scholarly journals Restrictions of the Islamic Financial System and Counterpart Financial Support for Xinjiang

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-130
Author(s):  
Helen Hui Huang ◽  
Hui Wang ◽  
Zexin Wei ◽  
Jiawei Xia ◽  
Shunming Zhang

Abstract This paper builds a theoretical framework of two-period general equilibrium model to explore whether 1) the restrictions of the Islamic financial system (RIFS) limit economic development in Xinjiang and 2) counterpart financial support for Xinjiang (CFSX) promotes economic development and social stability. First, we introduce above mentioned restrictions caused by Islamic beliefs into a general equilibrium model and modify Islamic agents’ budget constraints to define the benchmark equilibrium. Comparing the benchmark equilibrium with the perfect equilibrium, in which these restrictions are removed, we discover the RIFS paradox that RIFS undermine the social welfare and income of Muslims. Second, the financial support is introduced into the pattern of benchmark equilibrium as an exogenous variable to model its impact and hence we define the CFSX equilibrium. A series of policy analyses implies that the CFSX strategy improves living standards and social welfare in Xinjiang.

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. 560-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Christiano ◽  
Daisuke Ikeda

We describe a general equilibrium model in which an agency problem arises because bankers must exert an unobserved and costly effort to perform their task. Suppose aggregate banker net worth is too low to insulate creditors from bad outcomes on their balance sheet. Then, banks borrow too much in equilibrium because there is a pecuniary externality associated with bank borrowing. Social welfare is increased by imposing a binding leverage restriction on banks. We formalize this argument and provide a numerical example.


2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 743-756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Devadoss ◽  
Jude Bayham

The U.S. crop subsidies provide incentives for farmers to expand feedstock production, which benefits the biofuel producers by lowering input costs. This study develops a general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of a reduction in the U.S. crop subsidy on biofuel industries and social welfare. The impacts of feedstock policies on the biofuel market are marginal. In contrast, the biofuel mandate has a larger impact and counteracts the effects of the crop subsidy reduction. The mandate increases the demand for feedstock and causes not only grain ethanol, but also cellulosic ethanol production to rise. The mandate exacerbates the distortion, and government spending increases significantly, leading to greater welfare loss.


2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 431-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Azhr Al-Haboby ◽  
Clemens Breisinger ◽  
Dario Debowicz ◽  
Abdul Hussein El-Hakim ◽  
Jenna Ferguson ◽  
...  

1979 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-115
Author(s):  
T. N. Srinivasan

The paper is too long for conveying the message that shadow pricing used as a method of analysis in micro-economic issues of project selection is also useful for analysing macro-economic issues, such as foreign and domestic borrowing by the government, emigration, etc. Much of the methodological discussion in the paper is available in a readily accessible form in several publications of each of the coauthors; In contrast, the specific application of the methodology to Pakistani problems is much too cavalier. While it is hard to disagree with the authors' claim that shadow pricing "constitutes a relatively informal attempt to capture general equilibrium effects" (p. 89, emphasis added), their depiction of traditional analysis is a bit of a caricature: essentially it sets up a strawman to knock down. After all in the traditional partial equilibrium analysis, the caveat is always entered that the results are possibly sensitive to violation of the ceteris paribus assumptions of the analysis, though often the analysts will claim that extreme sensitivity is unlikely. Analogously, the shadow pricing method presumes "stationarity" of shadow prices in the sense that they are “independent of policy changes under review" (p. 90). The essential point to be noted is that the validity of this assertion or of the "not too extreme sensitivity" assertion of partial equilibrium analysts can be tested only with a full scale general equilibrium model! At any rate this reviewer would not pose the issue as one of traditional partial equilibrium macro-analysis versus shadow pricing as an approximate general equilibrium analysis, but would prefer a description of project analysis as an approach in which a macro-general equilibrium model of a manageable size (implicit or explicit) is used to derive a set of key shadow prices which are then used in a detailed micro-analysis of projects.


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