The Illusion of Transparency: Neoliberalism, Depoliticisation and Information As Commodity

Author(s):  
Rachel Adams

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Finn Janning ◽  
Wafa Khlif ◽  
Coral Ingley


2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roshan Rai ◽  
Peter Mitchell ◽  
Tasleem Kadar ◽  
Laura Mackenzie


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Beasley ◽  
Philip Ross Bullock

The impact of Russian literature on British literature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has long been considered through the prism of its single most energetic translator, Constance Garnett. Arguing that Garnett's project to translate nearly the entire canon of Russian realist fiction was shaped by a wider commitment to domesticating fluency, this introduction suggests ways in which current interest in translators, intermediaries, critics, and institutions can challenge this illusion of transparency, and offer a more variegated account of the multiple processes and ideologies of translation and reception that were at work in Britain at the turn of the century.



1998 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 332-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Gilovich ◽  
Kenneth Savitsky ◽  
Victoria Husted Medvec


2011 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roshan Rai ◽  
Peter Mitchell ◽  
Joanne Faelling




2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-85
Author(s):  
Jin-Sheng HU ◽  
Li-Zhu YANG


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (11) ◽  
pp. 3500-3539
Author(s):  
Kristóf Madarász

This paper studies bargaining with noncommon priors where the buyer projects and exaggerates the probability that her private information may leak to the seller. Letting the buyer name her price first, raises the seller’s payoff above his payoff from posting a price. In seller-offer bargaining, projection implies a partial reversal of classic Coasian comparative static results. Weakening price commitment can benefit the seller and, as long as the relative speed at which imaginary information versus offers arrive does not converge to zero too quickly, frictionless bargaining converges to a fast haggling process which allows the seller to extract all surplus from trade. Bargaining under common prior transparency is instead slow and becomes equivalent to simply waiting. The comparative static predictions are consistent with experimental evidence. (JEL C78, D82)



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