Experiences and Perceptions of Default Nudges

In this thesis I argue that how people perceive and experience nudge interventions is an underappreciated factor that can help assess, and potentially address, both effectiveness and ethical concerns. In the introduction, I outline a framework for how this can be the case. Specifically, I propose that people’s perceptions and experiences are relevant to assessing (1) the ethics of nudging, (2) the net effect of nudging, and that they may (3) be moderators of the success of nudges influencing behavior. I then present three empirical studies (nine sub-studies, total N = 5171) that used online experiments to assess how people perceive and experience being subjected to nudges. In contrast to the majority of similar research, the present studies primarily subjected participants to nudges first-hand. That is, participants did not rate descriptions of nudges, but engaged in choice tasks first hand before assessing the intervention. Results indicated that people subjected to default nudges: experienced themselves as highly, and not less, autonomous and satisfied with their choices (Study I); found the use of the nudge to be fair, though less fair than no nudge (Study II); and favorably perceived a choice architect using the nudge, and not less so than in the absence of a nudge (Study III). Additionally, the studies found that making the nudge increasingly transparent by disclosing its presence and expected effect to participants did not meaningfully change their experiences of choosing, but could either improve or worsen perceptions of the nudge depending on the circumstances of the evaluation. When participants were disclosed of the nudge after they had already made a choice, this was found to negatively affect their perceptions of the choice architect. Providing a nudge disclosure did not, however, influence participants’ propensity to act in line with the nudge. I conclude that the present findings paint a generally positive picture of how default nudges are perceived and experienced, but that more research is necessary to properly inform policy. I suggest that policymakers should routinely use measures of choice experiences as a guide when designing new nudge interventions. Nevertheless, as judged by the empirical evidence available at present, default nudges appear to be a viable form of intervention in relation to concerns about both their effectiveness and ethicality.

Are Default Nudges Deemed Fairer When They Are More Transparent? People's Judgments Depend on the Circumstances of the Evaluation

To avoid concerns of manipulation, nudges should be transparent to the people affected by the intervention. Whether increasing the transparency of a nudge also leads to more favorable perceptions of the nudge is however not certain, and may depend on the circumstances of the evaluation. Across three preregistered experiments (N = 1915), we study how increased transparency affects the perceived fairness of a default nudge, in joint vs. separate, and description- vs. experience-based evaluations. We find that transparency increases perceived fairness of the nudge in a joint comparison, when the relative benefits of transparency are easy to see. However, in a real choice-context, with nothing to compare against, transparency instead decreases perceived fairness. Efforts to make nudges more ethical may thus ironically make choice architects perceived as less ethical. Additionally, we find that the transparent default nudge still successfully affects behavior, that different default-settings communicate different perceived intentions of the choice architect, and that participants consistently favor opt-in defaults over opt-out defaults nudges – regardless of their level of transparency.

Nudge/sludge symmetry: on the relationship between nudge and sludge and the resulting ontological, normative and transparency implications

A recent development within nudge theory is the concept of sludge, which imposes frictions on decision-making. Nascent literature adopts a normative interpretation of sludge: nudge good, sludge bad. However, this normative interpretation leaves much to be desired. A clear definition and treatment of sludge remains absent from this literature, as is a complete understanding of ‘frictions’. Furthermore, the relationship between nudges and sludges is unclear. This paper proposes the concept of nudge/sludge symmetry in an attempt to advance the conceptual understanding of sludge. Building from the definition of a nudge, three types of friction permissible under nudge theory are identified: hedonic, social and obscurant. Sludge is then positioned, in terms of frictions, relative to nudge: nudges decrease relative frictions, sludges increase relative frictions. A consequence of this proposition is nudge/sludge symmetry – where a nudge decreases the frictions associated with a specific option, sludge is simultaneously imposed on all other options available to a decision-maker. Nudge/sludge symmetry subsequently challenges the normative interpretation of sludge, and so a new framework drawing on the literature on nudges in the private sector is offered, with the choice architect placed at the centre. This new approach to sludge and emphasis on the role of the choice architect, in turn, reaffirms the importance of transparency in public policy interventions.

Message and Environment: a framework for nudges and choice architecture

We argue that the diverse components of a choice architecture can be classified into two main dimensions – Message and Environment – and that the distinction between them is useful in order to better understand how nudges work. In the first part of this paper, we define what we mean by nudge, explain what Message and Environment are, argue that the distinction between them is conceptually robust and show that it is also orthogonal to other distinctions advanced in the nudge literature. In the second part, we review some common types of nudges and show they target either Message or Environment or both dimensions of the choice architecture. We then apply the Message–Environment framework to discuss some features of Amazon's website and, finally, we indicate how the proposed framework could help a choice architect to design a new choice architecture.

Gouverner par des « coups de pouce » (nudges) : instrumentaliser nos biais cognitifs au lieu de légiférer ?

En visant la partie inconsciente et émotionnelle de notre esprit, les sciences affectives et comportementales ont démontré la possibilité d’orienter nos actions sans recourir à la contrainte. Dans ces conditions, la tentation était vive de chercher à exploiter les résultats de telles recherches pour gouverner nos conduites au lieu de légiférer. Par d’habiles « coups de pouce » (nudges), l’État devient ainsi l’architecte de nos choix (choice architect), chargé de créer un environnement incitant, à notre insu, à obéir comme il le souhaite. En d’autres termes, donner un « coup de pouce » revient à créer un environnement comportemental incitateur (choice architecture) offrant un contexte propice à l’adoption d’un comportement déterminé sans contrainte apparente. Un tel mécanisme présente l’indéniable intérêt de contribuer à mettre en oeuvre les lois et les politiques publiques de manière plus souple. L’incitation doit en effet être préférée à la coercition si la première se révèle suffisamment efficace. Pourtant, la création d’environnements comportementaux incitateurs est un moyen possiblement très intrusif, susceptible de court-circuiter notre libre arbitre. Il reviendra donc aux autorités de ne retenir que ceux d’entre eux dont la nature n’est pas manipulatoire. Fondés sur une base légale, visant un intérêt public, proportionnés, conformes à la bonne foi, transparents et non discriminatoires, ces environnements ont en revanche toute leur place dans la panoplie d’un État de droit.