From 'The Lowest State of Poverty and Barbarism' to the Opulent Commercial Society: Adam Smith's Theory of Violence and the Political Economics of Development

Author(s):  
Barry R. Weingast
1985 ◽  
Vol 101 ◽  
pp. 104-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyce Kallgren

H. F. Schurmann observed in his classic work Ideology and Organization in Communist China, “economics in a Communist country means political economics hence administration.” This observation directs our attention to two specific aspects of Document No. 1, 1984: first, the possible political consequences of decentralization and secondly, some administration reforms that have accompanied the adoption of the agricultural responsibility system. A close relationship obviously exists between the two aspects, the emphasis here being placed on the political side.


1968 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis M. Bator

2020 ◽  
pp. 147488512098059
Author(s):  
Adam Lindsay

In On the People’s Terms, Philip Pettit incorporates the Sieyèsian notion of constituent power into his constitutional theory of non-domination. In this article, I argue that Emmanuel Sieyès’s understanding of liberty precludes such an appropriation. While a republican, his conceptualisation of liberty in the face of commercial society stood apart from theories of civic vigilance, preferring instead to disentangle individuals from politics and maximise what he understood to be their non-political freedoms. Sieyès saw that liberty was heightened through relations of representation and commercial dependency. This conception of liberty was pivotal to the identity of the nation, and so allowed Sieyès to assess forms of collective injustice committed by the French nobility. It also provided the normative foundation of his theory of constituent power. For Sieyès, constituent power guarded against legislative excess in a decidedly minimal sense, intending instead to separate citizens from the political sphere so they were not burdened with ongoing participation or public vigilance.


Author(s):  
James R. Otteson

Markets are often criticized for being amoral, if not immoral. The core of the “political economy” that arose in the eighteenth century, however, envisioned the exchanges that take place in commercial society as neither amoral nor immoral but indeed deeply humane. The claim of the early political economists was that transactions in markets fulfilled two separate but related moral mandates: they lead to increasing prosperity, which addressed their primary “economic” concern of raising the estates of the poor; and they model proper relations among people, which addressed their primary “moral” concern of granting a respect to all, including the least among us. They attempted to capture a vision of human dignity within political-economic institutions that enabled people to improve their stations. Their arguments thus did not bracket out judgments of value: they integrated judgments of value into their foundations and built their political economy on that basis.


Public Choice ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 126 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 107-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Roine

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