The Information Advantage of the Negligence Rule Over Strict Liability

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Lando

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 1-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Shavell

Abstract Courts generally insist that two criteria be met before imposing strict liability rather than basing liability on the negligence rule. The first—that the injurer’s activity must be dangerous—is sensible because strict liability possesses general advantages over the negligence rule in controlling risk. But the second—that the activity must be uncommon—is ill-advised because it exempts all common activities from strict liability no matter how dangerous they are. Thus, the harm generated by the large swath of common dangerous activities—from hunting, to construction, to the transmission of natural gas—is inadequately regulated by tort law. After developing this theme and criticizing ostensible justifications for the uncommon activity requirement, the article addresses the question of how it arose. The answer is that its legal pedigree is problematic: it appears to have been invented by the authors of the first Restatement of Torts. The conclusion is that the uncommon activity requirement for the imposition of strict liability should be eliminated.



Author(s):  
Ahson T. Azmat

This Article examines and evaluates a distinctive, increasingly popular account of the Mistake of Law doctrine. The doctrine, deeply ingrained in American criminal law, is at the same time notoriously unclear in its scope, content, and application. A growing number of legal theorists have criticized the traditional interpretation of the doctrine; legal moralists in particular have argued that this account is conceptually confused. Because the doctrine’s use of a strict liability punishment regime does not incentivize individuals to learn the law as well as a negligence regime might, legal moralists argue that the doctrine cannot be explained by a desire to incentivize legal knowledge. In evaluating this argument, the Article defends the traditional account, often identified with the liberal positivism of Justice Holmes. The Article advances three main arguments. First, legal moralism’s claim that a negligence standard is more effective than a strict liability standard in incentivizing individuals to learn the law is false: the safe harbor provision of a negligence rule acts as an insurance effect, disincentivizing individuals to learn the law. Second, legal moralism assumes that the moral content of the criminal law is determinate, and that agents have perfectly rational, objective motivational sets. These are illicit assumptions that result in a flawed argument. Finally, the Article contends that legal moralism misinterprets the structural core of the traditional account: properly understood, the Mistake of Law doctrine employs a negligence–strict liability hybrid, and is thus more sophisticated than legal moralists realize. The Article concludes that, contrary to what a surprising number of criminal law theorists have come to accept, legal moralism fails to make a plausible case against the traditional account of the Mistake of Law doctrine.



2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Lando

AbstractWhen parties are risk-averse and therefore take out insurance, the efficiency of a tort rule depends on how well the insurance contracts govern incentives, risk allocation and transaction costs under the rule. This article presents two overlooked or discarded advantages of the rule of negligence over strict liability, which appear when insurance contracts are incomplete due to ex-ante transaction or ex-post verification costs. One advantage arises because of a legal impediment under strict liability: insurers cannot exempt coverage for all acts of simple negligence. Instead, the insurer must, at a cost, precisely specify each act for which coverage is excluded. Such specification can be prohibitively costly when there are many acts and many contingencies. These transaction costs, or the inefficient risk allocation associated with a deductible, are avoided under the negligence rule, where under idealized conditions the injurer can simply take due care and need not take out insurance. The other advantage of the negligence rule is that it provides incentives for the victim to bring forward information about the injurer’s acts. The victim has little incentive to convey such information under strict liability, whereas the victim’s insurer may elicit it, e. g. by not covering the victim’s loss fully.



2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kangoh Lee

AbstractOne of the most important propositions in the economics of liability rules states that strict liability and the negligence rule are equivalent and first-best efficient if the standard of due care is set according to the Hand rule. This proposition hinges on the assumption that individuals are risk neutral. This paper considers this proposition with risk-averse individuals, and demonstrates that the proposition does not extend. In particular, the two liability rules are not equivalent, and the analysis compares the two liability rules in terms of utilitarian social welfare.



Author(s):  
Robert D. Cooter ◽  
Ariel Porat

This chapter proposes a novel form of the negligence rule known as total liability for excessive harm to address situations in which several injurers cause harm and the court can verify the total harm caused by all injurers but not the degree of harm caused by each injurer. Under the rule of total liability for excessive harm, each individual injurer should be liable for the total harm that everyone causes in excess of the optimal harm. This rule creates efficient incentives because each injurer internalizes the marginal social benefit from reducing his excessive pollution, for example. The chapter first considers alternative liability rules such as strict liability, strict total liability, and proportionate liability, along with their limitations. It then explains the basic model of total liability for excessive harm and concludes with some real and hypothetical examples in which the rule could be applied to great advantage.



2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Jiang ◽  
Donghua Zhou ◽  
Joseph H. Zhang

SYNOPSIS Against the backdrop of the Chinese Directive 40 (China's Reg FD) issued in 2007 as an attempt to curb insider trading and to level the information playing field, this study investigates whether analysts' private information acquisition influences the extent to which firm-specific information is impounded into stock prices, i.e., stock price synchronicity, and how the restrictions on selective disclosures imposed by Directive 40 have shaped the relationship between analyst information acquisition and synchronicity. Using a pre-Directive 40 sample, we show that synchronicity is negatively related to analysts' private information acquisition, which provides support for the “information advantage” argument of analysts' information production. However, the ability of analysts' private information acquisition in improving firm-specific information incorporated into stock price is mitigated post-Directive 40 due to a restriction on selective disclosures and/or private communication. Moreover, we find that this regulatory impact varies for firms being followed by affiliated analysts versus non-affiliated analysts. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; G17; G18.



2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. King ◽  
Rachel Schwartz

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how legal regimes affect social welfare. We investigate four legal regimes, each consisting of a liability rule (strict or negligence) and a damage measure (out-of-pocket or independent-of-investment). The results of the experiment are for the most part consistent with the qualitative predictions of Schwartz's (1997) model; however, subjects' actual choices deviate from the point predictions of the model. We explore whether these deviations arise because: (1) subjects form faulty anticipations of their counterparts' actions and/or (2) subjects do not choose the optimal responses given their anticipations. We find that subjects behave differently under the four regimes in terms of anticipation errors and departures from best responses. For example, subjects playing the role of auditors anticipate investments most accurately under the regime with strict liability combined with out-of-pocket damages, but are least likely to choose the optimal response given their anticipations. This finding implies that noneconomic factors likely play a role in determining subjects' choices.



Author(s):  
John Gardner

Torts and Other Wrongs is a collection of eleven of the author’s essays on the theory of the law of torts and its place in the law more generally. Two new essays accompany nine previously published pieces, a number of which are already established classics of theoretical writing on private law. Together they range across the distinction between torts and other wrongs, the moral significance of outcomes, the nature and role of corrective and distributive justice, the justification of strict liability, the nature of the reasonable person standard, and the role of public policy in private law adjudication. Though focused on the law of torts, the wide-ranging analysis in each chapter will speak to theorists of private law more generally.



Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document