Leader Survival, Military Mobilization, and Interstate Conflict in Democracies and Dictatorships.

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Carter
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 83-88
Author(s):  
Davlatbek Qudratov ◽  

The article analyzes the state of schools and education in General during the Second World war. The slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" defined the goal not only of all military mobilization activities of the Soviet state, but also became the center of all organizational, ideological, cultural and educational activities of the party and state bodies of Uzbekistan.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius Mehrl ◽  
Ioannis Choulis

Abstract Diversionary theories of interstate conflict suggest that domestic problems push leaders to initiate hostilities against foreign foes in order to garner support. However, the empirical support for this proposition is mixed as critics point out that leaders should not start conflicts that can be extremely costly for them, potentially even removing them from office. We propose that while leaders may not initiate new conflicts, they do tap into existing territorial disputes when facing internal disapproval. That is, they engage in material acts of foreign policy showing domestic audiences that they defend or emphasize their country's claim while being unlikely to result in full-scale armed confrontations. To test this claim, we use monthly data, covering the period 2013–2020, on leader approval and incursions into contested airspace from Turkey's long-standing territorial dispute with Greece. Results from time-series models offer support for our expectation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 437-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quan Li ◽  
Rafael Reuveny

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Quiroz Flores ◽  
Alastair Smith
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Shawna K. Metzger ◽  
Benjamin T. Jones

Abstract Logit and probit (L/P) models are a mainstay of binary time-series cross-sectional (BTSCS) analyses. Researchers include cubic splines or time polynomials to acknowledge the temporal element inherent in these data. However, L/P models cannot easily accommodate three other aspects of the data’s temporality: whether covariate effects are conditional on time, whether the process of interest is causally complex, and whether our functional form assumption regarding time’s effect is correct. Failing to account for any of these issues amounts to misspecification bias, threatening our inferences’ validity. We argue scholars should consider using Cox duration models when analyzing BTSCS data, as they create fewer opportunities for such misspecification bias, while also having the ability to assess the same hypotheses as L/P. We use Monte Carlo simulations to bring new evidence to light showing Cox models perform just as well—and sometimes better—than logit models in a basic BTSCS setting, and perform considerably better in more complex BTSCS situations. In addition, we highlight a new interpretation technique for Cox models—transition probabilities—to make Cox model results more readily interpretable. We use an application from interstate conflict to demonstrate our points.


Author(s):  
Farukh Mohammad Azad ◽  
Dr. Tim Frazier ◽  
Erik Wood

The literature indicates that conflict can result in food insecurity due to economic or political crisis. However, few studies have investigated the effects that nonviolent interstate conflict has on food security in the Middle East. Evidence from this study, based in Qatar, indicates that conflict can result in food insecurity due to economic or political crisis. This research critically examines the lingering political and economic blockade of the State of Qatar and the extent to which this blockade has impacted food security of residents. The study employed a sequential mixed methods approach to gain better insight into the nature of food security in Qatar. A focused qualitative review of the relevant literature was followed by a quantitative analysis which revealed that there was no significant effect of interstate conflict on food security, while the economic and political blockade correlated significantly with food security. Three groups were sampled, including government officials, regulatory agencies, and food suppliers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365
Author(s):  
Neta C. Crawford

AbstractIn Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, Ned Dobos highlights several negative consequences the preparation for war has for individuals and states. But he misses what I consider perhaps the most significant consequence of military mobilization for states, especially democracies: how war and the preparation for it affect deliberative politics. While many argue that all states, including democracies, require strong militaries—and there is some evidence that long wars can build democracies and states—I focus on the other effects of militarization and war on democratic states. War and militarism are antipodal to democracy and undermine it. Their normative bases are conflicting—democracy takes force off the table, whereas force is legitimate in war. Thus, while militarism and militarization can sometimes yield liberalization and the expansion of civil rights, they are arguably more likely to undermine democratic norms and practices.


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