scholarly journals Wojna o wodę – wyzwanie dla bliskowschodnich armii w XX i XXI w.

Author(s):  
Magdalena Pogońska-Pol

Due to geographical conditions, climate and political instability, the Middle East is mentioned as an area of future water conflict. In the 20th and 21st centuries there were numerous disputes over this raw material. Conflicts have both internal and external dimensions. The main dispute was between Israel and the Arabs and indirectly led to the June 1967 war. The Arab states also used the army as a deterrent in the race for water. The competition takes place on the line Iraq, Syria, Turkey. Water has also been used as a weapon in the Middle East. ISIS fought for dams to use them strategically and tactically.

Author(s):  
Yathrib Khattab Mandell

The confect in the Yemeni in state and its internal repercussions and the tragedies suffered by the Yemeni people and the divisions and problems that have occurred and political in stability and its impact on the stability of the middle East was the talk of all thinkers and researchers as the internal conflict turned into a regional conflict intersecting and different objectives and interests between the conflicting forces on the middle East As a result the Yemeni arena has become a constant and politically unstable arena.


Author(s):  
Marcus DuBois King

Chapter 9 summarizes the volume asserting that the chapters herein provide compelling evidence that alters our conceptualization of hydropolitics in the Middle East. Understanding that the regional power structure, always in flux, is changing significantly today the authors offer critical insights into the future of water conflict, often in the context of growing water inequalities both between nations and within the nations themselves of the type that were a critical factor in the incitement of wide-scale unrest across the region, including the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 and the Syrian civil war. The chapter amplifies the authors’ arguments concluding that, without decisive international agreements over water sharing, dam construction, and improvements in national water governance policy, the world will face a future of dangerous growth in inequalities across the Middle East, and their attendant consequences in the form of insecurity and more conflict.


1971 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187
Author(s):  
Julius Stone

The Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 (“the November Resolution”) will obviously be a main focus of international attention in the diplomacy following the renewed Israel-Egypt Cease-Fire of August 8, 1970. And the writer has published a study of it in “The ‘November Resolution’ and Middle East Peace: Pitfall or Guidepost”? The present study, parallel to that one, is a stocktaking for the three years or so between the Cease-Fires of 1967 and 1970, of the conduct of Israel and the Arab States, as this bears upon their obligations under international law. The detailed aspects of conduct involved will be clear enough from the headings. All of them obviously pertain either to conduct affecting the regime of cease-fire, or to conduct affecting the regime of Israel's administration of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan Heights.Egypt and Syria, with massive Soviet support, have more than restored their armaments virtually to pre-June 1967 levels. According to Washington Post figures of May 23, 1970, Egypt's front-line aircraft then numbered 600 (including 320 Mig 21's and Sukhai 7's) as compared with 450 immediately before, and only 100 immediately after, the Six Day War. To these, after the disclosure of actual Soviet air patrols in Egypt, it is clear that by July 1970 a further 100 Mig 21's with accompanying Soviet pilots have to be added; and the arrival of another 50 Soviet-piloted aircraft was reported to be then impending. Syria was reported by Aviation Week and Space Technology (at about the same date) to have 230 planes (including 100 Mig 21's and Sukhai 7's). That magazine estimated that the Arab States involved marshalled a total of 1230 fighter bombers (including the 100 Soviet-manned planes), and that this represented a four to one superiority over Israel's 330 aircraft which included 60 Mirage 3J's, 42 Phantoms, and 48 Skyhawks. (The London Institute of Strategic Studies estimated Israel's holdings in May as only 325, including 50 Phantoms).


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