scholarly journals The Curious Case of Choice Architect: Examining the Philosophical Inconsistencies of Libertarian Paternalism

Author(s):  
Francis Kuriakose
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 10007
Author(s):  
John Humphreys ◽  
Brandon Randolph-Seng ◽  
Stephanie Pane Haden ◽  
Milorad M. Novicevic

Author(s):  
Jason Hanna

This chapter considers libertarian paternalism, or “nudging,” as championed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. It focuses especially on the objection that such intervention is wrongly manipulative. The chapter begins by arguing that the charge of manipulation is most likely to be made against preference-shaping paternalism, which aims to influence behavior by operating on a person’s desires from the inside. It then argues that manipulation typically involves one person’s affecting another person’s deliberation for the worse: the victim of manipulation is typically led to act on bad reasons or ignore or downplay relevant considerations. This rough account of manipulation, it is argued, vindicates most of the preference-shaping strategies favored by Thaler and Sunstein. The chapter concludes by examining more problematic means of influence, such as subliminal messaging, and argues that they do not pose any distinctive threat to a pro-paternalist view.


2019 ◽  
Vol 130 (629) ◽  
pp. 1384-1415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Hertwig ◽  
Michael D Ryall

ABSTRACT Thaler and Sunstein (2008) advance the concept of ‘nudge’ policies—non-regulatory and non-fiscal mechanisms designed to enlist people's cognitive biases or motivational deficits so as to guide their behaviour in a desired direction. A core assumption of this approach is that policymakers make artful use of people's cognitive biases and motivational deficits in ways that serve the ultimate interests of the nudged individual. We analyse a model of dynamic policymaking in which the policymaker's preferences are not always aligned with those of the individual. One novelty of our set-up is that the policymaker has the option to implement a ‘boost’ policy, equipping the individual with the competence to overcome the nudge-enabling bias once and for all. Our main result identifies conditions under which the policymaker chooses not to boost in order to preserve the option of using the nudge (and its associated bias) in the future—even though boosting is in the immediate best interests of both the policymaker and the individual. We extend our analysis to situations in which the policymaker can be removed (e.g., through an election) and in which the policymaker is similarly prone to bias. We conclude with a discussion of some policy implications of these findings.


Author(s):  
James R. Otteson

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue for “libertarian paternalism,” defined as the strategy to devise policy that will “maintain or increase freedom of choice” and at the same time “influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better”. These two goals are often in conflict, and striking the right balance between them has proved difficult in both theory and practice. Where does Adam Smith fall in this debate? This chapter argues that Smith developed his own version of “libertarian paternalism.” It differs in important ways from that of Thaler and Sunstein, but it shares with them an attempt to balance respect for individual autonomy with a desire to help people lead better lives. Smith’s position accommodates the importance of both liberty and paternalism in enabling individuals to construct lives worth living, while avoiding some of the problems that have beset more recent versions of libertarian paternalism.


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