Public Education Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility in an Overlapping Generations Model

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Zheng
2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (197) ◽  
pp. 7-21
Author(s):  
Zambaa Ayed ◽  
Hassen Ben

This paper proposes an overlapping generations model along the lines of the papers by Glomm and Ravikumar (1997). Its aim is to provide a theoretical extension in which we establish, in an original framework, a comparison of public and private educational financing systems in terms of economic growth. The results provide a critique of the literature that suggests that private expenditure will inevitably lead to greater economic growth than a policy of public education.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1198-1226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bossi ◽  
Gulcin Gumus

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2542-2567
Author(s):  
B Biais ◽  
A Landier

Abstract While potentially more productive, more complex tasks generate larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents, however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually increase beyond what is optimal for the principal and for society.


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