CIVIL AND LEGAL LIABILITY OF JUDGES

Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Voyiakis

This comment discusses three recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of McElhinney v Ireland, Al-Adsani v UK, and Fogarty v UK. All three applications concerned the dismissal by the courts of the respondent States of claims against a third State on the ground of that State's immunity from suit. They thus raised important questions about the relation the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)—especially the right to a fair trial and access to court enshrined in Arcticle 6(1)—and the law of State immunity.


Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.


Pravni zapisi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 620-644
Author(s):  
Tamás Korhecz

The right to peaceful enjoyment of property is a first-generation human right, protected by the international and domestic law of the highest rank. This is not an absolute right - the European standards of protecting property rights allow possible interferences prescribed by law. The interferences can be made in the public interest but only under the assumption that the proportionality between the public interest and property rights of individuals at stake is established. Forfeiture of undeclared cash the individuals are transferring across state borders, together with imposing fines for a misdemeanor, represent an interference with individuals' property rights. The EU Member States do not share an identical system of sanctions for this petty offense, but there is a tendency of unification related to the monitoring, registering, and sanctioning of undeclared, cross-border, individual cash transfer. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has established rather precise criteria for distinguishing permitted from unpermitted interferences in cases of undeclared cross-border cash transfers. The Serbian Constitutional Court has been faced with several constitutional complaints regarding alleged unconstitutionally of the imposed security measure amounting to the forfeiture of undeclared cash physically transferred across the state borders. The Constitutional Court has ruled inconsistently on the matter. Although it has regularly referred to the European Court of Human Rights' relevant decisions, it fails to be consistent in following the Strasbourg Court's rulings. In this article, the author has suggested that the legal certainty principle requires the Constitutional Court to consistently interpret the constitutional rights and be systematic in following Strasbourg. Only in this way, the Constitutional Court can help regular courts effectively to harmonize the interpretation and application of laws with the constitutional and international human rights standards regarding property rights.


Author(s):  
Zhou Heng

Deputies to people’s congresses enjoy the right to elect the personnel of a state organ, members of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress at the same level and deputies to the People’s Congress at a higher level in accordance with the provisions of the law. Based on the official nature of the right to vote, deputies to NPC can not transfer their right to vote and sell votes. As selling ballots is an illegal exercise of their official duty, they should assume for corresponding criminal responsibility for the crime of undermining election and bribery provided in the Criminal Law of China. Moreover, delegates to NPC who have the status of public officials shall be included in the supervision , and strengthen the responsibility inquiry.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


2020 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 487-507
Author(s):  
Tijana Surlan

This article offers a short study of the conjugation of freedom of religion, freedom of association and the legal status of religions and churches. Human rights are elaborated as defined in international human rights law, accentuated by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. A compliance case that came before the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia provides a national jurisprudential example useful for the analysis of relations between human rights and the legal status of a church. Analysis of the law is both horizontal and vertical: a description of norms is intertwined with a discussion of principles of identity and equality. The article explores whether the principles of human rights and freedoms and the norms regulating the legal status of a church are consistent with each other; whether these principles are independent and how their mutual relationship influences the application and interpretation of the law; and whether the norms prescribed by international law or in national jurisprudence can be applied independently of canon law, or whether application of the law has to take into account specific religious jurisdictions and relations between churches which are rooted in their autonomous canon law.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irini Papanicolopulu

In a unanimous judgment in the case Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Court) held that Italy’s “push back” operations interdicting intending migrants and refugees at sea and returning them to Libya amounted to a violation of the prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or Convention), the prohibition of collective expulsions under Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the Convention, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention. Hirsi Jamaa is the Court’s first judgment on the interception of migrants at sea and it addresses issues concerning the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, as well as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.


Author(s):  
Silvia DEL SAZ

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren ondorioz, Konstituzio Auzitegiak aurreko doktrina zuzendu behar izan du. Horretarako, errugabetasun-presuntziorako eskubidearen irismena zabaldu behar izan du, eta, administrazio-ebazpen zehatzaileetatik eta zigor-epaietatik harago, kalte-ordaina ukatzen duten erabakietara zabaldu du hori, Botere Judizialaren Lege Organikoaren 294. artikuluak eskatzen duen bezalaxe, errugabetasun-presuntzioaren printzipioa ezarri ostean akusatua absolbitu egin den baina delituzko egintzak egon ez zirela frogatu ez den kasuetarako. RESUMEN: Fruto de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Tribunal Constitucional se ha visto obligado a rectificar su doctrina anterior extendiendo el alcance del derecho a la presunción de inocencia, más allá de las resoluciones administrativas sancionadoras y sentencias penales, a los pronunciamientos que, tal y como exige el art. 294 LOPJ, deniegan la indemnización en atención a que el acusado fue absuelto en aplicación del principio de presunción de inocencia sin que haya quedado probado que los hechos delictivos no existieron. ABSTRACT: As a result of the case law by the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court was compelled to rectify its former doctrine by broadening the scope of the right to the presumption of innocence beyond punitive administrative resolutions and criminal judgments to rulings that as art. 294 of Judiciary Act requires, deny the award of damages on the ground that the accused was acquitted due to the application of the principle of innocence without having been proved that the criminal offences did not exist.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Ragone ◽  
Valentina Volpe

This Article analyses, through the lens of comparative law, theOliari and others v. Italyjudgment, which was issued by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in July 2015. TheOliaricase is important for being the first judgment in which the ECtHR established the granting of legal “recognition and protection” to same-sex couples as a positive obligation for the Member States of the Council of Europe on the basis of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In order to understand the role of judicial bodies in the progressive protection of homosexual rights, this Article combines an analysis of European case law with the national perspective. As it concerns the supranational facet, the authors illustrateOliari's reasoning and situate the case in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Elements of both continuity and innovation emerge from the analysis, as well as a relevant dimension of judicial dialogue supporting the incremental recognition of gay rights in Europe. As it concerns the national facet, this specific case was initially dealt with at the domestic level and was the object of judgment 138/2010 by the Italian Constitutional Court. The judgment is critically put into perspective through the examination of the jurisprudence of other European Constitutional Courts (France, Portugal and Spain) that were called on to decide similar cases in the same period. Therefore, the Article offers a comparative analysis of theOliarijudgment clarifying its relevance and speculating on the potential value of this case for the future recognition of the right to a “gay” family life in Europe.


Law and World ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-59

The paper addresses the basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia, in particular, issues related to personal data. The development of information technology has had a significant impact on the dangers of illegal processing of personal data. The European Court of Human Rights considers the inviolability of private life as a precondition for human autonomy, independent development and protection of human dignity. According to the norms of international law, the right to respect for private life is recognized as one of the most important and fundamental rights, the protection of which is indicated by the legislation of Georgia. The aim of the paper is to analyze the legislation and practice of police law in the field of protection of the right to privacy and to offer relevant recommendations, taking into account the standards set by European and national courts. Human rights legislation must ensure the protection of all human beings against the abuse of state power. Interference with rights must be based on the principle of proportionality. The use of policing should not pose an excessive threat of fundamental human rights violations. Interference with a particular right must be done under principle of proportionality to achieve a certain public good. In clarifying the issue of alleged violation of the right, special attention should be paid to the severity and probability of the expected threat to legal good. The Constitution of Georgia, EU and Council of Europe data protection standards, national legislation, as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the National Constitutional Court are analyzed around the topic. In addition, the reports of the State Inspector, the Public Defender and the relevant scientific literature are used to study the above issues.


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