Do Large-Scale Refinancing Programs Reduce Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Ehrlich ◽  
Jeffrey Perry
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Mortgage Defaults

scholarly journals Effectiveness of a Power Factor Correction Policy in Improving the Energy Efficiency of Large-Scale Electricity Users in Ghana

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 2582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Lotsu ◽  
Yuichiro Yoshida ◽  
Katsufumi Fukuda ◽  
Bing He
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Power Factor ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Power Factor Correction ◽  
Energy Crisis ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
The Government ◽  
Power Factor Improvement ◽  
The Impact

Confronting an energy crisis, the government of Ghana enacted a power factor correction policy in 1995. The policy imposes a penalty on large-scale electricity users, namely, special load tariff (SLT) customers of the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), whose power factor is below 90%. This paper investigates the impact of this policy on these firms’ power factor improvement by using panel data from 183 SLT customers from 1994 to 1997 and from 2012. To avoid potential endogeneity, this paper adopts a regression discontinuity design (RDD) with the power factor of the firms in the previous year as a running variable, with its cutoff set at the penalty threshold. The result shows that these large-scale electricity users who face the penalty because their power factor falls just short of the threshold are more likely to improve their power factor in the subsequent year, implying that the power factor correction policy implemented by Ghana’s government is effective.

scholarly journals Election Administration, Resource Allocation, and Turnout: Evidence From Kenya

2020 ◽  
pp. 001041402093808
Author(s):  
J. Andrew Harris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Middle Income ◽  
Election Administration ◽  
Middle Income Countries ◽  
Policy Choices

Decisions about how to organize and run an election can shape political participation. Policy choices may distribute election resources unequally, skewing voting outcomes. In low- and middle-income countries where electoral capacity and resources are scarce and decision-making highly centralized, election administration has the potential to shape results on a large scale. In the context of Kenya’s August 2017 elections, I study the consequences of a legislated threshold that determines the capacity of polling centers to quickly serve voters by reducing election-day lines. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that turnout is 2.4% lower in congested polling places just below the threshold relative to polling places above the threshold. Relative to other hypothetical thresholds, the chosen threshold benefits the incumbent president, as incumbent strongholds receive more polling resources than opposition areas. The results demonstrate how electoral resource allocation shapes political behavior and election outcomes.

scholarly journals Election Administration, Resource Allocation, and Turnout: Evidence from Kenya

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Andrew Harris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Middle Income ◽  
Election Administration ◽  
Middle Income Countries ◽  
Policy Choices

Decisions about how to organize and run an election can shape political participation. Policy choices may distribute election resources unequally, skewing voting outcomes. In low- and middle-income countries where electoral capacity and resources are scarce and decision-making highly centralized, election administration has the potential to shape results on a large scale. In the context of Kenya's August 2017 elections, I study the consequences of a legislated threshold that determines the capacity of polling centers to quickly serve voters by reducing election-day lines. Using a regression discontinuity design I find that turnout is 2.4% lower in congested polling places just below the threshold relative to polling places above the threshold. Relative to other hypothetical thresholds, the chosen threshold benefits the incumbent president, as incumbent strongholds receive more polling resources than opposition areas. The results demonstrate how electoral resource allocation shapes political behavior and election outcomes.

scholarly journals Do Restrictions on Home Equity Extraction Contribute to Lower Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Policy Discontinuity at the Texas Border

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 268-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil Kumar
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Mortgage Default ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Design Framework ◽  
Home Equity ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Home Value ◽  
Texas Border ◽  
Mortgage Defaults

Texas is the only US state that limits home equity borrowing to 80 percent of home value. This paper exploits this policy discontinuity around Texas’ interstate borders and uses a multidimensional regression discontinuity design framework to find that limits on home equity borrowing in Texas lowered the likelihood of mortgage default by about 1.5 percentage points for all mortgages and 4–5 percentage points for non-prime mortgages. Estimated non-prime mortgage default hazards within 25 to 100 miles on either side of the Texas border are about 20 percent smaller when crossing into Texas. (JEL G21, G28, R31)

scholarly journals Asymmetric Incentives in Subsidies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Electricity Rebate Program

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koichiro Ito
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Air Conditioner ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Household Level ◽  
Effectiveness Analysis ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run

Many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities. Such policy designs create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. I investigate the implications of such policies by using a regression discontinuity design in California's electricity rebate program. Using household-level panel data, I find that the incentive produced precisely estimated zero treatment effects on energy conservation in coastal areas. In contrast, the rebate induced short-run and long-run consumption reductions in inland areas. Income, climate, and air conditioner saturation significantly drive the heterogeneity. Finally, I provide a cost-effectiveness analysis and investigate how to improve the policy design. (JEL D12, D62, H76, L94, L98, Q48)

How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off?

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Hall ◽  
James M. Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Previous Election ◽  
Us Senate ◽  
State Legislative

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the degree to which incumbents scare off challengers with previous officeholder experience. The estimates indicate a surprisingly small amount of scare-off, at least in cases where the previous election was nearly tied. As Lee and others have shown (and as we confirm for our samples) the estimated party incumbency advantage in these same cases is quite large—in fact, it is about as large as the average incumbency advantage for all races found using other approaches. Drawing from previous estimates of the electoral value of officeholder experience, we thus calculate that scare-off in these cases accounts for only about 5–7 percent of the party incumbency advantage. We show that these patterns are similar in elections for US House seats, statewide offices and US senate seats, and state legislative seats.

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