Ex Ante Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Lessons from the ACA and Risky Sex

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barton Willage
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risky Sex ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

A perverse ‘net’ effect? Health insurance and ex-ante moral hazard in Ghana

2012 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zelalem Yilma ◽  
Luuk van Kempen ◽  
Thomas de Hoop
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals How Individual Characters Affect the Ex ante Moral Hazard of Basic Medical Insurance: Evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Ji Luo ◽  
Yuanxiang Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Medical Insurance ◽  
Basic Health Insurance ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Basic Health ◽  
Basic Medical Insurance ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Basic Medical

How individual characters affect the ex ante moral hazard of basic medical insurance still remain academically debatable. This paper based on divergent individual characters of insurers to analyze the roles of basic health insurance on the ex ante moral hazard. It found health level, marital status, income level and age are the key individual factors affecting ex ante moral hazard of basic health insurance. But the roles of rural-urban difference and gender are not obvious. It gives supplementary explanations to the medical service expenditure, waste of medical resources and other issues, and also put forward the corresponding policy recommendations.

scholarly journals Health insurance and ex ante moral hazard: evidence from Medicare

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dhaval Dave ◽  
Robert Kaestner
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard: Evidence from Medicare

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dhaval Dave ◽  
Robert Kaestner
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals Ex-ante moral hazard: empirical evidence for private health insurance in Brazil

Nova Economia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 987-1008
Author(s):  
Ana Carolina Maia ◽  
Mônica Viegas Andrade ◽  
Flávia Chein
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Diagnostic Tests ◽  
Private Health Insurance ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Health Insurance Coverage ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Medical Visits ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

Abstract This paper explores the existence of ex-ante moral hazard in private health insurance in Brazil. Before the advent of illness, insured individuals have no incentives to seek preventive care if it is not previously contractible. The data set comprises longitudinal administrative records of health care utilization from a Brazilian employer-sponsored health insurance plan. The empirical strategy is based on an exogenous and anticipated shock in health insurance coverage not associated with health conditions. The results show an increase of up to 17% on medical visits and 22% on diagnostic tests due to the loss of health insurance. Medical visits start to increase five months before the individual leaves the health insurance pool, reaching its peak at two months prior to exit. For diagnostic tests, the increase was observed only in the last two months before the loss of health insurance coverage.

scholarly journals Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited

2017 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
David Rowell ◽  
Son Hong Nghiem ◽  
Luke B. Connelly
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals Ex Ante Moral Hazard Pada Sistem Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) di Indonesia

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fajar Nurhaditia Putra
Keyword(s):  
Physical Activity ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Smoking Behavior ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
National Health Insurance System ◽  
Risky Health Behaviors ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

AbstrakPenelitian ini memberikan kontribusi berupa studi empiris ex ante moral hazard pada Sistem Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) di Indonesia. Kami menemukan bahwa kepemilikan Program JKN memiliki hubungan negatif dengan aktivitas fisik dan hubungan positif dengan pengeluran rokok individu. Selanjutnya dengan menghitung efek marginal kami mendapatkan bahwa Program JKN mengurangi probabilitas individu untuk melakukan aktivitas fisik sebesar 2.7% dan mengurangi intensitas melakukan aktivitas fisik. Program JKN juga ditemukan berhubungan positif pengeluaran rokok individu bagi perokok. Hasil analisis menyatakan bahwa ada indikasi terjadinya ex ante moral hazard pada Program JKN karena terdapat hubungan yang positif antara kepemilikan JKN dan probabilitas individu melakukan perilaku kesehatan berisiko seperti aktivitas fisik dan perilaku merokok.Abstract This paper contributes to the empirical evidence of ex ante moral hazard on the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) in Indonesia. We find that JKN participation has a negative relationship with physical activity and positive relationship with smoking spending. Furthermore, by calculating marginal effect we obtained that JKN participation reduce the probability of physical activity by 2.7% and also reduce the intensity of individual physical activity. For the smoker, JKN Participation is expected increase in their spending for smoking. The result indicates that there is an evidence of ex ante moral hazard since there is a positive relationship between JKN participation and risky health behaviors such as physical activity and smoking behavior.

scholarly journals Multiple Losses, EX ANTE Moral Hazard, and the Implications for Umbrella Policies

2005 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-538 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Breuer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante
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