scholarly journals A new perspective of countable and uncountable infinite sets on Georg Cantor’s definition in set theory

Author(s):  
Shee-Ping Chen

Abstract Georg Cantor defined countable and uncountable sets for infinite sets. Natural number set is defined as a countable set, and real number set is proven as an uncountable set by Cantor’s diagonal method. However, in this paper, natural number set will be proven as an uncountable set using Cantor’s diagonal method, and real number set will be proven as a countable set by Cantor’s definition. The process of argumentation provides us new perspectives to consider about the size of infinite sets.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shee-Ping Chen

Abstract Georg Cantor defined countable and uncountable sets for infinite sets. Natural number set is defined as a countable set, and real number set is proven as an uncountable set by Cantor’s diagonal method. However, in this paper, natural number set will be proven as an uncountable set using Cantor’s diagonal method, and real number set will be proven as a countable set by Cantor’s definition. The process of argumentation provides us new perspectives to consider about the size of infinite sets.


Kybernetes ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wujia Zhu ◽  
Yi Lin ◽  
Guoping Du ◽  
Ningsheng Gong

PurposeThe purpose is to show that all uncountable infinite sets are self‐contradictory non‐sets.Design/methodology/approachA conceptual approach is taken in the paper.FindingsGiven the fact that the set N={x|n(x)} of all natural numbers, where n(x)=df “x is a natural number” is a self‐contradicting non‐set in this paper, the authors prove that in the framework of modern axiomatic set theory ZFC, various uncountable infinite sets are either non‐existent or self‐contradicting non‐sets. Therefore, it can be astonishingly concluded that in both the naive set theory or the modern axiomatic set theory, if any of the actual infinite sets exists, it must be a self‐contradicting non‐set.Originality/valueThe first time in history, it is shown that such convenient notion as the set of all real numbers needs to be reconsidered.


Axiomathes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Powell

AbstractThis article provides a survey of key papers that characterise computable functions, but also provides some novel insights as follows. It is argued that the power of algorithms is at least as strong as functions that can be proved to be totally computable in type-theoretic translations of subsystems of second-order Zermelo Fraenkel set theory. Moreover, it is claimed that typed systems of the lambda calculus give rise naturally to a functional interpretation of rich systems of types and to a hierarchy of ordinal recursive functionals of arbitrary type that can be reduced by substitution to natural number functions.


Author(s):  
Howard Stein

Dedekind is known chiefly, among philosophers, for contributions to the foundations of the arithmetic of the real and the natural numbers. These made available for the first time a systematic and explicit way, starting from very general notions (which Dedekind himself regarded as belonging to logic), to ground the differential and integral calculus without appeal to geometric ‘intuition’. This work also forms a pioneering contribution to set theory (further advanced in Dedekind’s correspondence with Georg Cantor) and to the general notion of a ‘mathematical structure’. Dedekind’s foundational work had a close connection with his advancement of substantive mathematical knowledge, particularly in the theories of algebraic numbers and algebraic functions. His achievements in these fields make him one of the greatest mathematicians of the nineteenth century.


1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Myhill

In a previous paper, I proved the consistency of a non-finitary system of logic based on the theory of types, which was shown to contain the axiom of reducibility in a form which seemed not to interfere with the classical construction of real numbers. A form of the system containing a strong axiom of choice was also proved consistent.It seems to me now that the real-number approach used in that paper, though valid, was not the most fruitful one. We can, on the lines therein suggested, prove the consistency of axioms closely resembling Tarski's twenty axioms for the real numbers; but this, from the standpoint of mathematical practice, is a pitifully small fragment of analysis. The consistency of a fairly strong set-theory can be proved, using the results of my previous paper, with little more difficulty than that of the Tarski axioms; this being the case, it would seem a saving in effort to derive the consistency of such a theory first, then to strengthen that theory (if possible) in such ways as can be shown to preserve consistency; and finally to derive from the system thus strengthened, if need be, a more usable real-number theory. The present paper is meant to achieve the first part of this program. The paragraphs of this paper are numbered consecutively with those of my previous paper, of which it is to be regarded as a continuation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Ferreirós

AbstractSet theory deals with the most fundamental existence questions in mathematics-questions which affect other areas of mathematics, from the real numbers to structures of all kinds, but which are posed as dealing with the existence of sets. Especially noteworthy are principles establishing the existence of some infinite sets, the so-called “arbitrary sets.” This paper is devoted to an analysis of the motivating goal of studying arbitrary sets, usually referred to under the labels ofquasi-combinatorialismorcombinatorial maximality. After explaining what is meant by definability and by “arbitrariness,” a first historical part discusses the strong motives why set theory was conceived as a theory of arbitrary sets, emphasizing connections with analysis and particularly with the continuum of real numbers. Judged from this perspective, the axiom of choice stands out as a most central and natural set-theoretic principle (in the sense of quasi-combinatorialism). A second part starts by considering the potential mismatch between the formal systems of mathematics and their motivating conceptions, and proceeds to offer an elementary discussion of how far the Zermelo–Fraenkel system goes in laying out principles that capture the idea of “arbitrary sets”. We argue that the theory is rather poor in this respect.


1973 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
G.P. Monro

One problem in set theory without the axiom of choice is to find a reasonable way of estimating the size of a non-well-orderable set; in this paper we present evidence which suggests that this may be very hard. Given an arbitrary fixed aleph κ we construct a model of set theory which contains a set X such that if Y ⊆ X then either Y or X - Y is finite, but such that κ can be mapped into S(S(S(X))). So in one sense X is large and in another X is one of the smallest possible infinite sets. (Here S(X) is the power set of X.)


Author(s):  
John P. Burgess

In the late nineteenth century, Georg Cantor created mathematical theories, first of sets or aggregates of real numbers (or linear points), and later of sets or aggregates of arbitrary elements. The relationship of element a to set A is written a∈A; it is to be distinguished from the relationship of subset B to set A, which holds if every element of B is also an element of A, and which is written B⊆A. Cantor is most famous for his theory of transfinite cardinals, or numbers of elements in infinite sets. A subset of an infinite set may have the same number of elements as the set itself, and Cantor proved that the sets of natural and rational numbers have the same number of elements, which he called ℵ0; also that the sets of real and complex numbers have the same number of elements, which he called c. Cantor proved ℵ0 to be less than c. He conjectured that no set has a number of elements strictly between these two. In the early twentieth century, in response to criticism of set theory, Ernst Zermelo undertook its axiomatization; and, with amendments by Abraham Fraenkel, his have been the accepted axioms ever since. These axioms help distinguish the notion of a set, which is too basic to admit of informative definition, from other notions of a one made up of many that have been considered in logic and philosophy. Properties having exactly the same particulars as instances need not be identical, whereas sets having exactly the same elements are identical by the axiom of extensionality. Hence for any condition Φ there is at most one set {x|Φ(x)} whose elements are all and only those x such that Φ(x) holds, and {x|Φ(x)}={x|Ψ(x)} if and only if conditions Φ and Ψ hold of exactly the same x. It cannot consistently be assumed that {x|Φ(x)} exists for every condition Φ. Inversely, the existence of a set is not assumed to depend on the possibility of defining it by some condition Φ as {x|Φ(x)}. One set x0 may be an element of another set x1 which is an element of x2 and so on, x0∈x1∈x2∈…, but the reverse situation, …∈y2∈y1∈y0, may not occur, by the axiom of foundation. It follows that no set is an element of itself and that there can be no universal set y={x|x=x}. Whereas a part of a part of a whole is a part of that whole, an element of an element of a set need not be an element of that set. Modern mathematics has been greatly influenced by set theory, and philosophies rejecting the latter must therefore reject much of the former. Many set-theoretic notations and terminologies are encountered even outside mathematics, as in parts of philosophy: pair {a,b} {x|x=a or x=b} singleton {a} {x|x=a} empty set ∅ {x|x≠x} union ∪X {a|a∈A for some A∈X} binary union A∪B {a|a∈A or a∈B} intersection ∩X {a|a∈A for all A∈X} binary intersection A∩B {a|a∈A and a∈B} difference A−B {a|a∈A and not a∈B} complement A−B power set ℘(A) {B|B⊆A} (In contexts where only subsets of A are being considered, A-B may be written -B and called the complement of B.) While the accepted axioms suffice as a basis for the development not only of set theory itself, but of modern mathematics generally, they leave some questions about transfinite cardinals unanswered. The status of such questions remains a topic of logical research and philosophical controversy.


1983 ◽  
Vol 248 (6) ◽  
pp. 122-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph W. Dauben
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