Amicus Curiae Brief to the Russian Constitutional Court on the Right to be Forgotten

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paige Morrow
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Jud Mathews

AbstractThe Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 27-30
Author(s):  
Matej Avbelj

AbstractThe ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Right to be forgotten II case is an example of constitutional pluralism in action. It demonstrates how a pluralist-minded court can elevate itself from and above the constitutional confines of its own legal order. By integrating the material standards of another legal order in its own review of constitutionality a national constitutional court contributes directly to the strengthening of the fundamental rights of individuals against the national authorities within the overall system of European legal order.


Author(s):  
Evgeniya V. GERASIMOVA

The development of digital technologies affects the legal status of an individual. The task of constitutional justice is the constitutional interpretation of new legal phenomena such as the right to be forgotten. This article aims to analyze the right to be forgotten in the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and German Constitutional Court in a comparative aspect. The research methodology is primarily a dialectical method. This method helps the author to identify the content of the right to be forgotten, as well as to determine its role in relation to other constitutionally significant values. The comparative legal method is of particular importance for achieving the objectives of the research and helps to highlight the general and specific in the approaches of the courts to the concept of this right. This approach distinguishes the novelty of this research in comparison with other papers. The use of the dialectical and comparative legal research methods allows drawing the following conclusions. The distinctive feature of the right to be forgotten is its dualistic nature. On the one hand, this is a civil right associated with the right to privacy; on the other, it acts as a way to protect other constitutional rights (for example, the dignity of the individual). This right is not absolute. Some information may be of public interest. To resolve the issue of the prevailing constitutionally significant value in a particular case, the Russian Constitutional Court suggests using the method of finding a balance. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany emphasized that the right to free personal development and dignity sometimes prevails over freedom of information, especially considering the time factor in the case, as well as the degree of harm caused to a person by links to information posted on the Internet. The German Federal Constitutional Court, characterizing the legal relationship regarding the exercise of the right to be forgotten, highlights that this is a relationship between private subjects with fundamental rights, and refers to the concept of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (“mittelbare Drittwirkung”) developed in German constitutional law. This article concludes that the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the right to be forgotten are the guidelines for other courts, as well as the legislator for further improving legal regulation. Taking into account the development of information technologies, the author believes that the constitutional courts will more than once turn to the digital aspects of the legal status of an individual and, in particular, the concept of the right to be forgotten.


2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 505-518
Author(s):  
Amanda Spies

In 2002 the South African Constitutional Court rejected the decriminalisation of sex work and for many years the judgment has constricted further debate on the topic. In 2013 organisations such as the Commission for Gender Equality have again publicly committed themselves toward lobbying for the decriminalisation of sex work. The renewed debate has necessitated a reconsideration of the Court’s decision in S v Jordan and this article focuses on the organisations that participated as amicus curiae in the matter. The discussion highlights the importance of organisational participation in litigation and how this participation could provide the context in which to consider future debates on the topic. 


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».


2017 ◽  
pp. 67-86
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Krajewski

The Constitutional Tribunal is defined as the Polish constitutional court and at the same time the judicial authority. It was created at the turn of 1982. Not long after that it began its jurisprudence; more precisely it was in 1986. Describing its basic tasks, it is pointed out that judicial review of so-called constitutional law deserves a closer look. This is particularly true about controlling the compliance of lower legal norms with higher legal norms. Here attention is drawn towards the connection of the Constitution with some international agreements, ie. the court of law. The purpose of the paper below was to analyze the constitutional principles of criminal proceedings in the context of the case law of the Polish Constitutional Court. At the beginning the concept, the division and the role of the constitutional rules of criminal procedure were presented. In this section, it was emphasized that all the rules of the criminal process are considered superior norms of a very significant social importance. Then the principle of objectivity, which is reflected in the Constitution of the Republic, was described. A following aspect was the discussion of the principle of the presumption of innocence and the principle of in dubio pro reo. It has been emphasized that the essence of the principle is that the person who was brought before the court is treated as innocent until a lawful judgment is pronounced against the defendant. The author also pointed out the principle of the right to defense. According to this rule, the defendant has the right to defend themselves in the process and to use the help of a defender. Another described principle is so-called rule of publicity. It concerns the fact that information about criminal proceedings should be accessible to the public. Then it was pointed to the principle of the right to the trial and the independence of the judiciary. The first one is reflected in national law and acts of international rank. The second shows that the independence of the judiciary is determined by the proper exercise of the profession of judge and becomes a guarantee of freedom and civil rights. The humanitarian principle and the principle of participation of the social factor in the penal process are shown in the final section. At the end of the paper a summary and conclusions were presented.


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