Law and International Relations: An Essay on Possible Theoretical Solutions for the Economic Consequences to Brazil Resulting from the Monetary Policy Adopted by the United States During the Height of the International Financial Crisis in 2008

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandre Coelho
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 110-138
Author(s):  
Francisco J. Buera ◽  
Juan Pablo Nicolini

We study a model with heterogeneous producers that face collateral and cash-in-advance constraints. A tightening of the collateral constraint results in a credit-crunch-generated recession that reproduces some features of the financial crisis that unraveled in 2007 in the United States. We use the model to study the effects, following a credit crunch, of alternative monetary and fiscal policies. (JEL E31, E44, E52, E62, G01, H63)


Author(s):  
Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich

AbstractThe two Great Crises occurred in times of very different international political relations. While they were conditioned by some different economic circumstances, they also display many common characteristics. From comparing such similarities one might deduce the causes of Great Crises and develop policy concepts for protecting economies against such breakdowns. This article limits the comparison mainly to developments in the United States, where both Great Crises originated. It sets the scene with some general remarks on the recent financial crisis, its timing, and some of its economic consequences in comparison to those of the 1930s′ crisis. It then takes stock of the classical-liberal laissez-faire setting that the Republicans in power during the New Era of the 1920s created for business to thrive in. This setting is remarkably similar to the blueprint of neo-liberal policies that were set in motion in the second half of the 1970s and have led up to the recent Great Crisis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 542-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek J. Harmon

This study investigates what happens when a prominent leader explicitly reaffirms the taken-for-granted assumptions underlying an institution. While such efforts are usually made to reinforce the institution, I theorize that they actually destabilize the institution and create collective uncertainty by reopening the very considerations that people take for granted. Using speeches made by the chair of the United States Federal Reserve from 1998 to 2014, I demonstrate that reaffirming the taken-for-granted assumptions underlying the monetary policy framework creates uncertainty in the broader financial market. This market reaction is also influenced by emotions present at the time of the speech that shape how the event is interpreted. Speeches conveyed in an overall more positive tone suppress this reaction, while more fear in the business media amplifies it. Moreover, supplementary analyses conducted on speeches during the financial crisis suggest that when the taken-for-grantedness of these assumptions has weakened, reaffirming them no longer creates uncertainty to the same extent. This study expands our understanding of the consequences of communication in market contexts, raises important questions about the trade-offs between public transparency and market stability, and contributes new insights to research on the cognitive and emotional microfoundations of institutions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. e59052
Author(s):  
Gabriel Barbosa de Castilho

Há um consenso na academia em atribuir a causa da crise internacional de 2008 ao processo de financeirização da economia dos Estados Unidos. Esta pesquisa considera esse entendimento correto, porém insuficiente para entender com profundidade como a crise impactou a economia mundial e o sistema interestatal. O objetivo deste trabalho é fugir do “nacionalismo metodológico” que permeia essa visão e entender a crise de 2008 como uma crise da conjuntura da economia-mundo capitalista. Seguindo a análise dos Sistemas-Mundo, o artigo é iniciado com o estudo da atual conjuntura, de expansão financeira do ciclo sistêmico estadunidense, que deve ser entendida através dos processos complementares de financeirização econômica e reestruturação produtiva mundial. Em um segundo momento, a pesquisa se volta para entender como esses dois processos construíram um “eixo sino-americano de acumulação”. Finalmente, entende-se que, apesar da aparente simbiose dessa relação, ela apresenta um desequilíbrio estrutural que originou a crise de 2008.Palavras-chave: Crise Financeira Internacional de 2008; China; Estados Unidos.ABSTRACTThere is a consensus in academia to attribute the cause of the 2008 international crisis to the financialization process of the United States’ economy. This research considers this understanding correct, but insufficient for a deep understanding of the crisis’ impact in the world economy and in the interstate system. This research aims to escape the “methodological nacionalism” that permeates this vision, understanding the 2008 crisis as a crisis in the conjuncture of the capitalist world-economy. Following the World-Systems Analysis, this research starts with the study of the current conjuncture, the financial expansion of the American systemic cycle of accumulation, which must be understood through the complementary processes of economic financialization and world productive restructure. In a second step, the research turns to understand how these two processes built a “Sino-American axis of accumulation”. Finally, it is understood that, despite the apparent symbiosis of this relationship, it presents a structural imbalance that originated the 2008 crisis.Keywords: 2008 International Financial Crisis; China; United States. Recebido em: 10/04/2021 | Aceito em: 17/07/2021. 


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


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