scholarly journals Linking Regional Science and Urban Economics: Long-Run Interactions among Preferences for Amenities and Public Goods

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip E. Graves
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Urban Economics ◽  
Regional Science ◽  
Long Run

scholarly journals Cheater-altruist synergy in immunopathogenic ecological public goods games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce Morsky ◽  
Dervis Can Vural
Keyword(s):  
Immune System ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Average Growth ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Cheating Behavior ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Population Dynamics Models ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dynamics Models

AbstractMuch research has focused on the deleterious effects of free-riding in public goods games, and a variety of mechanisms that suppresses cheating behavior. Here we argue that under certain conditions cheating behavior can be beneficial to the population. In a public goods game, cheaters do not pay for the cost of the public goods, yet they receive the benefit. Although this free-riding harms the entire population in the long run, the success of cheaters may aid the population when there is a common enemy that antagonizes both cooperators and cheaters. Here we study models in which an immune system antagonizes a cooperating pathogen. We investigate three population dynamics models, and determine under what conditions the presence of cheaters help defeat the immune system. The mechanism of action is that a polymorphism of cheaters and altruists optimizes the average growth rate. Our results give support for a possible synergy between cooperators and cheaters in ecological public goods games.

scholarly journals Distortionary tax and general equilibrium analysis of welfare maximized private and public goods consumption

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-185
Author(s):  
SMA Islam
Keyword(s):  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Economic Welfare ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Consumption Tax ◽  
Theoretical Assumption ◽  
Long Run

There is a debate on economic efficiency and the improvement of economic welfare. In this research, I have fixed the value of rich and poor with equal weight with an assumption that the consumption tax is the source of government expenditure for public goods. This paper optimized improvement of equality and private consumption share of public goods with the prime revenue of consumption tax. This optimization process has also been analyzed in accordance with the theoretical assumption of Roy`s identity and Marshallian ordinary market demand function for justification of equity and welfare. Finally, this process compared implicitly to the process of Kuznets pattern economic development with taking assumption of distortionary consumption tax to penetrate the relationship between long term economic growth and economic welfare. The empirical evidence found in my earlier publication that consumption tax is welfare augmented in long run if the source of government expenditure is consumption tax to produce public goods. This welfare maximized general equilibrium evidences have potential opportunity of welfare augmented resource mobilization in a developing country where consumption tax is the source of prime revenue.Progressive Agriculture 29 (2): 178-185, 2018

scholarly journals Cooperation Enforcement and Collusion Resistance in Repeated Public Goods Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 2085-2092
Author(s):  
Kai Li ◽  
Dong Hao
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Collusion Resistance ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Simple Strategy ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Multi Agent

Enforcing cooperation among substantial agents is one of the main objectives for multi-agent systems. However, due to the existence of inherent social dilemmas in many scenarios, the free-rider problem may arise during agents’ long-run interactions and things become even severer when self-interested agents work in collusion with each other to get extra benefits. It is commonly accepted that in such social dilemmas, there exists no simple strategy for an agent whereby she can simultaneously manipulate on the utility of each of her opponents and further promote mutual cooperation among all agents. Here, we show that such strategies do exist. Under the conventional repeated public goods game, we novelly identify them and find that, when confronted with such strategies, a single opponent can maximize his utility only via global cooperation and any colluding alliance cannot get the upper hand. Since a full cooperation is individually optimal for any single opponent, a stable cooperation among all players can be achieved. Moreover, we experimentally show that these strategies can still promote cooperation even when the opponents are both self-learning and collusive.

Theories of Urban Externalities. Studies in Regional Science and Urban Economics, Volume 6.

1981 ◽  
Vol 91 (361) ◽  
pp. 268
Author(s):  
Peter M. Townroe ◽  
Yoshitsugu Kanemoto
Keyword(s):  
Urban Economics ◽  
Regional Science

The effect of supply and demand shocks on the non-market valuation of local public goods

1999 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.R. DESHAZO
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Demand Shocks ◽  
Supply And Demand Shocks ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Non Market Valuation ◽  
Spatial Arbitrage

For local public goods, supply or demand shocks may create periods during which it is welfare enhancing for households to undertake spatial arbitrage by relocating residentially. We point out that the magnitude and direction of the average benefit estimate obtained during such a transition period is likely to vary systematically depending upon the magnitude of the shock, the level of transaction costs and the extent to which other affected goods are substitutes or complements. We test a subset of our model's predictions using cross-sectional data on household demand for improved municipal services in post-socialist Romania. Our preliminary empirical analysis suggests that there have been substantial gains in welfare resulting from spatial adjustment following the opening up of housing markets. Furthermore, our results indicate that benefit estimates for improved water services during the transition may be substantially higher than long-run estimates. This limited evidence supports our concern that economists may recommend non-optimal levels of long-run investment, regulation, or user fees if they are unaware of the implications of future readjustment to supply or demand shocks.

scholarly journals REPRESENTATION WITHOUT TAXATION, TAXATION WITHOUT CONSENT: THE LEGACY OF SPANISH COLONIALISM IN AMERICA

2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandra Irigoin
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
The United States ◽  
Spanish America ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Spanish Colonialism ◽  
Colonial Legacy ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Fiscal System ◽  
Money Creation

ABSTRACTThe essay examines Spain’s colonial legacy in the long-run development of Spanish America. It surveys the fiscal and constitutional outcomes of independence and assesses the relative burden imposed by colonialism. Constitutional asymmetries between revenue collecting and spending agents constrainedde factogovernments’ power to tax. Inherent disparities embedded in the colonial fiscal system worsened with vaguely defined representation for subjects and territories andvexedtheir aggregation into a modern representative polity. Governments with limited fiscal capacity failed to deliver public goods and to distribute the costs and benefits of independence equitably. Growing indirect taxes, debt and money creation allowed them to transfer the fiscal burden to other constituents or future generations. Taxpayers became aware of the asymmetry between private contributions and public goods and hence favoured a low but regressive taxation. Comparisons with trajectories in the metropolis and the United States are offered to qualify this legacy.

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