Government Debt, the Real Interest Rate and External Balance in an Endogenous Growth Model of a Small Open Economy

Author(s):  
George Alogoskoufis
2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (6) ◽  
pp. 2530-2561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde ◽  
Pablo Guerrón-Quintana ◽  
Juan F Rubio-Ramírez ◽  
Martin Uribe

We show how changes in the volatility of the real interest rate at which small open emerging economies borrow have an important effect on variables like output, consumption, investment, and hours. We start by documenting the strong evidence of time-varying volatility in the real interest rates faced by four emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. We estimate a stochastic volatility process for real interest rates. Then, we feed this process in a standard small open economy business cycle model. We find that an increase in real interest rate volatility triggers a fall in output, consumption, investment, hours, and debt. (JEL E13, E20, E32, E43, F32, F43, 011)


Author(s):  
Rangan Gupta ◽  
Emmanuel Ziramba

In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations monetary endogenous growth model of a financially repressed small open economy characterized by bureaucratic corruption, and, in turn, analyze optimal policy decisions of the government following an increase in the degree of corruption. As suggested in the empirical literature, we find that increases in the degree of corruption should ideally result in an increase in the ratio of seigniorage to total revenue, as an optimal response of the benevolent government. In addition, higher degrees of corruption are also found to be accompanied by higher levels of financial repression. 


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 1454-1483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noritaka Maebayashi ◽  
Takeo Hori ◽  
Koichi Futagami

We construct an endogenous growth model that includes productive public capital and government debt. We assume that the government debt-to-GDP ratio is gradually adjusted to a target level, reflecting the permanent commitment rules in the Stability and Growth Pact or the Maastricht Treaty in the European Union (i.e., the well-known 60% rule). These rules affect government borrowing and public investment. Here, we examine the welfare implications of the permanent commitment rules. We find that fiscal consolidation based on the rules improves social welfare. Moreover, the improvement in welfare accelerates as fiscal consolidation progresses more rapidly. Last, we also discuss and derive the optimal long-run debt-to-GDP ratio.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-86
Author(s):  
Syed Yusuf Saadat

This study investigates whether government borrowing can be likened to a Ponzi scheme which will allow the government to roll-over its debt perpetually. The results show that, on the basis of the condition of maintaining real economic growth rate above and beyond the real interest rate on government debt, it will not be possible to sustain a perpetual Ponzi scheme of all four types of National Savings Certificates in Bangladesh. The government’s debt may be rolled over perpetually for two types of National Savings Certificates, following the condition outlined in Ball, et al. (1998), or for three types of National Savings Certificates following the condition outlined in Mehrotra (2017). 


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