scholarly journals La filiación internacional a examen por el Tribunal Supremo. A propósito de las sentencias TS 223 y 224 de 17 de abril de 2018 = International declaration of parentage before the Supreme Court. Supreme Court case Law Nº 223 and 224, 17th April 2018

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 624
Author(s):  
Mónica Guzmán Zapater

Resumen: Dos Sentencias del TS de 2018 abordan el problema de la sucesión de normas de competencia judicial y norma de conflicto en procesos de filiación. En atención a los valores que presiden la materia se decantan soluciones ad hoc sin proclamarla aplicación retroactiva de las nuevas normas en la materia.Palabras clave: filiación, competencia judicial internacional, ley aplicable, elemento temporal de las normas de conflicto, valores y objetivos en presencia, otras cuestiones.Abstract: In two cases Spanish Supreme Court goes through the question of temporary application of new rules on jurisdiction and applicable law in ascertainment filiation actions. Taking into account interest and values on filiation actions finally establishes ad hoc solutions in each case avoiding a formal declaration on it´s retroactive consequences.Keywords: filiation, international jurisdiction, applicable law, time element in conflict of law rules, values and objectives, other questions.

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Miguel Gómez Jene

Resumen: Este estudio analiza la jurisprudencia actual (internacional, comparada y española) en interpretación de las normas internacionales y de fuente interna que regulan la eficacia del convenio arbitral. La irrupción en el tráfico de nuevos tipos de convenios arbitrales (cláusulas híbridas y cláusulas escalación), así como la falta de una regulación ad hoc para determinados supuestos (extensión de los efectos del convenio a terceros no firmantes) exigen un estudio comparado de las soluciones dadas a estas cuestiones en las jurisdicciones con mayor tradición arbitral. Por último, se analizan las posibles consecuencias que la reciente jurisprudencia del TS sobre el principio Kompetenz-kompetenz (“tesis débil”) puede tener sobre el efecto positivo del convenio arbitral; así como la posible extensión al ámbito del convenio arbitral de la jurisprudencia del TS sobre responsabilidad por incumplimiento de una cláusula de sumisión a tribunales españoles.Palabras clave: Convenio arbitral. Voluntad inequívoca: Ley aplicable al convenio arbitral. Extensión de los efectos del convenio arbitral. Cláusulas híbridas. Cláusulas escalación. Efectos positivo y negativo del convenio arbitral. Tesis débil de la Kompetenz-kompetenz. Responsabilidad.Abstract: This paper analyzes the current case law (international, comparative and Spanish) in interpretation of international and internal norms that regulate the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement. The emergence of new types of arbitration agreements (hybrid clause and escalation clause), as well as the lack of an ad hoc regulation for certain assumptions (extension of the effects of the agreement to non-signatory third parties) require a comparative study of the Solutions given to these issues in jurisdictions with a greater tradition of arbitration. Finally, the possible consequences that the recent Supreme Court case law on the Kompetenz-kompetenz principle (“soft Thesis”) can have on the positive effect of the arbitration agreement are analyzed, as well as the possible extension to the scope of the arbitration agreement of the Supreme Court case law on liability for breach of a clause of submission to Spanish courts.Keywords: Arbitration agreement. Unequivocal will. Applicable law to the arbitration agreement. Extension of Effects of the arbitration agreement. Hybrid clause. Escalation clause. Positive and negative effects of the arbitration agreement. Soft thesis of Kompetenz-kompetenz. Liability.


Author(s):  
Aaron Baker

Abstract The ‘range of reasonable responses’ (RORR) test for assessing the fairness of a dismissal under section 98(4) ERA 1996 started life as a mistake and never recovered. Where the statute tells judges a dismissal is unfair if an employer acted ‘unreasonably’, the RORR tells them this refers to a special kind of ‘employer reasonableness’. In a setting where the only question is whether a dismissal is too harsh or not it is senseless to ask anyone, including a judge, to behave as if a dismissal they consider too harsh is nevertheless not too harsh. Yet this is what the RORR has always asked Employment Tribunal judges to do, with predictable results. Because they are told that they may not use their own idea of what counts as reasonable, they have no choice but to assume that ‘employer reasonableness’ tolerates more harshness than ‘reasonableness’. Lady Hale, possibly viewing the matter in the same light, appears to have invited a Supreme Court challenge to the RORR in Reilly v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council. This article argues that the Supreme Court must do away with the RORR because it artificially makes it harder to succeed in an unfair dismissal claim, it is doctrinally confused, and incremental efforts by the lower courts to resolve these problems within the RORR framework inevitably fail. The answer must involve distinguishing between a ‘standard for decision’ and a ‘standard of review’. The RORR tried to perform both functions by distorting the standard for decision to address standard of review concerns. Recent Supreme Court case law on proportionality, however, has made it clear this is the wrong approach. What the Court should install, in place of the RORR, is (a) a clear standard for decision, not subject to modification over standard of review concerns, and (b) targeted guidance about how tribunals should focus their inquiry and where to give deference to employers.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (22) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Hope Davidson

<p>Faced with the difficulty of reconciling the tensions between the need for treatment, and respecting patients’ rights, case law suggests that the courts in Ireland have tended to maintain a deferential approach to the medical profession and not to give voice to the significant rights protections set out in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and instead view the legislation in this area, the Mental Health Act 2001 through a paternalistic prism. This has given rise to what seems at first glance to be the extraordinary logic in what is now the leading, and only, Irish Supreme Court case in the area, E.H. v Clinical Director St Vincent’s Hospital. This case states that a voluntary patient is not a voluntary patient in so far as one ordinarily understands the word. In the Supreme Court, Kearns J, said:</p><p><br />‘The terminology adopted in s.2 of the Act ascribes a very particular meaning to the term ‘voluntary patient’. It does not describe such a person as one who freely and voluntarily gives consent to an admission order.’</p><p><br />This suggests an interpretation of the 2001 Act which is not immediately reconcilable with the considerable body of jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.</p>


Author(s):  
Bennett Capers

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Hunter ◽  
Hector R. Lozada ◽  
John H. Shannon

This article is a summary discussion of the main issues faced by faculty at private, often church-sponsored, universities who sought to be represented by a union in collective bargaining with their employers. The discussion begins by tracing the origins of the rule that faculty at private universities are managers and not employees under the aegis of the National Relations Act in the Supreme Court case of Yeshiva University. The summary then follows developments over the years up to the most recent decision of the National Labor Relations Board that sanctioned the efforts of adjunct professors at Elon University to seek union representation. In examining these two book-end cases, the article discusses issues relating to the effect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment in the context of the National Labor Relations Board’s shifting views on the topic. Last, the authors discuss unionization in the context of church-sponsored colleges and universities. Is it now time for the Supreme Court to review its seminal decision in Yeshiva University and for church-sponsored colleges and universities to rethink their positions as well?


Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe

This chapter examines the Supreme Court case stemming from the issue of redistricting in Texas. After the 2002 election, Texas's congressional delegation consisted of seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans. After the 2004 election, the delegation was eleven Democrats and twenty-one Republicans. This change was the result of the 2003 redistricting effort demanded and orchestrated by United States House majority leader Tom DeLay. It completed the process of making Texas a Republican state. In 2003, Representative Joe Crabb of the House Redistricting Committee introduced a redistricting bill that would spark a legal battle between Republicans and Democrats in Texas. The chapter discusses the Democrats' legal challenge to this bill over the issue of gerrymandering as well as the winners and losers from the litigation.


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