scholarly journals POSITIVE-NEGATIVE ASYMMETRY IN MENTAL STATE INFERENCE: REPLICATION AND EXTENSION

PSYCHOLOGIA ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 267-277
Author(s):  
Koichiro ITO ◽  
Jiro TAKAI
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
State Inference

Tension

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lasana T. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Context ◽  
General Theory ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Classical Equation ◽  
The Social ◽  
State Inference ◽  
Key Terms

The first chapter states that flexible social cognition—having the ability to engage and not engage in mental state inferences with others—perhaps explains why people are capable of pro and anti-social behaviour. It introduces a classical equation for social behaviour, before suggesting an edit that equation that accounts for social cognition. It then suggests a metaphor to explain how social cognition might be engaged based on the social context. Next, it defines the key terms for the argument surrounding flexible social cognition: flexible and mental state inference as the most fundamental form of social cognition. It reconciles differences in the use of various psychological jargon for various types of social cognition, then defines social groups, explaining their importance to the general theory.

scholarly journals Thinking about Others’ Minds: Mental State Inference in Boys with Conduct Problems and Callous-Unemotional Traits

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (10) ◽  
pp. 1279-1290
Author(s):  
Ruth Roberts ◽  
Eamon McCrory ◽  
Geoffrey Bird ◽  
Molly Sharp ◽  
Linda Roberts ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Conduct Problems ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Callous Unemotional ◽  
Callous Unemotional Traits ◽  
Unemotional Traits ◽  
State Inference

Tracking the Neurodevelopmental Correlates of Mental State Inference in Early Childhood

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 379-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura C. Anderson ◽  
Katherine Rice ◽  
Jeffrey Chrabaszcz ◽  
Elizabeth Redcay
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Mental State ◽  
State Inference

Student mental state inference from unintentional body gestures using dynamic Bayesian networks

2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 21-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Rehman Abbasi ◽  
Matthew N. Dailey ◽  
Nitin V. Afzulpurkar ◽  
Takeaki Uno
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Networks ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Dynamic Bayesian Networks ◽  
State Inference

Modeling inference of mental states

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Meijering ◽  
Niels A. Taatgen ◽  
Hedderik van Rijn ◽  
Rineke Verbrugge
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Cognitive Model ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Developmental Study ◽  
Cognitive Demands ◽  
Problem Solving Skills ◽  
State Inference

Behavior oftentimes allows for many possible interpretations in terms of mental states, such as goals, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Reasoning about the relation between behavior and mental states is therefore considered to be an effortful process. We argue that people use simple strategies to deal with high cognitive demands of mental state inference. To test this hypothesis, we developed a computational cognitive model, which was able to simulate previous empirical findings: In two-player games, people apply simple strategies at first. They only start revising their strategies when these do not pay off. The model could simulate these findings by recursively attributing its own problem solving skills to the other player, thus increasing the complexity of its own inferences. The model was validated by means of a comparison with findings from a developmental study in which the children demonstrated similar strategic developments.

scholarly journals God's Mind on Morality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Anne McNamara ◽  
Rebekah Senanayake ◽  
Aiyana Koka Willard ◽  
Joseph Henrich
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Cultural Models ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Local Models ◽  
Local Institutions ◽  
Human Judgment ◽  
North Americans ◽  
Western Model ◽  
Internal States ◽  
State Inference

Most research on cognition behind religious belief assumes understanding of other minds is culturally uniform and follows the Western model of mind, which posits (a) others’ thoughts can be known, and (b) action is best explained by mental state inference. This is potentially problematic if, as a growing body of evidence suggests, other populations view minds differently. We recruit Indigenous iTaukei Fijians who hold 1) a model of mind that discourages mental state inference and 2) co-existing Christian (Western) and traditional supernatural agent beliefs. Study 1 (N=108), uses free-listing to examine how Western and local models of mind relate to beliefs. The Christian God cares about internal states and traits (aligning with the Western model of mind). Study 2 tests whether evoking God triggers intent focus in moral reasoning. Instead, God appears to enforce cultural models of mind in iTaukei (N=151) and North Americans (N=561). Expected divine judgment mirrors human judgment; iTaukei (N=90) expect God to emphasize outcome, while Indo-Fijians (N=219) and North Americans (N=412) expect God to emphasize intent. When reminded to think about thoughts, iTaukei (N=72) expect God to judge outcomes less harshly. Results suggest cultural/ cognitive co-evolution: introduced cultural forms can spread new cognitive approaches, while Indigenous beliefs can persist as a reflection of local institutions.

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