scholarly journals Input-to-state Stability in the Meaning of Switching for Delayed Feedback Switched Stochastic Financial System

Author(s):  
Ruofeng Rao

Financial system is essentially chaotic and unstable if there is not any external inputs. By means of Lyapunov function method, design of switching law, novel fuzzy assumption, $L^p$ estimation technique and Laplace semigroup theory, the author presents the boundedness and LMI-based (globally) asymptotical input-to-state stability criteria of financial systems. Particularly, the globally asymptotical stability in the meaning of switching implies that when the time $t$ is big enough, the dynamic of any subsystem must approach its unique equilibrium point. Besides, the global financial crisis often erupts periodically, which illuminates that the global stability in the classical sense is actually meaningless. So the stability in the meaning of switching proposed in this paper is suitable and appropriate. Numerical examples illuminate the effectiveness of the obtained results.

Bankarstvo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 68-87
Author(s):  
Milena Lazić ◽  
Ksenija Zorčić

Having drawn attention to the existing banking regulation issues, the Global Financial Crisis also raised awareness of the importance of depositors' confidence for the stability of the financial system, and brought the role and significance of the deposit guarantee schemes to the fore. Serbian economy started experiencing its effects in Q4 2008, in parallel with the global spreading of the crisis. This paper focuses on the fluctuations in deposit levels and structure in the Serbian banking system, between 2008 and 2019. It also aims to underscore the importance and development perspectives of the Serbian deposit guarantee scheme.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 33-66
Author(s):  
Eva Lorenčič ◽  
◽  
Mejra Festić ◽  

After the global financial crisis of 2007, macroprudential policy instruments have gained in recognition as a crucial tool for enhancing financial stability. Monetary policy, fiscal policy, and microprudential policy operate with a different toolkit and focus on achieving goals other than the stability of the financial system as a whole. In ligh of this, a fourth policy – namely macroprudential policy – is required to mitigate and prevent shocks that could destabilize the financial system as a whole and compromise financial stability. The aim of this paper is to contrast macroprudential policy with other economic policies and explain why other economic policies are unable to attain financial stability, which in turn justifies the need for a separate macroprudential policy, the ultimate goal whereof is precisely financial stability of the financial system as a whole. Our research results based on the descriptive research method indicate that, in order to prevent future financial crises, it is indispensable to combine both the microprudential and the macroprudential approach to financial stability. This is because the causes of the crises are often such that they cannot be prevented or mitigated by relying only on microprudential or only on macroprudential policy instruments.


Author(s):  
Ranald C. Michie

Before the crisis the megabanks had established themselves at the centre of the world’s financial system, transcending national boundaries and time zones as they extended their operations around the globe. These banks also spread themselves over a growing diversity of activities that destroyed the compartmentalized structures of the past.Such was their size, scale, and spread, and the structure of the business they conducted, that these banks were regarded as too-big-to-fail not only by those who worked for them, used them, and traded with them but also by the regulators responsible for supervising financial systems and the central banks tasked with preserving financial and monetary stability. It was this world that appeared to evaporate with the Global Financial Crisis. That turned out not to be the case. Though curbs were placed on the megabanks they turned out to be indispensible in an age of globalization and the only available mechanism through which regulators and central banks could exercise a degree of control over the financial system. What remained after the crisis was a small number of even more powerful US-based megabanks along with an equivalent group of US-based megafunds.


GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 49-59
Author(s):  
Dhananjaya K. ◽  
Krishna Raj

In a bank-dominated financial system like India, the strength of the overall financial system or financial stability highly depends on the soundness of banks. Indian Banking system proved to be strong and resilient during the global financial crisis of 2008. But of late, there has been increased concerns about the continued deterioration in the stability of the banking sector. Financial stability report of RBI confesses to the fact that the risks to Indian banking sector have been increasing in the post-recession period particularly the risk of accumulating NPAs. This study attempts to analyse the trend in profitability, NPAs, and the effectiveness of recovery mechanisms and interbank disparity in NPA management with respect to public sector banks. We found that the profitability of public sector banks is declining in the post-crisis period and the amount of NPA has been on the rise. Further, the recovery mechanisms have proved to be ineffective in containing the problem of bad debts.


Author(s):  
Ranald C. Michie

The Global Financial Crisis that took place in 2007–9 was the product of both long-term trends and a specific set of circumstances. In particular, the thirty years preceding that crisis had witnessed a refashioning of the global financial system, which was, itself, a reaction to that which had emerged after the Second World War. Over those thirty years competitive markets gradually replaced governments and central banks in determining the volume and direction of international financial flows. The interaction within and between economies took place on a daily basis through the markets for short-term credit, long-term loans, foreign exchange, securities, and a growing array of ever more complex financial instruments that allowed risks to be hedged whether in terms of interest rates, currencies, exposure to counterparties, or other variables. This was a period of great innovation as new financial instruments were created in order to match the needs of lenders for high returns, certainty, and stability and those of borrowers for low cost finance and flexibility in terms of the amount, currency, and timing of repayment. Nevertheless, governments remained heavily involved through the role played by regulators and central banks, generating confidence in the stability of the new financial system. That confidence was destroyed by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and had not been rebuilt by 2020.


Author(s):  
Ranald C. Michie

To many the Global Financial Crisis that engulfed the world in 2008 was an event that could not happen because of the trends that had preceded it. The emergence of the megabanks, the switch to the originate-and-distribute model, the introduction of the Basel Rules, and the use of derivative contracts were all meant to make the global financial system much more resilient. Under the collective guidance of central banks the world appeared to have discovered the secret of how to deliver a financial system that met the needs of all users and was also both competitive and stable. This system balanced the desire of governments to pursue independent economic, monetary, and financial policies with the free movement of funds around the world and relatively stable exchange rates. The various financial crises that had occurred during the 1980s and 1990s provided ample warnings of this instability but faith was placed in business models and mathematical formula to deliver the stability that had once been associated with the pre-1970s era of control and compartmentalization. As a financial crisis did occur many have pointed to it being the inevitable consequence of what had happened since the 1970s, and especially during the previous fifteen years. Conversely, others predicted that the crisis would lead to major change in direction for the world’s banks and financial markets, and the demise of London and New York as global financial centres.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Iwanicz-Drozdowska ◽  
Łukasz Kurowski

Abstract The global financial crisis (GFC) has shown that monetary policy focused on a stable price level may negatively affect the stability of the financial system. Therefore, achieving price and financial stability using interest rates as the main tool is difficult. In this paper, we analyse how often monetary policy strengthened imbalances in the financial system in 20 countries from 1999Q1 to 2020Q2. To this end, we compare monetary policy stance with a novel financial imbalance index (FII). We find that monetary policy is material in aggravating financial imbalances mostly in Eurozone countries. We attribute this finding to the ECB’s “too loose, too long” monetary policy and to difficulties with applying single monetary policies in countries with different economic conditions and in different phases of credit and financial cycles. Our results point to a need for a proactive macroprudential policy in the environment of low interest rates.


Author(s):  
Ben Clift

The IMF uses crisis-defining economic ideas, and crisis legacy-defining ideas, to construct interpretations of economic crises in ways which prioritize particular policy or institutional responses, and rule out or marginalize others. The post-crash IMF enjoyed scope to shift the boundaries of ‘legitimate’ policy, involving heightened appreciation of ‘non-linear’ threats from losses of confidence, prolonged weak demand, and financial system fragilities and contagion. The policy corollaries of this Fund rethink were that economic stability has to be actively pursued through a wider range of policy and regulatory interventions by governments, central banks, the IMF, and other forms of authority and public power. In the context of the Great Recession, the Fund no longer considered it safe to assume an inherent tendency on the part of unfettered market forces in finance and the real economy to deliver the stability and full employment at the heart of its mandate.


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rohana Othman ◽  
Nooraslinda Abdul Aris ◽  
Rafidah Mohd Azli ◽  
Roshayani Arshad

The global financial crisis that devastated many of the worlds financial systems in a manner never seen before exposed the glaring weakness in risk management and interest-driven policies. The crisis brought the collapse of several iconic financial institutions once perceived to be too strong to capitulate. The crisis engulfed one economy after another from corporations to eventually bring about the collapse of governments of countries reeling from the impact of the crisis. Asset values plummeted and the crisis clearly demonstrated the fragility of the western capitalist system and the free market economy. The Islamic economic and financial system is anchored on universal honorable values, ideals and morals - honesty, credibility, transparency, co-operation and solidarity. These fundamental values uphold stability, security and safety in any financial transactions. Of paramount consideration is that the Shariah prohibits any economic and financial transactions that involve usury, lying, gambling, cheating, unsubstantiated risk or uncertainty (gharar), monopoly, exploitation, greed, unfairness and taking other peoples money unjustly. Another key aspect to the philosophy behind the Islamic financial system is money issued must be fully asset backed. It is impermissible to allow money to be traded for money except at par. Islam is not just the prohibition of riba and zakah (alms); it is a comprehensive system to fulfill societys basic necessities (food, clothing and shelter). History has demonstrated that Islam has the capacity to deliver and has succeeded in providing a viable economic system.


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