Paradox of Crosses in Association Football (Soccer) A Game-Theoretic Explanation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Sarkar
2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Sarkar

Abstract In association football, crosses from the wide areas of the pitch in the attacking third is a standard tactic for creating goal-scoring opportunities. But recent studies show that crosses adversely impact goals. Regression run in this paper on data from the premier soccer leagues of England, Spain, Germany, France and Italy for 2016–2017 season also found this inverse relation. However, there is no research that explains the reason for this inverse relation between crosses and goals. A game-theoretical model developed in this paper explains why crosses adversely affect goal-scoring. The model identifies a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), wherein the attacking team’s probability of playing a cross decreases with increase in their crossing accuracy, heading accuracy and probability of winning aerial balls. If the attacking team is good in terms of these parameters, the defending team’s probability of using an offside trap increases and that forces the attacking team to use crosses less frequently. In the MSNE, teams with a greater chance of scoring from crosses use the crosses less frequently than teams having a smaller chance of scoring from crosses. The theory was subsequently validated using the data of the 2016–2017 football season.


2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.


2018 ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
O. Yu. Bondarenko

his article explores theoretical and experimental approach to modeling social interactions. Communication and exchange of information with other people affect individual’s behavior in numerous areas. Generally, such influence is exerted by leaders, outstanding individuals who have a higher social status or expert knowledge. Social interactions are analyzed in the models of social learning, game theoretic models, conformity models, etc. However, there is a lack of formal models of asymmetric interactions. Such models could help elicit certain qualities characterizing higher social status and perception of status by other individuals, find the presence of leader influence and analyze its mechanism.


2012 ◽  
Vol E95.B (10) ◽  
pp. 3345-3348
Author(s):  
Jiamin LI ◽  
Dongming WANG ◽  
Pengcheng ZHU ◽  
Lan TANG ◽  
Xiaohu YOU

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