scholarly journals Inside the Mind Reader's Tool Kit: Projection and Stereotyping in Mental State Inference.

2004 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 340-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Ames
1856 ◽  
Vol 2 (18) ◽  
pp. 479-494
Author(s):  
C. Lockhart Robertson

“The knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and the body” saith the founder† of modern science, in discoursing of human philosophy, or the knowledge of ourselves, as he terms it, is “fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself. The consideration is double: either how and how far the humours and effects of the body do alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and how far the passions and apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body. The former of these,” (the influence of the body on the mental state,) continues Bacon, “hath been enquired and considered as a part and appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in phrensies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory and the like: but the scruples and superstitions of diet and other regimen of the body in the sect of Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mahomet do exceed. … The root and life of all which prescripts is besides the ceremony, the consideration of that dependency, which the affections of the mind are submitted unto, upon the state and disposition of the body.”


2021 ◽  
pp. 125-147
Author(s):  
Loreta Vaičiulytė-Semėnienė

This article deals with the content of neighbour on the basis of the forms of the noun ‘neighbour’ (Lith. kaimynas). Efforts are made to strike a balance between the structural and the cognitive approach to its meaning. The sample base for the study consists of 700 published sentences sourced in the Corpus of the Modern Lithuanian Language (CMLL) compiled by the Centre for Computational Linguistics at the Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas.The study has revealed a neighbour to be someone who experiences a certain mental state, someone who, in his or her (un)favourable response to the environment, affects another person in a relatively close space. Emotionally charged, this effect shows a neighbour who is a nice or a bad person to live next-doors with. The (dis)harmony of attitudes, values, and actions grounded on an (un)favourable mind-set defines a dynamic coexistenceof neighbours, or a failure to coexist.When it comes to the perception of neighbour that shifts in time, what matters is the shared space of the neighbours that has its relative boundaries and is measured as a distance – the closeness resulting in the distinction between a close > distant neighbour; yet even more important is the camaraderie – the proximity of attitudes, values, and the actions that they define – something that the dictionary definitions of the word neighbour tend to omit – and the related gradational differences between a homey > strange neighbour. When it comes to building and maintaining proximity, it is the neighbour’s temper, polite and supportive interaction, and behaviour that favours another person, such as sharing things with them and all kinds of assistance, especially in need, that matters. As the mind-sets, values, and behaviours assimilate, the neighbours become one – they become homey to each other. And the axis of oneness grounded on favour in neighbourhood is God.


Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker

A mental state is luminous if and only if being in a state of that kind always puts one in a position to know that one is in the state. This chapter is a critique of Timothy Williamson’s margin-of-error argument that no nontrivial states are luminous in this sense. While I agree with Williamson’s rejection of a Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, I argue that an externalist conception (one based on information theory) can be reconciled with the luminosity of intentional mental states such as knowledge. My argument, which uses an artificial and simplified model of knowledge, is not a direct rebuttal to his argument, as applied to a more realistic notion of the knowledge of human beings, but I argue that it shows that a luminosity assumption is compatible with externalism about knowledge, and it suggest an intuitively plausible strategy for resisting his argument.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Chaoyi Li ◽  
Yu Yin ◽  
Changzheng Zhou ◽  
Dezhong Yao

This paper proposes a method to translate human EEG into music, so as to represent mental state by music. The arousal levels of the brain mental state and music emotion are implicitly used as the bridge between the mind world and the music. The arousal level of the brain is based on the EEG features extracted mainly by wavelet analysis, and the music arousal level is related to the musical parameters such as pitch, tempo, rhythm, and tonality. While composing, some music principles (harmonics and structure) were taken into consideration. With EEGs during various sleep stages as an example, the music generated from them had different patterns of pitch, rhythm, and tonality. 35 volunteers listened to the music pieces, and significant difference in music arousal levels was found. It implied that different mental states may be identified by the corresponding music, and so the music from EEG may be a potential tool for EEG monitoring, biofeedback therapy, and so forth.


Author(s):  
Ercenur Ünal ◽  
Anna Papafragou

This chapter discusses how children’s conceptual representations of the mind make contact with language. It focuses on two domains: the understanding of the conditions that lead to knowledge, and the ability to attribute knowledge to oneself and others. Specifically, it asks whether language provides the representational resources necessary for representing mental states and whether cross-linguistic differences in encoding of mental states influence sensitivity to the features that distinguish the conditions that allow people to gain knowledge. Empirical findings in these domains strongly suggest that language scaffolds the development of these cognitive abilities without altering the underlying conceptual representations of mental states.


Author(s):  
Alex Byrne

T&SK sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge—knowledge of one’s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans’ discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is “transparent”: self-knowledge is achieved by an “outward glance” at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an “inward glance” at one’s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ‘p’ to ‘I believe that p.’ One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ‘p’ is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ‘I intend to ϕ‎,’ or ‘I feel a pain’? T&SK argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one’s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one’s mental states (peculiar access).


Author(s):  
Shirley Telles ◽  
Nilkamal Singh

The aim of yoga is to attain a mental state free from disturbance. Various yoga techniques have been prescribed for this in traditional yoga texts. The ancient yoga masters realized there was a close association between the functioning of the breath and the mind. Voluntarily regulated yoga breathing (pranayama) involves regulating various aspects of breathing of breathing: (i) breathing through one or both nostrils (ii) increasing the depth of breathing (iii) breathing with a period of breath holding (iv) exhaling with the production of a sound (v) breathing through the mouth and (vi) increasing the rate of breathing. The present chapter discusses these yoga breathing techniques. This chapter also discusses the psychophysiological effects of yoga regulated breathing based on the findings of scientific studies on the psychophysiology of yoga regulated breathing.


Author(s):  
Rebecca McKnight ◽  
Jonathan Price ◽  
John Geddes

In general hospital and community settings, the term ‘physical examination’ is almost always applied to the procedures used by medical and other staff to examine the body, including the nervous system, of patients. In mental health settings, the terms ‘psy­chological examination’ or ‘mental examination’ might seem most appropriate for the procedures used to examine the mind. However, the lengthier term ‘mental state examination’ is usually used, often with capitals, for reasons of tradition. This term is often shortened to MSE. You will find that effective communication of the re­sults of the MSE requires familiarity with many new terms and with their precise meanings. It is important that you grapple with these issues early on in your training. Like specific diagnostic terms, the terms for specific abnormalities of mental state become an ef­fective shorthand, aiding communication between healthcare professionals. The goal of the MSE is to elicit the patient’s cur­rent psychopathology, that is, their abnormal sub­jective experiences, and an objective view of their mental state, including abnormal behaviour. It therefore includes both symptoms (what the pa­tient reports about current psychological symptoms, such as mood, thoughts, beliefs, abnormal percep­tions, cognitive function, etc.) and signs (what you observe about the patient’s behaviour during the interview). Inevitably, the MSE (i.e. now) merges at the edges with the history of the presenting problems (recently). Behavioural abnormalities which the pa­tient reports as still present, but which cannot be ob­served at interview (e.g. disturbed sleep, overeating, cutting) are part of the history of the presenting illness. A symptom which has resolved, such as an abnormal belief held last week but not today, should usually form part of the history, but will not be re­ported in the MSE. In contrast, an abnormal belief held last week which is still held today will be re­ported in both the history of the presenting prob­lems and the MSE. The components of the MSE are listed in Box 5.1. In taking the history, the interviewer will have learnt about the patient’s symptoms up to the time of the consultation. Often the clinical features on the day of the examination are no different from those described in the recent past, in which case the mental state will overlap with the recent history.


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