scholarly journals Modeling the interplay between epidemics and regional socio-economics

Author(s):  
Jan E. Snellman ◽  
Rafael A. Barrio ◽  
Kimmo K. Kaski ◽  
Maarit J. Käpylä

Abstract In this study we present a dynamical agent-based model to investigate the interplay between the socio-economy of and SEIRS-type epidemic spreading over a geographical area, divided to smaller area districts and further to smallest area cells. The model treats the populations of cells and authorities of districts as agents, such that the former can reduce their economic activity and the latter can recommend economic activity reduction both with the overall goal to slow down the epidemic spreading. The agents make decisions with the aim of attaining as high social positions as possible relative to other agents. They evaluate their social positions based on the local and regional infection rates, compliance to the authorities’ regulations, regional drops in economic activity, and the efforts they make to mitigate the spread of epidemic. We find that the willingness of populations to comply with authorities’ recommendations has the most drastic effect to the spreading of epidemic: periodic waves spread almost unimpeded in non-compliant populations, while in compliant ones the spread is minimal with a chaotic spreading pattern and significantly lower infection rates. Health and economic concerns of agents turned out to have lesser roles, the former increasing their efforts and the latter decreasing them.

Author(s):  
R. Chakrabarti

The author builds an agent-based model wherein the societal corruption level is derived from individual corruption levels optimally chosen by heterogeneous agents with different risk aversion and human capital. The societal corruption level, in turn, affects the risk-return profile of corruption for the individual agents. Simulating a multi-generational economy with heterogeneous agents, the author shows that there are locally stable equilibrium corruption levels with certain socio-economic determinants. However, there are situations when corruption can rise until it stifles all economic activity. “You live in a society where everybody steals. Do you choose to steal? The probability that you will be caught is low ... and, even if you are caught, the chances of your being punished severely for a crime so common are low. Therefore you too steal. By contrast, if you live in a society where theft is rare, the chances of your being caught and punished are high, so you choose not to steal.” (Mauro, 1998, p. 12)


2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minoru Tabata ◽  
Akira Ide ◽  
Nobuoki Eshima ◽  
Kyushu Takagi ◽  
Yasuhiro Takei ◽  
...  

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