Supply Network Linkages and CEO Compensation Contracts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lok-Si Ieong ◽  
Shawn Thomas ◽  
YiLin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Supply Network ◽  
Compensation Contracts

Board Committee Overlap and the Use of Earnings in CEO Compensation Contracts

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Ellen Carter ◽  
Luann J. Lynch ◽  
Melissa A. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Implicit Relation ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Potential Alternative ◽  
Larger Sample

Using proxy statement data describing the terms of compensation contracts, we examine how overlapping membership between compensation and audit committees influences the use of earnings metrics in compensation. Although research predicts that such overlap could either increase or decrease the reliance on earnings, we find that firms with overlapping directors rely less on earnings-based performance measures in incentive contracts without altering the overall level of performance-contingent cash bonuses. In addition, we provide evidence that firms substitute earnings measures with measures less subject to earnings management. Our findings are robust to potential alternative explanations, extend to an implicit relation between earnings and compensation for a larger sample, and are not driven by the tendency toward an overlapping committee structure more broadly. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

Geographic and Industrial Corporate Diversification: The Level and Structure of Executive Compensation

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Augustine Duru ◽  
David M. Reeb
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Performance Criteria ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Geographic Diversification ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Industrial Diversification ◽  
Diversification Strategies ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
And Performance

We explore the relation between corporate diversification and CEO compensation. We document that geographic diversification provides a compensation premium, while industrial diversification is associated with lower levels of CEO pay. We also examine the effect of corporate diversification on the structure and performance criteria of CEO compensation contracts. We find that both diversification strategies are associated with a greater use of incentive-based compensation and with a greater reliance on market-based, rather than accounting-based measures of firm performance. Finally, we address the question of whether shareholders reward CEOs for corporate diversification. We document that while value-enhancing geographic diversification is rewarded, non-value-enhancing industrial diversification is penalized.

scholarly journals Investor protection and CEO compensation in family firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Bozzi ◽  
Roberto Barontini ◽  
Ivan Miroshnychenko
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Institutional Context ◽  
Rent Extraction ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Relationship

This paper investigates the relationship between investor protection and CEO pay in family-controlled corporations. Using a panel of 986 firm-year observations from 11 EU countries, we show that the lower the investor protection, the higher the compensation of the CEO. The sensitivity of pay to the institutional context is higher for a family CEO than a professional CEO, a result that corroborates the hypothesis that CEO compensation contracts in family firms are influenced by familiar connections. Overall, these results are more consistent with the hypothesis of rent extraction than with the perspective of optimal remuneration contracts.

scholarly journals Geographical relationships and CEO compensation contracts

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junli Yu ◽  
Wei Xu ◽  
Ping Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Compensation Contracts

scholarly journals Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation: The Peer Effects of Say on Pay

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (7) ◽  
pp. 3130-3173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane K Denis ◽  
Torsten Jochem ◽  
Anjana Rajamani
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Peer Effects ◽  
Web Site ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Peer Groups ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Say On Pay ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Published Paper

Abstract We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers’ compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely with their weak-vote peers in the executive labor market, and when those peers perform well. Reductions occur following peers’ disclosures of revised pay and are proportional to those needed to retain firms’ relative positions in their peer groups. We conclude that the spillover effects of shareholder voting occur through both learning and compensation targeting channels. (JEL G34, G38, J38, M12, M52) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

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