THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN THE PRACTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE BODIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Author(s):  
Evgeniya V. GERASIMOVA

The development of digital technologies affects the legal status of an individual. The task of constitutional justice is the constitutional interpretation of new legal phenomena such as the right to be forgotten. This article aims to analyze the right to be forgotten in the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and German Constitutional Court in a comparative aspect. The research methodology is primarily a dialectical method. This method helps the author to identify the content of the right to be forgotten, as well as to determine its role in relation to other constitutionally significant values. The comparative legal method is of particular importance for achieving the objectives of the research and helps to highlight the general and specific in the approaches of the courts to the concept of this right. This approach distinguishes the novelty of this research in comparison with other papers. The use of the dialectical and comparative legal research methods allows drawing the following conclusions. The distinctive feature of the right to be forgotten is its dualistic nature. On the one hand, this is a civil right associated with the right to privacy; on the other, it acts as a way to protect other constitutional rights (for example, the dignity of the individual). This right is not absolute. Some information may be of public interest. To resolve the issue of the prevailing constitutionally significant value in a particular case, the Russian Constitutional Court suggests using the method of finding a balance. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany emphasized that the right to free personal development and dignity sometimes prevails over freedom of information, especially considering the time factor in the case, as well as the degree of harm caused to a person by links to information posted on the Internet. The German Federal Constitutional Court, characterizing the legal relationship regarding the exercise of the right to be forgotten, highlights that this is a relationship between private subjects with fundamental rights, and refers to the concept of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (“mittelbare Drittwirkung”) developed in German constitutional law. This article concludes that the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the right to be forgotten are the guidelines for other courts, as well as the legislator for further improving legal regulation. Taking into account the development of information technologies, the author believes that the constitutional courts will more than once turn to the digital aspects of the legal status of an individual and, in particular, the concept of the right to be forgotten.

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Jud Mathews

AbstractThe Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 27-30
Author(s):  
Matej Avbelj

AbstractThe ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Right to be forgotten II case is an example of constitutional pluralism in action. It demonstrates how a pluralist-minded court can elevate itself from and above the constitutional confines of its own legal order. By integrating the material standards of another legal order in its own review of constitutionality a national constitutional court contributes directly to the strengthening of the fundamental rights of individuals against the national authorities within the overall system of European legal order.


2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.


Author(s):  
M.V. Demidov ◽  
I.V. Semyonova

The development of the institution of constitutional control emphasizes the importance of the Constitution as an act that establishes the basis of the legal status of the individual, the structure and relationship of state bodies and the basis of the legal status of the state at the international level. The peculiarities of the organization of the activities of specialized bodies of constitutional justice and other bodies of constitutional control in foreign countries are of considerable scientific interest. In countries with a federal form of territorial structure, both a federal body of constitutional control and similar bodies in the subjects of the federation can be created. From the point of view of the considered problems, the experience of the constitutional justice of the Federal states of Germany is instructive. The organization of their work and the results of their activities are considered to be among the most successful on the European continent. Most often, the terms of reference of the German land courts are determined by analogy with the Federal Constitutional Court. The paper notes that the experience of the functioning of constitutional justice in the federal states of Germany can be used in the organization of the system of regional constitutional control in Russia in the context of the ongoing processes of its reform.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 190
Author(s):  
Christoph Enders

The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany did originally not provide for social or economic rights understood as claims to benefits. The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) did, indeed, recognise the states obligation to protect individuals against assault by others (right to security) and further ruled that everyone has the right to use facilities provided by the state under equal conditions (right to participation). These rights, however, aim to ensure that the state uses existing means as intended. In addition, the FCC by now has recognised a “right to the guarantee of a dignified minimum subsistence”. It is an original entitlement as the state is obliged to create and provide benefits for individuals in need. This new legal construction, however, misconceives the division of responsibilities between the FCC and the legislator and collides with the principle of the separation of powers


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 433-490
Author(s):  
Leonardo Martins

 Resumo: Este é um estudo de caso antecedido por uma explanação sistemática de seus pressupostos teóricos. O caso é fictício, mas fortemente inspirado em uma decisão de Câmara do Tribunal Constitucional Federal alemão. Nela, tratava-se de avaliar a constitucionalidade de uma medida policial e sua confirmação judicial no contexto de uma contramanifestação a uma reunião que ocorria em local público. Para a sua solução, desenvolveu-se um parecer jurídico-constitucional cujo objeto é a situação jurídica presente no caso, com vistas a avaliar as chances de êxito de uma eventual ação judicial contra as medidas estatais (policiais e decisão judicial), considerando a hipótese da violação do direito fundamental à liberdade de reunião a ser testada. No que se refere aos pressupostos teóricos do caso e à conjuntura política e jurídica brasileira, tem-se o seguinte. Como ocorre em qualquer Estado democrático, também no Brasil sob a égide da Constituição Federal (CF) o entorno político-ideológico do direito fundamental à liberdade de reunião é tão notório quanto contraproducente, pelo menos quando se pensa na imprescindibilidade de uma abordagem especificamente técnico-jurídica constitucional. Há um déficit na discussão pátria que o presente ensaio visa a sanar à luz do direito comparado alemão. Conjugar, assistematicamente, o princípio democrático com a liberdade de reunião e seu suposto caráter instrumental em relação àquele não faz jus aos desafios hermenêuticos implícitos no complexo teor do art. 5º, XVI CF em que se positivou o direito fundamental à liberdade de reunião. Partindo de uma análise sistemática do texto constitucional, o presente ensaio apresenta definições jurídico-dogmáticas, metodologicamente disciplinadas, e analisa o teor do dispositivo, classificando suas locuções entre condições subjetivas para o exercício da liberdade de reunião e previsão implícita de seus limites constitucionais que, por sua vez, podem ser, atendido certo ônus argumentativo, concretamente traçados pelo legislador ordinário. Assim, uma legislação ordinária regulamentadora não poderia ser, de plano, descartada como inconstitucional. Também a interpretação e a aplicação dessa eventual lei regulamentadora, assim como no caso da interpretação de quaisquer outros dispositivos normativos pertinentes ao direito administrativo e penal em geral, devem ser interpretadas e aplicadas à luz do direito fundamental à liberdade de reunião, de tal sorte a serem observados os vínculos específicos de todos os órgãos estatais pertinentes às três funções estatais clássicas.Palavras-chave: Autoaplicabilidade de direitos fundamentais. Regulamentação da liberdade de reunião. Limites constitucionais da liberdade de reunião. Interpretação judicial à luz da liberdade de reunião. Abstract: This is a case study preceded by a systematic explanation of its theoretical framework. The case is fictitious but strongly inspired by a judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany, in which the court assessed the constitutionality of a police measure and its judicial confirmation in the context of a counter-protest to a meeting that had occurred in a public space. For the case study’s resolution, it was developed a juridical-constitutional opinion centred on the juridical situation exposed on the case, with the aim to evaluate the chances of a positive outcome of an eventual judicial action against the state measures (police measure and its juridical confirmation), considering the hypothesis of violation of the fundamental right to assembly. As in any other democracy, in Brazil under the Federal Constitution (FC) of 1988, the political-ideological contours of the right to freedom of assembly are as notorious as they are counterproductive - at least when one thinks of the indispensability of a specific constitutional legal technique. There is a deficit in the Brazilian literature that the present essay seeks to remedy in the light of comparative law considering the German case. To reconcile the democratic principle with the freedom of assembly, without a systematic approach, one assumes its instrumental character in relation to the former and does not meet the hermeneutical challenges implicit in the complex content of article 5, XVI, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, in which freedom of assembly was enshrined. From a systematic analysis of the constitutional text, this study presents legal-dogmatic definitions that are methodologically disciplined, and analyzes the content of the aforementioned constitutional article, classifying its parts as either subjective conditions for the exercise of freedom of assembly or as implicit constitutional limits, which can be concretely drawn by the ordinary legislator, provided that they observe certain argumentative burdens. Thus, such a regulatory legislation could not, prima facie, be considered unconstitutional. Also, its eventual interpretation and application -as the interpretation of any other normative provision of administrative or criminal law in general - must be done in the light of freedom of assembly in such a way that the specific bounds between all three state functions are respected.Keywords: Self-enforceability of fundamental rights. Regulation of the freedom of assembly. Constitutional limits of the freedom of assembly. Judicial interpretation in the light of the freedom of assembly.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolay Taskayev ◽  
Anna Oleynik

The article examines the process of emergence, formation and development of the constitutional justice institution in Russia. It carries out an analysis of organization and activities of the USSR Constitutional Control Committee, the RSFSR Constitutional Court and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. The authors draw a conclusion of the need of conducting constitutional and legal reforms in Russia, introducing amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In order to increase efficiency of the constitutional jurisdiction, improving the organization and activity of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the General Prosecutors Office of the Russian Federation, the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation, the Executive Office of the Human Rights Commissioner in the Russian Federation, the authors offer proposals of introducing amendments and additions to Articles 104, 125, 129 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Federal Constitutional Law of 21.07.1994 № 1-ФКЗ «On Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation» in terms of authorizing the above-mentioned office-holders with the right of legislative initiative and making inquiries to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. In particular, on issues of constitutionality of the laws, normative legal acts of the supreme bodies of the governmental power and office-holders of the Russian Federation and the entities of the Russian Federation; on solvation of disputes in terms of competence between the supreme bodies of the governmental power and office-holders of the Russian Federation and the entities of the Russian Federation; on violence of citizens constitutional rights. The authors also offer to expand the Article 129 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation up to a separate chapter of the Constitution in which to establish the place in the system of the governmental power the designation, system, structure, principles of organization and activity, the authorities of the prosecutors office bodies, including in the sphere of constitutional jurisdiction.


2021 ◽  
pp. 166-175
Author(s):  
Ivan Vladimirovich Grigorev

The subject of this research is the normative sources that establish the rights, responsibilities and prohibitions in civil service, as well as the mechanisms for their implementation. The author dwells on the practical issues arising in the context of implementation of anti-corruption legislation associated with the right of the officers to exercise other paid activity, acquire and own securities, responsibility to notify about the possible colliding interests, limitation on the deed of gift due to their professional activities, providing data on income, expenses, property, and real obligations. Special attention is given to certain legal provisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and courts of general jurisdiction related to the peculiarities of the legal status of civil officers. The scientific novelty consists in comprehensive examination of the legal issues in regulation of anti-corruption elements of the legal status of civil officers. The main conclusions lies in determination of the gaps and conflicts of legal regulation of such relations. Critical assessment is given to the case law on the appeal of the prosecutors to transfer the property with no evidence that it has been acquired with legitimate income to the income of the Russian Federation. The author formulates recommendations for the improvement of the existing federal legislation on countering corruption in civil service.


Author(s):  
Slipachyk Slipachyk

The scientific article focuses on the analysis of a sentence of life imprisonment without a realistic prospect of release in Ukraine as a violation of the “right to hope” in the context of the human dignity category. The study provides an overview of approaches to the definition of human dignity in national legal doctrine and practice, a historical and legal analysis of the origins of legal regulation of the idea of ​​respect for human dignity in international legal acts, and analyses the constitutional stages of the evolution of this concept as a matter of international law. The author has reviewed the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on this issue and studied the reasons of the Court on setting standards for acceptable treatment of a person through the lenses of human dignity and the inadmissibility of inhuman and degrading offences. Taking into account these standards, a critical assessment has been carried out, in particular, of the judicial practice of the Federal Republic of Germany on the application to a prisoner of such a type of punishment as preventive detention with indefinite duration. Emphasis has been given to the national judicial practice in cases of possible releasing life-sentenced prisoners in the conclusions of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court and the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on this issue. Based on the results of the study, a set of measures, including amending the legislation to bring it in line with the requirements of European human rights standards to protect human dignity and ensure the “right to hope” has been offered.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Barnert ◽  
Natascha Doll

On January 15th 1958, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court - FCC) pronounced a judgement deemed to be a prime example for the Court's early jurisprudence concerning the scope of fundamental rights in Germany: The Court's famous “Lüth”-decision resulted from a constitutional complaint brought by Erich Lüth, former member of the Hamburg senate.* In the early 1950s, Lüth had called upon film distributors and the public to boycott Veit Harlan's tearjerker movie Unsterbliche Geliebte (Immortal Beloved). Cause for his appeal was Harlan's prominent role in the Nazi propaganda machinery as Goebbels' protégé and director of the movie Jud Süss in 1940, which counts as one of the worst anti-semitic films released during the Nazi regime. After having lost several civil lawsuits, Lüth asserted the violation of constitutional rights. Over six years later, he was to be proved correct: The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lüth's complaint was covered by the right to freedom of speech guaranteed in Art. 5 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Court stated that the fundamental rights as laid down in the Grundgesetz are not only of importance as subjective rights protecting the individual against state intrusions on the private sphere. As a whole they also unfold an objective dimension in representing society's crucial values. Therefore, they govern the entire legal order - including civil law and private law relations! This was indeed understood as a staggering conclusion with which the Court went far beyond the issue at stake. Since Lüth, German legal discourse characterizes this phenomenon as the third-party or horizontal effect of basic rights (Drittwirkung).


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