Rational Voter Responses to the 2018 Trade War: Evidence From the 2018 U.S. House of Representatives Elections

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang Hoon Kong
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Trade War ◽  
Rational Voter

Post-US-midterm dynamic could ease China trade spat

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Immediate Release ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Telephone Conversation ◽  
China Trade ◽  
Midterm Elections ◽  
Trade War ◽  
High Level

Significance This follows high-level China-US trade talks restarting after a November 1 Trump-Xi telephone conversation, November 6’s US midterm elections that delivered a Democrat-majority House of Representatives from January 2019 and US-China trade-related frictions at the APEC Summit (November 15-17) preventing a joint communique’s immediate release. These frictions have sparked fears of a US-China ‘trade war’, or worse, and what scenarios and drivers might see this avoided. Impacts China may eye further trade renegotiations with the next US president, from 2021 or 2025. Democrats would want any trade deal to include human rights and environmental protections; Beijing would certainly resist the former. China might offer intellectual property concessions on paper, since there are multiple ways to circumvent such restrictions. Trump could sell a ‘partial’ deal politically, but he may calculate that ‘China-the-adversary’ rhetoric will win more 2020 votes.

Silence of the Land: On the Historical Irrelevance of Territory to Congressional Districting and Political Representation in the United States

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Rehfeld
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Representative Government ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
Communities Of Interest

Every ten years, the United States “constructs” itself politically. On a decennial basis, U.S. Congressional districts are quite literally drawn, physically constructing political representation in the House of Representatives on the basis of where one lives. Why does the United States do it this way? What justifies domicile as the sole criteria of constituency construction? These are the questions raised in this article. Contrary to many contemporary understandings of representation at the founding, I argue that there were no principled reasons for using domicile as the method of organizing for political representation. Even in 1787, the Congressional district was expected to be far too large to map onto existing communities of interest. Instead, territory should be understood as forming a habit of mind for the founders, even while it was necessary to achieve other democratic aims of representative government.

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