'Turkeys Don't Vote for Thanksgiving!' Metaphors Used by Australian Company Directors to Describe Contradictions and Constraints on Optimal Board Performance

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Areni
1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 174-181
Author(s):  
Bernard Barry ◽  
Peter J. Dowling

2003 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm Alexander

This article examines the (interpersonal) network of boardroom contacts among the directors of Australia's largest companies in 1976 and 1996. Interlocking directors create an intercorporate network but also an interpersonal, contact network. The network reaches all directors serving on any board that has a connected interlocker/networker on it. The interpersonal network of 1996 is broader, more cohesive and more densely connected than that of 1976. However, there is only minimal change in the density of inter-corporate linkages over these two decades. These findings suggest that, by the late 1990s, internal social organization among the corporate elite in Australia is independent of the political economy of intercorporate relations and changing in directions suggested by Useem's study of `investor capital-ism' in the USA. Australian corporate power structure research needs to study the interaction of these trends with the pre-existing concentrations of corporate control in this country.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Azasu ◽  
Anthony Owusu-Ansah ◽  
Aashen Lalloo ◽  
Senyo Cudjoe

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert White ◽  
Matt Bradshaw

As market relations become more pervasive, so the classical sociological issue of the tension between ‘economic’ and ‘social’ explanations becomes more salient than ever. Michel Callon has proposed that the Actor-Network Theory (A-NT) developed in science and technology studies provides a useful approach to this tension. In this article we outline his innovatively traditional ‘market test’ of A-NT, and then test and illustrate it through a contract between an Australian company and a transport logistics consortium that it fostered under changing conditions in its market. We exemplify Callon’s case for the co-emergence of calculative and cultural effects, and conclude that business in action is a promising research site for their global reconfiguration.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (6/7) ◽  
pp. 582-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar ◽  
Hafiz Majdi Abdul Rashid

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to ascertain the control role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), as prescribed in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG).The MCCG (2000) requires substantive involvement of INEDs on the audit, nomination and remuneration board sub-committees. The study also examines the effectiveness of INEDs in discharging their monitoring roles in these sub-committees. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative research design consisting of a series of interviews with board members of Malaysian-owned PLCs on the board of Bursa Malaysia was used. Findings – Interviews with 27 company directors reveal that, due to their independence, INEDs are crucial in safeguarding the interests of smaller investors if situations arise in which shareholders’ interests may be threatened. The interviews also disclose that the audit committee possesses the most authority among the sub-committees, as it derives its power not only from the Listing Requirements but also from statute, as well as being involved in areas of the company not traditionally associated with the committee. The study also reveals the differences in opinion between executive directors and INEDs with regard to the extent of INEDs’ effectiveness. Research limitations/implications – This research utilises interviews. Generalisation may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. In addition, the sample is not random, as access to many directors is dependent on recommendations. In addition, the respondents have been consciously selected to cover various board positions, including independent and non-independent directors. Practical implications – The findings from this research suggest that INEDs are able to discharge their responsibilities in overseeing the conduct of executives and protecting the interests of investors. In addition, the interviews disclose that the effectiveness of INEDs depends on how non-executive directors view INEDs being on the board. Rather than focusing solely on their control role, INEDS are expected to have a more proactive and progressive role in ensuring sustainable growth and the expansion of the business entity. Originality/value – There are limited studies using qualitative research design in investigating the effectiveness of INEDs in the control role of the board in developing countries. Prior studies were predominantly based upon the experience of Western economies.


1962 ◽  
Vol 72 (285) ◽  
pp. 219
Author(s):  
J. B. Heath ◽  
J. A. Bushnell
Keyword(s):  

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