Does IPO Underpricing in China Explain a Firm's Long-Term Performance? An Empirical Study of IPOs in China with Corporate Governance Perspectives

Author(s):  
Martin T. Hovey ◽  
Larry Li
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daeheon Choi ◽  
Paul Moon Sub Choi ◽  
Joung Hwa Choi ◽  
Chune Young Chung

This study investigates the monitoring effectiveness of the largest institutional blockholder in Korea, the Korean National Pension Service (KNPS), on firms’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR). We use a large, unique sample from Korea, where the financial market is primarily characterized by chaebols. We show that lagged KNPS blockholdings do not significantly influence investee firms’ concurrent CSR indexes. This result indicates that even the largest institutional blockholder in Korea does not actively engage in firms’ CSR initiatives to enhance their long-term performance and prosperity. Overall, our results suggest that institutional investors should more actively serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism in emerging Asian markets, where companies aim to be profitable and long-term corporate governance is very important.


Author(s):  
Erik P.M. Vermeulen

This chapter examines initial public offerings (IPOs) as funding rounds for high-tech companies and exit mechanisms for investors, as well as the stringent corporate governance requirements that apply to newly listed companies in the growth stages of their development. Current investment trends seem to indicate that the IPO market is aging: More and more high-tech companies decide to remain private longer. Moreover, public market investors, such as hedge funds and mutual funds, increasingly invest in non-listed high-tech companies, making “IPO-like” investment rounds at massive valuations a normal phenomenon in the private market. These developments have led to the belief that we are in the next tech bubble. Fortunately, however, a new “establishment” amongst investors is emerging. They realize that in order to prevent the bursting of the bubble, they must collaborate with management and actively contribute to a company’s medium-term and long-term performance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (10) ◽  
pp. 2447-2473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harish Kumar Singla

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the long-term performance of construction sector initial public offers (IPO) made in India during 2006–2015. The study aims to compare the performance of the construction sector IPOs with the non-construction sector IPOs and finds the determinants of long-term performance of construction sector IPO with a time horizon of three years. The study also attempts to find out, if the long-term IPO underpricing that has been discussed in the literature, really exists or it is a myth. Design/methodology/approach The study uses data of IPOs listed on National stock exchange during 2006–2015. In total, 281 IPOs are considered for the study, among which 44 are construction sector IPOs. IPOs anniversary performance of three successive years is calculated from the date of listing, and a random effect panel regression model with clustered robust estimates using the maximum likelihood method is performed to find out the determinants of IPO performance. The data are also tested for multicollinearity, stationarity and heteroscedasticity to ensure the robustness of results. Findings The results show that in the long-run construction sector IPOs outperform the non-construction sector IPOs, though the performance is below average when compared to market returns. The IPO underpricing is a myth, and IPO underperformance is a reality in India. The performance of construction sector IPOs is driven positively by market return, size of the firm and negatively by liquidity of the firm. Originality/value The paper is the first attempt to analyze the performance of construction sector IPOs, and compare it with non-construction sector IPOs. The study uses a random effect panel regression model with robust estimates using the maximum likelihood method to ensure the robustness of results. This is the first time the performance of IPOs is studied with a panel data approach.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wang ◽  
Guanying Wang

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore how the price limit policy implemented in 2014 affects initial public offering (IPO) underpricing and long-term performance in China.Design/methodology/approachThe data are the IPOs from Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between 2004 and 2018. The data are firstly divided into the IPOs before the price limit policy and the IPOs after the price limit policy according to the time of issuance. Then the two groups are divided into 4 subsamples according to the market blocks and the P/E ratio. The authors use multiple regression models to explore the effect of price limit policy in each subsample.FindingsThe first-day price limit system for IPOs is similar to the upward fuse mechanism, the purpose of which is to suppress IPO underpricing. However, this study finds that the policy does not suppress IPO underpricing, but increases the underpricing rate in all subsamples. Besides, the long-term performance in each subsample is different from each other. Main Board stocks’ long-term performance is worse after the policy. The policy makes Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SME Board) and Growth Enterprise Market Board (GEM Board) stocks with high P/E ratios perform better in the long term. For SME Board and GEM Board stocks with low P/E ratios, the policy makes no significant effect.Practical implicationsGood policy intentions may sometimes lead to counterproductive effects. However, since the long-term performance of each subsample is different, it is difficult to judge whether the policy should continue to be implemented or cancelled. Implementing different policies for different subsamples may be a better way to solve this problem.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the study of IPO underpricing and long-term performance from the perspective of price limit policy.


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