Sticking to One's Guns: Mass Shootings and the Political Economy of Gun Control in the U.S.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hasin Yousaf
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Gun Control ◽  
The Political ◽  
Mass Shootings ◽  
The U.S

scholarly journals The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atif Mian ◽  
Amir Sufi ◽  
Francesco Trebbi
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Mortgage Default ◽  
The U.S

Health Care Public Sector Share and the U.S. Life Expectancy Lag: A Country-level Longitudinal Study

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 328-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan M. Reynolds
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Life Expectancy ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
The Political ◽  
Life Expectancy At Birth ◽  
Political Economy Of Health ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

Growing research on the political economy of health has begun to emphasize sociopolitical influences on cross-national differences in population health above and beyond economic growth. While this research investigates the impact of overall public health spending as a share of GDP (“health care effort”), it has for the most part overlooked the distribution of health care spending across the public and private spheres (“public sector share”). I evaluate the relative contributions of health care effort, public sector share, and GDP to the large and growing disadvantage in U.S. life expectancy at birth relative to peer nations. I do so using fixed effects models with data from 16 wealthy democratic nations between 1960 and 2010. Results indicate that public sector share has a beneficial effect on longevity net of the effect of health care effort and that this effect is nonlinear, decreasing in magnitude as levels rise. Moreover, public sector share is a more powerful predictor of life expectancy at birth than GDP per capita. This study contributes to discussions around the political economy of health, the growth consensus, and the American lag in life expectancy. Policy implications vis-à-vis the U.S. Affordable Care Act are discussed.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Negotiations on the Uruguay Round of MTN: Can the U.S. and European Community Reach an Acceptable Compromise in the GATT?

1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen C.W. Ames
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
European Community ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Agricultural Trade ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Trade Negotiations ◽  
The Political ◽  
The U.S

AbstractA model of the political economy of agricultural policy formulation was used to analyze the current stalemate in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The combination of social welfare increasing and transferring policies in the European Community and the U.S. is one of the primary causes of the deadlock in trade negotiations. The Community's farm policy of high internal price supports, limited market access, and export subsidies represents short-term equilibria in the market for social-welfare policies which distribute benefits to producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Thus, the opportunity for internal reform of the CAP leading to a compromise in the GATT negotiations is problematic at best. However, international commitments to agricultural policy reform will force the Community to make concessions which will bring equivalent change in domestic policy.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of the Congressional Fast Track Vote

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred O. Boadu ◽  
Maria R. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Fast Track ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The Political ◽  
Hispanic Origin ◽  
Explanatory Factors ◽  
The U.S

AbstractThis paper presents an empirical analysis of the strategic forces shaping U.S.-Mexico trade relationships and the possibilities of extending the trade agreement to the rest of the Americas. The paper concludes that constituency interests, party loyalty, the proportion of a state's population of Hispanic origin, and the influence of textile-related employment in the state were significant explanatory factors in the Congressional Fast Track vote that occurred in May of 1991.

scholarly journals Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety

2009 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Diana C. Mutz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Surveys ◽  
Factor Endowments ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
Trade Preferences ◽  
Foreign Commerce ◽  
Mass Attitudes ◽  
The U.S

AbstractAlthough it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic. These studies have focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual's income. The factor endowments or Heckscher-Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person's skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works. We find little support for either of these models using two representative national surveys of Americans. The only potential exception involves the effects of education. Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, further analysis reveals that education's effects are less representative of skill than of individuals' anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U.S. economy as a whole is affected by trade.

The Political Economy of the Japanese Yen and the U.S.-Japan Trade Conflict

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. C. Fung ◽  
Hitomi Iizaka ◽  
Paul Lau ◽  
Chelsea Lin
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Japanese Yen ◽  
The U.S

On the Political Economy of Binational Counter-Terrorism

2007 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edmund H. Mantell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
The Political ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
The U.S

This paper applies game theory to explore the economic incentives facing foreign nations sheltering terrorists. The players are a nation that has been a target of international terrorist activities and a nation that is a host (willing or unwilling) of international terrorists. The economics of multinational terrorism involve the costs to host nations of sanctions imposed by the U.S. and others, as well as the economic benefits transferred to the host nations by terrorist groups that they shelter. The main result shows that coalitions between international terrorists and their host nations allow the latter to sell licenses to terrorists thereby frustrating the counter-terrorist activities of victim nations.

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