm value in the Chinese context. The effect of family businesses is also examined as a moderator of the relationship between short-selling and firm value. Using panel data analysis of Chinese listed companies, this paper tests a total sample of 22,468 firm-year observations from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2019 by applying the PSM-DID method in order to mitigate self-selection and endogenous problems caused by the uniqueness of Chinese short selling mechanisms. The findings suggest that both deregulation and the propensity of short selling can improve the firm value. Our findings also established that family ownership weakens firm value with the availability of short-selling, which indicates that family businesses have long orientations and conduct better corporate governance practices than non-family business, as short-selling shows a weaker external governance effect on firm value creation by family businesses in China. A robust test of alternative measurements is conducted and validated. This study provides significant insights for policymakers to consider in order to further relax short-selling constraints, which can act as effective external governance for better firm value creation, especially for non-family businesses in developing countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 261 ◽  
pp. 04028
Author(s):  
Mingming Liu ◽  
Hongjie Zhang

As China attaches great importance to the construction of ecological civilization, the fiscal expenditure on environmental protection is increasing year by year, which needs to attract more social capital to participate in the construction of ecological civilization. As the main body of market economy, it is of great significance for enterprises to fulfill their environmental responsibilities. Especially when technological innovation has become the most important driving force for enterprise growth and national competition, the relationship between corporate environmental responsibility fulfillment and technological innovation has attracted more and more attention from all walks of life. Based on this, this paper uses 2015-2019 non-state-owned chemical industry listed companies as the research object to investigate whether environmental protection behavior affects enterprise performance and whether innovation performance plays a mediating role. It is found that there is a significant positive correlation between environmental protection behavior and enterprise performance, but innovation performance will not have a significant mediating effect on environmental protection behavior and enterprise performance in the short term.


2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.


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