scholarly journals Hedge Funds: Do They Do What They Say They Do?

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott P. Mackey ◽  
Michael R. Melton

<p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The purpose of this research is two-fold, to determine if hedge funds follow their stated strategy styles and to examine how hedge funds&rsquo; strategy allocations evolve over time in response to changed economic and market conditions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Our key advance is that we show that standard linear style models like that of Sharpe (1992) can be applied to hedge fund returns as long as the returns of the style indices in the model themselves display the nonlinear option-like characteristics of hedge fund returns.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>For our research, the returns of our sample of Funds of Hedge Funds are strongly correlated to the returns of portfolios of hedge fund investment style indices. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>In this way, we capture the spirit of Fung &amp; Hsieh's (2002) Asset-Based Style Factors for Hedge Funds.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Based on our results, it appears that the answer to the first question is &ldquo;somewhat&rdquo;, while we find ample evidence of significant shifts in allocation among the Fund of Hedge Funds from the first sample period (1997-2001) to the second (2002-2006).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The changes in allocation appear to rationally reflect the changed economic conditions and investment opportunities existing at the time.</span></span></p>

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 565-586
Author(s):  
James Rambo ◽  
Gary Van Vuuren

Hedge funds are notorious for being opaque investment vehicles, operating beyond regulation and out of reach of the average investor. In the past decade, however, they have become increasingly accessible to industry and investors. Hedge fund investment vehicles have become more complex with disparate strategies employed to obtain hedged returns. With this added complexity and impenetrability of managerial tactics, investors need a robust means of distinguishing 'good' funds from 'bad'. The most commonly used ratio to do this is the Sharpe ratio, but hedge funds exhibit non-normal returns because of their use of derivatives, short selling and leverage. The Omega ratio accounts for all moments of the return distribution and in this article, it is used to rank fund returns and compare results obtained with those obtained from the Sharpe ratio over an expansionary period (2001 to 2007) and a period of economic difficulty (2008 to 2013). The Omega ratio is found to provide far superior rankings. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-439
Author(s):  
Sandip Dutta ◽  
James Thorson

Purpose Extant literature suggests that the difficulty associated with the interpretation of macroeconomic news announcements by the market in general in different economic environments, might be the reason why most studies do not find any significant relationship between real-sector macroeconomic variables and financial asset returns. This paper aims to use a different approach to measure macroeconomic news. The objective is to examine if a different measure of a macroeconomic news variable, constructed from media coverage of the same, significantly affects hedge fund returns. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a news index for unemployment, which is a real-sector variable, constructed from newspaper coverage of unemployment announcements and examine its impact on hedge fund returns. Findings Contrary to the other studies that examine the impact of macroeconomic news on hedge fund returns, the authors find that media coverage of unemployment news announcements significantly affects hedge fund returns. Practical implications Overall, this paper demonstrates that the manner in which the market interprets macroeconomic news announcements in different economic environments is probably a more relevant factor for hedge funds and is more likely to impact hedge fund returns. In conjunction with variables – constructed from media coverage of unemployment news announcements – that factor in the manner of interpretation, it is found that surprises also matter for hedge fund returns. This is an important consideration for hedge fund managers as well. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of media coverage of macroeconomic news announcements on hedge fund returns and finds significantly different results with real-sector macro variables.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (10) ◽  
pp. 4771-4810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clemens Sialm ◽  
Zheng Sun ◽  
Lu Zheng

Abstract Our paper analyzes the geographical preferences of hedge fund investors and the implication of these preferences for hedge fund performance. We find that funds of hedge funds overweigh their investments in hedge funds located in the same geographical areas and that funds with a stronger local bias exhibit superior performance. Local bias also gives rise to excess flow comovement and extreme return clustering within geographic areas. Overall, our results suggest that while funds of funds benefit from local advantages, their local bias also creates market segmentation that can destabilize the underlying hedge funds.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (08) ◽  
pp. 1750051 ◽  
Author(s):  
DILIP B. MADAN ◽  
WIM SCHOUTENS ◽  
KING WANG

Market efficiency is measured by arbitrage proximity. The level of efficiency is calibrated by extent of a distortion of probability required to neutralize the drift. Simulations of bilateral gamma models estimated from past returns deliver for each asset on each day an empirical acceptability index. The assets covered include equities, commodities, currencies, volatility and hedge fund returns. It is observed that efficiency in equity is related to the process for up moves having more frequent and smaller jumps than its down side counterpart. For commodities the situation is reversed. Volatility indices trade more efficiently than equities, commodities, or currencies. Hedge fund returns reflect lower levels of efficiency supportive of hedge funds effectively exploiting market inefficiences. The relative inefficiency of the absence of trading is noted on comparing close to open with open to close returns. Small capitalization stocks trade more efficiently than the large ones. Sector exchange traded funds trade more efficiently than the S&P 500 index. Furthermore, economic activity reflected in greater high low spreads enhance market efficiency.


Author(s):  
Mikhail Tupitsyn ◽  
Paul Lajbcygier

In theory, analogous to equity indices, hedge fund indices can provide broad exposure to hedge funds in a cost-effective manner. In practice, however, hedge fund indices are difficult to implement because direct investment in hedge funds is impractical. Unlike equities, hedge funds are not traded on liquid secondary markets and are often closed to new investment. A solution is hedge fund replication, which, rather than require direct investment in hedge funds, synthetically recreates hedge fund index returns by investing in portfolios that are exposed to the same underlying economic factors that drive hedge fund returns. This approach provides broad, cost-effective, hedge fund exposure and avoids the practical problems associated with direct hedge fund investment. As a consequence, such hedge fund clones exhibit lower tracking error and substantially higher raw and risk-adjusted returns than both investible and noninvestible hedge fund indices.


2021 ◽  
pp. 392-418
Author(s):  
Philippe Jorion

The growth of the hedge fund industry can be ascribed to its performance-based incentive compensation system as well as a lighter regulatory environment. These features, however, could also potentially create more opportunities for financial misreporting and even fraud. In response, recent research has attempted to detect misreporting by using due diligence information or by examining patterns in hedge fund returns. Empirical evidence suggests that hedge fund fraud can be usefully predicted from due diligence information, especially evidence of previous misrepresentation. Predicting misreporting from hedge fund returns, however, is much more difficult. This is because returns may reflect patterns in underlying assets instead of manager manipulation. For hedge fund investors, the good news is that the accumulated body of experience about detecting misreporting should help improve the quality of hedge fund investments. In addition, newly-imposed registration requirements for hedge fund advisors should also lower occurrences of misreporting.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-12
Author(s):  
Michael R. Butowsky ◽  
Michele L. Gibbons

This article discusses the implications of heightened regulatory attention to hedge funds by focusing on the practical questions that are on the minds of many in the hedge fund industry and, possibly, even in the thoughts of the regulators themselves. The primary regulatory condition relevant to the offer and sale of interests in hedge funds is the prohibition on general solicitation or general advertising by the sponsor of the hedge fund. Under NASD rules, brokers must (1) provide balanced disclosures in their promotional efforts; (2) perform reasonable‐basis suitability determinations; (3) perform customer‐specific suitability determinations; (4) supervise associated persons selling hedge funds and funds of hedge funds; and (5) train associated persons regarding the features, risks, and suitability of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds. Internal controls, including supervision and compliance, must include written procedures to ensure that sales of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds comply with all relevant NASD and SEC rules. Promotion of hedge funds must be balanced by a fair presentation of the risks and potential disadvantages of hedge fund investing


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 882-901
Author(s):  
Jeremy King ◽  
Gary Wayne van Vuuren

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the use of the bias ratio as a possible early indicator of financial fraud – specifically in the reporting of hedge fund returns. In the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, numerous hedge funds were liquidated and several cases of financial fraud exposed. Design/methodology/approach Risk-adjusted return metrics such as the Sharpe ratio and Value at Risk were used to raise suspicion for fraud. These metrics, however, assume distributional normality and thus have had limited success with hedge fund returns (a characteristic of which is highly skewed, non-normal return distributions). Findings Results indicate that potential fraud would have been detected in the early stages of the scheme’s life. Having demonstrated the credibility of the bias ratio, it was then applied to several indices and (anonymous) South African hedge funds. The results were used to demonstrate the ratio’s scope and robustness and draw attention to other metrics which could be used in conjunction with it. Results from these multiple sources could be used to justify further investigation. Research limitations/implications The traditional metrics for performance evaluation (such as the Sharpe ratio), assume distributional normality and thus have had limited success with hedge fund returns (a characteristic of which is highly skewed, non-normal return distributions). The bias ratio, which does not rely on normally distributed returns, was applied to a known fraud case (Madoff’s Ponzi scheme). Practical implications The effectiveness of the bias ratio in demonstrating potential suspicious financial activity has been demonstrated. Originality/value The financial market has come under heightened scrutiny in the past decade (2005 – 2015) as a result of the fragile and uncertain economic milieu that still (2015) persists. Numerous risk and return measures have been used to evaluate hedge funds’ risk-adjusted performance, but many fail to account for non-normal return distributions exhibited by hedge funds. The bias ratio, however, has been demonstrated to effectively flag potentially fraudulent funds.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Smith ◽  
Kenneth Small ◽  
Phillip Njoroge

This chapter discusses investment benchmarking and measurement bias in hedge fund performance. A good benchmark should be unambiguous, investible, measurable, appropriate, reflective of current investment opinions, specified in advance, and accountable. Additionally, a good benchmark should be simple, easily replicable, comparable, and representative of the market that the benchmark is trying to capture. Several biases, such as database selection bias, survivorship bias, style classification bias, backfill bias, self-reporting bias, and return-smoothing bias exist that impede the process of creating a benchmark. These biases increase the difficulty of studying hedge fund returns and managerial skill. However, most of the academic research on hedge fund returns report positive alphas for hedge funds.


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