scholarly journals Prospect Theory and Utility Theory: Temporary Versus Permanent Attitude towards Risk

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haim Levy ◽  
Zvi Wiener
Risks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Oleg Uzhga-Rebrov ◽  
Peter Grabusts

Choosing solutions under risk and uncertainty requires the consideration of several factors. One of the main factors in choosing a solution is modeling the decision maker’s attitude to risk. The expected utility theory was the first approach that allowed to correctly model various nuances of the attitude to risk. Further research in this area has led to the emergence of even more effective approaches to solving this problem. Currently, the most developed theory of choice with respect to decisions under risk conditions is the cumulative prospect theory. This paper presents the development history of various extensions of the original expected utility theory, and the analysis of the main properties of the cumulative prospect theory. The main result of this work is a fuzzy version of the prospect theory, which allows handling fuzzy values of the decisions (prospects). The paper presents the theoretical foundations of the proposed version, an illustrative practical example, and conclusions based on the results obtained.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Cohen ◽  
Amanda R. Cromley ◽  
Katelyn E. Freda ◽  
Madeline White

Here, we proposed Subjective Values Theory, a theory of the perception of value, andhow that perception drives preferential choice. Utility Theory, Prospect Theory, and traditional implementations of sequential sampling theory derive value from observers’ preferential choices. Subjective Values Theory goes beyond these theories by (a) precisely defining and measuring value independent of preferential choice, and (b) using these independent measurements of value to a priori predict preferential choice. We instantiate the decision mechanism proposed by Subjective Values Theory in a new Robust Random Walk (RRW) procedure. We evaluate the validity of Subjective Values Theory and the RRW in six experiments that measure the value of human lives and predict participants’ RTs and preferential choices in complex social decisions. In these experiments, we demonstrate that the process of perceiving Psychological Value is the same for objects and human lives, social status influences the perceived Psychological Value of a human life, and quantity has little or no influence on the perceived Psychological Value of human lives or objects. We discuss the implications of these findings in relation to decision theory, behavioral economics, and the psychology of morality.


Author(s):  
Luis E. Castro ◽  
Yuan Ren ◽  
Nazrul I. Shaikh

This article presents a practical approach to estimate the substitution probabilities between products at a retail store by using the store's point of sale data and prospect theory based structural restrictions on the consumer choice behavior. The prospect theory-based reference dependent preference structure imposed on the consumer choice behavior (a) accounts for how consumers make their original choice as well as how they substitute, (b) eliminates the IIA and IPS assumptions that the standard utility theory based models impose on consumer choice, and (c) alleviates the need for inventory information for estimating the substitution probabilities. Simulations and empirical studies have been used to show that the estimates of the substitution probabilities are efficient and are robust to stock-out rates.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui-Kuan Chung ◽  
Paul Glimcher ◽  
Agnieszka Tymula

Prospect theory, used descriptively for decisions under both risk and certainty, presumes concave utility over gains and convex utility over losses; a pattern widely seen in lottery tasks. Although such discontinuous gain-loss reference-dependence is also used to model riskless choices, only limited empirical evidence supports this use. In incentive-compatible experiments, we find that gain-loss reflection effects are not observed under riskless choice as predicted by prospect theory, even while in the same subjects gain-loss reflection effects are observed under risk. Our empirical results challenge the application of choice models across both risky and riskless domains. (JEL C91, D12, D81)


1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Quattrone ◽  
Amos Tversky

We contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory, using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues. The results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory. In particular, our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. This is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times. The results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options, contrary to the assumption of invariance. Finally, we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Stewart ◽  
Benjamin Scheibehenne ◽  
Thorsten Pachur

To fit models like prospect theory or expected utility theory to choice data, a stochastic model is needed to turn differences in values into choice probabilities. In these models, the parameter measuring risk aversion is strongly correlated with the parameter measuring the sensitivity to differences in value. We use dimensional analysis from the physical sciences to show that this is because the sensitivity parameter has units which depend on the risk aversion parameter. This means that comparing sensitivities across individuals with different level of risk aversion is meaningless and forbidden. We suggest a simple bug fix for prospect theory and other decision models which corrects this problem. The bug fix completely removes the correlation between sensitivity and risk aversion parameters in model estimations and allows the parameters to be interpreted as they were originally intended.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document