Signaling Games of Election Fraud

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirill Kalinin
Keyword(s):  
Signaling Games ◽  
Election Fraud

The Forensics of Election Fraud

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Myagkov ◽  
Peter C. Ordeshook ◽  
Dimitri Shakin
Keyword(s):  
Election Fraud

Examining false beliefs about voter fraud in the wake of the 2020 Presidential Election

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David Gertler Rand
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Election ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Legal Challenges ◽  
Election Fraud ◽  
Voter Fraud ◽  
Election News

The 2020 U.S. Presidential Election saw an unprecedented number of false claims alleging election fraud and arguing that Donald Trump was the actual winner of the election. Here we report a survey exploring belief in these false claims that was conducted three days after Biden was declared the winner. We find that a majority of Trump voters in our sample – particularly those who were more politically knowl-edgeable and more closely following election news – falsely believed that election fraud was wide-spread and that Trump won the election. Thus, false beliefs about the election are not merely a fringe phenomenon. We also find that Trump conceding or losing his legal challenges would likely lead a ma-jority of Trump voters to accept Biden’s victory as legitimate, although 40% said they would continue to view Biden as illegitimate regardless. Finally, we found that levels of partisan spite and endorsement of violence were equivalent between Trump and Biden voters.

scholarly journals Electronic Voting and Credible Election in Nigeria: A Study of Owerri Senatorial Zone

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nnaeto Japhet Olusadum ◽  
Ndoh Juliet Anulika
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Computer Technology ◽  
Electronic Voting ◽  
Electoral Fraud ◽  
Information And Computer Technology ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Election Fraud ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
Physically Challenged ◽  
Structured Questionnaire

The study is basically to examine electronic-voting in Nigeria elections as an improvement on the traditional paper voting with a focus on Owerri Senatorial Zone, Imo State. Worried by the frequent and debilitating incidences of electoral fraud and disenfranchisement of voters for unsubstantiated reasons, the study tended to sample opinion of respondents in Owerri on the subject as a way of strengthening democracy. Martin Hagen theory of e-democracy was adopted as theoretical framework. Hagen construes e-democracy as a strategic tool to strengthen democratic practices using the information and computer technology (ICT). The study is a survey attempt which made use of structured questionnaire to elicit information from respondents. Simple per centage was used for data analysis. It is our finding among others that e-voting will reduce incidences of election fraud especially in the areas of voting and counting of votes, and also the physically challenged qualified voters and citizens living and working abroad will have opportunity to cast their votes. The study concludes that Nigeria must cash in on flourishing (ICT) to fight endemic electoral irregularities in Nigeria through firm belief in and avowed adoption of e-voting. The study recommended among others institutionalization of legal frameworks and structures that will formidably support the practice of e-voting in Owerri senatorial zone in particular and Nigeria in general.

Plausibility of Signals by a Heterogeneous Committee

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Krehbiel
Keyword(s):  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Signaling Games ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Empirical Implications

Krishna and Morgan propose “amendments” to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel’s theoretical studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the empirical expectations of prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. This note gives primary attention to heterogeneous committees and compares and contrasts the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in previous legislative signaling games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules—specifically, the finding of a positive relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules—is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not.

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